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Busing, Timetables, Goals, and Ratios:
Touchstones of Equal Opportunity
Hon. Gerald W. Heaney*
INTRODUCTION
Powerful voices in the land are calling for an end to affirm-
ative action as a means of achieving equality of opportunity for
black Americans in education and employment. These voices
decry, in particular, the use of '%using" as a tool to integrate
schools and the use of "goals, timetables, and ratios" to achieve
equality in employment. Many in the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government hear the voices and are per-
suaded. Others who hear and reject the siren call are unwilling
to speak. The black community itself is divided.
This Article examines in detail the history of discrimina-
tion against blacks in employment and education in the Eighth
Circuit and concludes that race-conscious remedies are still nec-
essary if discrimination and its effects are to be eliminated.
Part I reviews the early history of slavery and traces the story
of that evil institution from 1719, when the first slaves were
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. I ex-
press my gratitude to my secretaries, Elda E. Ignatius and Mary L. Bibbey, and
to my law clerks, Louis P. Smith, Edward T. Wahl, Gary R. Ostos-Irwin, and
Dean A. Rindy for their assistance in research and writing.
This Article is dedicated to the memory of the late Judge Jacob Trieber,
United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas from 1900 to
1927. A pilgrim in the cause of equal opportunity for blacks, Judge Trieber
was the first judge to hold that discrimination against blacks in employment is
illegal. United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903). One year later, in
Hodges v. United States (unreported, 1904), Judge Trieber reaffirmed this po-
sition by upholding the United States's power to prosecute several individuals
who forced eight blacks to quit their jobs at a local sawmill by threatening
them with great bodily harm. The United States Supreme Court reversed, 203
U.S. 1 (1906), and decades of discrimination followed.
Judge Trieber was born in Germany in 1853 and immigrated with his par-
ents to St. Louis, Missouri, sometime after 1865. In 1868, he and his parents
moved to Helena, Arkansas, where he became a leader in business, Republican
politics, and the law. In 1900, he was appointed United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of Arkansas by President McKinley, a position in
which he served with great distinction until his death in 1927.
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brought to the Eighth Circuit states, to the Emancipation Proc-
lamation. It notes the short-lived gains made by blacks during
the brief period of Reconstruction and shows how those gains
were eliminated by a series of Supreme Court decisions, by Jim
Crow laws, and by congressional and executive inaction in the
face of blatant discrimination and racism.
Part II reviews the historic decisions of the Supreme Court
and of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that held
that black Americans had suffered discrimination as a class. It
notes the vigorous resistance to the decisions and concludes
that courts were compelled to become increasingly specific with
respect to remedies. Only with specificity by the courts, and
only after Congress had passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, did
blacks begin to receive decent educations and to have opportu-
nities to work in jobs from which they had been excluded for
more than 250 years.
Part III studies the reaction that is increasingly evident,
both within government and without, as blacks begin to com-
pete with whites in the job market and as white students are
increasingly left with the alternatives of attending either inte-
grated public schools or private academies. A few members of
the academic community have provided the intellectual under-
pinnings for this reaction by arguing that race-based remedies
offend the Constitution by preferring black Americans to white
Americans. They have popularized this reaction by focusing on
the most effective techniques used to desegregate schools (bus-
ing) and to open job opportunities (goals, timetables, and ra-
tios). This Article concludes that if American society is to
preserve its democracy, there is no alternative but to continue
the efforts to eliminate racism and to renew the commitment to
those techniques that are beginning to bring equality of oppor-
tunity to black Americans.
I. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
A. SLAVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1719-1874
The roots of racial discrimination in the states that now
constitute the Eighth Circuit1 can be traced to the introduction
of slaves in Missouri in 1719.2 Although slaves were held in
1. These states are Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Dakota, and South Dakota.
2. 2 L. HOUCK, A HISTORY OF MISSOURI FROM THE EARLIEST EXPLORA.
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much of the Eighth Circuit from 1719 to 1865, slavery grew
most rapidly in the Circuit's two slave states of Arkansas and
Missouri. 3 By 1860, slaves comprised 25.6% of the population of
Arkansas and 10.0% of the population of Missouri.4
Even before the region became United States territory, its
law lent support to racial discrimination. In 1724, Louis XV of
France issued the Code Noir, the first slave code for the colony
of Louisiana, a vast area that included Arkansas and Missouri.5
Although less severe than the state codes that followed it, the
Code placed the full force and effect of the law behind racial
discrimination. Under the Code, slaves were prohibited from
leaving the master's plantation without a pass, carrying arms,
assembling unlawfully, assaulting their masters, owning prop-
erty, engaging in business, or marrying.6 Not only were slaves
subject to severe punishment for violations of the Code,7 they
were not allowed to prevent the sale or abuse of themselves or
TIONS AND SETrLEmNT5 UNTIL THE ADMISSION OF THE STATE INTO THE UNION
240 (1974); cf. 0. TAYLOR, NEGRO SLAVERY IN ARKANSAS 3 (1958) (stating that
slaves were first brought to Arkansas in 1720); Violette, The Black Code in
Missouri,. 6 Miss. VALLEY HisT. A. PROC. 287, 288 (1913) (suggesting that the
first black slaves were brought to Missouri in 1735). See generally H.
TREXLER, SLAVERY IN MIssOURI 1804-1865 (32 Johns Hopkins U. Stud. in Hist.
& Pol. Sri. No. 2, 1914) (discussing the nature and development of slavery in
Missouri); Sampson & Breckenridge, Bibliography of Slavery and Civil Wvar
in Missouri, 2 Mo. HIST. REV. 233.
3. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, NEGRO POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
1790-1915, 57 (1918) [hereinafter cited as NEGRO POPULATION]. For Iowa. the
high point of slavery came in 1840, when 16 slaves lived in the state. Id.; see
also Pelzer, The Negro and Slavery in Early Iowa, 2 IOWA J. HIST. & PoL 471
(1904) (discussing slavery in Iowa). For Nebraska, the peak came in 1860, when
the census reported 15 slaves. NEGRO POPULATION, supra, at 57. For Minne-
sota, the census never reported any slaves. See id. Studies on black slaves in
Minnesota, however, report that a few slaves were held in the state. Appel,
Slavery in Minnesota, 5 MINN. HIST. BULL. 40, 40-43 (1923); Spangler, The Ne-
gro In Minnesota, in 20 PAPERS READ BEFORE THE HIsT. & SCI. SOC'Y OF MAN.
ITOBA SERIES III 13, 19 (1965). The census bureau reported no blacks, slave or
free, in North or South Dakota before the Civil War, NEGRO POPULATION.
supra, at 57, and there are apparently no works on slavery in either state.
4. There were 111,115 black slaves in Arkansas and 114,931 black slaves
in Missouri. NEGRO POPULATION, supra note 3, at 57. Only a minority of fami-
lies in each state actually owned slaves. Id. at 56.
5. 0. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 14-17; Violette, supra note 2, at 288.
6. Violette, supra note 2, at 288-301; see also Gregley v. Jackson, 38 Ark.
487, 490 (1882) ("There were no valid marriages amongst [the slaves] .... );
0. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 64 (". . . the slave had no legal right even to the
clothes on his back .... [Hie could make no valid contract, nor could he
either sue or be sued.").
7. See generally G. STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAV-
ERY (2d ed. 1856) (Ist ed. 1827).
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their family members.8 They were denied education, in prac-
tice if not by force of law,9 and in general were given the mini-
mum in housing, clothing, food, and medical care.10 The basic
contours of the Code Noir remained in effect in Arkansas and
Missouri until the 1820's and 1830's, when both states entered
the union as slave states."'
Increasing racism 1 2 and defensiveness against northern ab-
olitionists, however, led Missouri and Arkansas to strengthen
their slave codes between 1820 and 1865.13 Amendments re-
stricted association among slaves, travel without a pass, engag-
ing in any business without a license, and obtaining an
education. 14 New laws strengthened the power of citizen pa-
trols established to enforce the codes, 15 and the penalties for vi-
8. Id. at 82; see also Merrill v. Dawson, 17 F. Cas. 86, 104 (C.C.D. Ark.
1846) (No. 9469) (offspring of slaves belong to owner of the mother), aff'd sub
nom. Fowler v. Merrill, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 375, 396 (1850).
9. 0. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 187-88; H. TREXLER, supra note 2, at 83-84.
See generally H. BOND, THE EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN SO-
CIAL ORDER 21 (1966) (estimating that by 1860 "in the slave states, hardly
more than 5% of the Negro population [slave or free] possessed the simplest
tools of learning"); G. STROUD, supra note 7, at 133-45 (detailing denial of edu-
cation to blacks in slave states); C. WOODSON, THE EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO
PRIOR TO 1861, 151-78 (1919) (detailing opposition to education of blacks).
10. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 27-28 (1976); 0. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at
131-49; see also G. STROUD, supra note 7, at 16 (detailing the minimal legal re-
quirements, if any, to provide slaves with food and clothing).
11. Violette, supra note 2, at 302. See generally Trexler, supra note 2:
Trieber, Legal Status of Negroes in Arkansas Before the Civil War, 3 ARK.
HIST. A. 175-83 (1911).
12. One commentator stated: "Basic to slavery in the South-and only in
the South, for this was not true elsewhere in the world or in history-was the
firm conviction that the Negro belonged to another and inferior species." M.
KONViTz, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 11 (1961). One standard history text-
book describes the growth of the racist justification of slavery: "Never before
had the justification of human bondage been presented with so much moral
fervor and in such elaborate detail as in the antebellum South." J. BLUM, E.
MORGAN, W. ROSE, A. SCHLESINGER JR., K. STAMPP & C. WOODWARD, TIlE NA-
TIONAL EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES TO 1877, 256 (3d ed.
1973) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL EXPERIENCE]; see also G. MYRDAL, AN
AMERICAN DILEMMA 83-112 (1962) (studying the development of racist beliefs
among the white population); T. WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 13-
42 (1965) (describing the changing attitude of the white population toward
slaves and free blacks).
13. Trieber, supra note 11, at 178-79; Violette, supra note 2, at 310-16.
14. Trieber, supra note 11, at 178-79; Violette, supra note 2, at 305-16. The
main sections of the antebellum slave code of Arkansas may be found at ARK.
STAT. ch. 153, §§ 1-64 (1848).
15. 0. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 209-11; Trieber, supra note 11, at 177
("[T]he patrol was authorized to inflict summarily, without the judgement of
any court or magistrate, not exceeding twenty lashes on any slave .. ").
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olations of the codes were increased.' 6 Under the amendments,
whites could be imprisoned if they traded or associated with
blacks or even suggested that blacks were not racially
inferior.' 7
During this time, the Missouri and Arkansas legislatures
also passed some of the most hostile laws in the nation restrict-
ing free blacks.' 8 Free blacks could not vote, serve on juries,
testify against whites, or keep guns.' 9 A mosaic of laws re-
stricted, and in some instances eliminated, both educational 2o
and employment 2' opportunities. By 1847, both Missouri and
Arkansas had laws prohibiting the entrance of free blacks into
16. Trieber, supra note 11, at 179-80; Violette, supra note 2, at 306.
17. M. KoNvrZ supra note'12, at 6-7, 11-12; cf. T. STAPLEs, RECONSTRUC-
TION IN ARKANSAS, 1862-74, 333 (109 Colum. U. Stud. in Hist., Econ. & Pub. L.
1923) (noting that after the war, claims by whites that blacks were their equals
led to "a storm of protest and vitruperation"). See generally G. STROUD, supra
note 7, at 248-56 (detailing laws prohibiting speech or publication by whites
that promotes equality or questions white supremacy).
18. 0. TAYLOR, supra note" 2, at 237-58; Trieber, supra note 11, at 178-79,
181-82; Violette, supra note 2, at 307-16.
19. E.g., ARK. CONST. of 1861, art. II, § 21 (only "free white men" and Indi-
ans had the right to keep and bear arms); id. art. IV, § 2 (1861) (only "free
white male citizen[s] of the Confederate States of America" had the right to
vote); MO. CONST. of 1820, art. Ill, § 10 ("every free white male citizen" has the
right to vote); 0. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 253-55; Trieber, supra note 11, at
176-83; Violette, supra note 2, at 310-15 (free blacks needed a license to own a
gun in Missouri). For numerous other denials of rights to free blacks in Ar-
kansas by 1861, see the 1861 Arkanias Constitution, which limits its entire bill
of rights, including the right to trial by jury and the right to counsel, to "free
white men." See ARK. CONST. OF 1861, art. II.
20. See, eg., G. STROUD, supra note 7, at 133-45; 0. TAYLOR, supra note 2,
at 187; H. TREXLER, supra note 2, at 83; C. WOODSON, supra note 9, at 151-78;
Violette, supra note 2, at 314.
21. See generally C. WESLEY, NEGRO LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850-
1925, 69-86 (1927) (detailing employment restrictions on free blacks).
From an early date, both Arkansas and Missouri required free blacks to
have a license and to pay a bond just to remain in the state. 0. TAYLOR, supra
note 2, at 244-45; Violette, supra note. 2, at 311-14. A free black who moved
from one county to another haa to reregister. Violette, supra note 2, at 312.
These licensing laws were often used to prevent free black artisans from com-
peting with white labor. See C. GREENE & C. WOODSON, THE NEGRO WAGE
EARNER 15-16 (1930).
The early slave code in the Arkansas and Missouri territories prohibited
free blacks from selling anything to slaves on the Mississippi River. Violette,
supra note 2, at 309. An Arkansas law prohibited the hiring of any free black
in or about any place selling liquor, including employment such as sweeping or
bringing in water. Trieber, supra note 11, at 180. Another Arkansas act pro-
hibited captains and owners of steamboats from employing free blacks on their
boats. Id. at 182. In 1843, Missouri passed a law fining anyone who would hire
or harbor a free black. Violette, supra note 2, at 313. For general discussions
of the wide range of such statutes in the South, see C. WESLEY, supra, at 81-83,
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the state, and any free black who wished to remain in the state
had to obtain a license and pay a bond.22 A Missouri law of
1859 placed a wide range of restrictions on free blacks and pro-
vided for summary trials without juries for blacks who could
not prove that they had legally entered the state before 1847.23
Although fewer free blacks resided in Arkansas in 1850 than in
any slave state other than Texas,24 a bill was introduced in Ar-
kansas that year to expel what the Arkansas State Democrat
called "this worse than useless population. '25 The bill was nar-
rowly defeated, chiefly because a majority of the legislators be-
lieved that free blacks were citizens of the United States and
therefore had a right to remain in Arkansas.26
This barrier was removed by the decision in Dred Scott v.
Sandford,27 in which the United States Supreme Court, 28 af-
firming a district court of the Eighth Circuit,29 ruled that
blacks, free or slave, were not citizens of the United States.30
Chief Justice Taney placed the Court's imprimatur on racism
when he wrote that blacks were "beings of an inferior order,
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in
social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect .... ,,31
and T. WILSON, supra note 12, at 38-41 (noting prohibitions on free blacks own-
ing shops or hawking goods).
In Arkansas and Missouri, free blacks between the ages of 7 and 20 (Mis-
souri) or 21 (Arkansas) were hired out as apprentices, apparently without any
choice of the area of apprenticeship. They were forbidden to work side by side
with whites, so their opportunities were limited. Trieber, supra note 11, at
179; Violette, supra note 2, at 312-13. An 1859 Arkansas act further provided
that the proceeds of the free black's apprenticeship would be used to ship the
free black out of the state after age 21 on threat of sale into slavery. Trieber,
supra note 11, at 181. Free blacks could be hired out into temporary enslave-
ment for failure to pay fines, the license bond, or taxes. Trieber, supra note
11, at 179; Violette, supra note 2, at 312. Laws in some southern states also
permitted hiring out to satisfy private judgments. T. WILSON, supra note 12, at
38-40.
22. 0. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 244-45; Violette, supra note 2, at 313-14.
23. Violette, supra note 2, at 314-15.
24. NEGRO POPULATION, supra note 3, at 57.
25. 0. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 255.
26. Id.
27. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
28. Id.
29. The case was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the district of Missouri, then brought up by writ of error to the
Supreme Court. There is no published lower court opinion. Catterall, Some
Antecedents of the Dred Scott Case, 30 AM. HisT. REV. 56, 70 (1925).
30. 60 U.S. at 406-23.
31. Id. at 407. The courts of Arkansas and Missouri endorsed such racism
[Vol. 69:735
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Spurred on by this decision, a committee of prominent Ar-
kansas citizens called for the expulsion of the "free Negro so
worthless and depraved an animal," characterized by "immoral-
ity, filth, and laziness."32 The Arkansas legislature promptly
complied, enacting a bill ordering all free blacks under seven
and over twenty-one out of the state on threat of sale into slav-
ery.33 Free blacks between seven and twenty-one were to be
hired out to-the highest bidder and then, after age twenty-one,
shipped out of the state.34 Further manumission of slaves was
also prohibited. The extent to which the law was enforced is
unclear; in any event, its operation was suspended a year later
when Arkansas joined the Confederacy.35
On September 23, 1862, President Abraham Lincoln an-
nounced the Emancipation Proclamation, which freed the ap-
proximately four million slaves held in the Confederate
states.36 Although the proclamation applied to Arkansas, a
Confederate state, and not to Missouri, a Union state,3 the
postwar developments pertaining to blacks in each state were
the same year. See, for example, Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509, 512 (1844), in
which the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an 1843
Arkansas law prohibiting free blacks from entering the state by holding that
free blacks were not citizens of the United States. The court said in dicta:
"The two races, differing as they do in complexion, habits, conformation and
intellectual endowments, could not nor ever will live together upon terms of
social or political equality. A higher than human power has so ordered it
... ." In an 1859 ruling, the court gave further insight into its view: "Slavery
... has its foundation in an inferiority of race. There is a striking difference
between the black and white man, in intellect, feelings and principles. In the
order of providence, the former was made inferior to the latter;, and hence the
bondage of the one to the other." Ewell v. Tidwell, 20 Ark. 136, 144 (1859)
(emphasis in original).
For an example of a Missouri case along the same line, see Douglass v.
Ritchie, 24 Mo. 177, 180 (1857) (Slaves are "things," not "persons." 'They (are]
not the subjects of civil rights, and of course [are] incapable of owning prop-
erty or contracting legal obligations; they and all that appertained to them [be-
long] to their master, and they [are] under his dominion.") (emphasis in
original.)
32. 0. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 256. The committee of prominent citizens
included two future governors, one of whom was an Arkansas Supreme Court
justice at the time.
33. I& at 257.
34. I&
35. Id. at 257-58.
36. NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 12, at 344-45.
37. I& Missouri, bitterly divided between unionists and confederates, sent
30,000 troops to the Confederate Army and representatives to the Confederate
government, but it remained officially a union state. Id at 328.
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similar. Missouri freed its 115,000 slaves on January 12, 1865.38
From 1865 to 1866 most former slave states either enacted
new black codes or kept in force prewar codes designed to dis-
criminate.39 Arkansas and Missouri did not enact new black
codes in 1865 or 1866, but substantial portions of the states' re-
strictive prewar codes remained in effect until 1867 and 1868.40
Congress responded to this de jure racial discrimination by
passing twelve civil rights laws and proposing the thirteenth,
fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution.41
The Civil Rights Act of 1866,42 perhaps the most far-reaching of
the reconstruction-era acts, overturned Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford43 and guaranteed blacks the protections of citizenship and
the "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens."44 The Act provided for federal enforcement and "pun-
ished private persons or officials who obstructed its
execution. '45 From 1872 to 1875, Congress debated a powerful
civil rights bill intended to assure full equality for blacks, in-
38. Williams, The Development of the Negro Public School System in Mis-
souri, 5 J. NEGRO HIST. 137, 138 (1920).
39. T. WILSON, supra note 12, at 61-115.
Blacks were forced to attend segregated schools. See, e.g., MO. CONST. of
1865, art. IX, § 2 (allowing separate schools); Mo. GEN. STAT. ch. 46, § 20 (1866)
(requiring separate schools); Mo. GEN. STAT. ch. 48, § 13 (1866) (same). Inter-
marriage was forbidden. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 6, 1867, No. 32, § 2, 1866-1867
Ark. Stat. 98, 99 (prohibiting interracial marriage); see also B. REAMS, JR. & P.
WILSON, SEGREGATION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT IN THE STATES: A
SURVEY OF STATE SEGREGATION LAWS 1865-1953, 353-54 (1975) (prepared for
the United States Supreme Court in re Brown v. Board of Education of To-
peka) (noting that interracial marriage or sexual relations was prohibited in
Missouri before the Civil War). In Arkansas and other states, blacks convicted
of misdemeanors could be leased out to counties. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. §§ 2049,
2060, 2071 (1921).
40. W. PARRISH, MISSOURI UNDER RADICAL RULE, 1865-1870, 106-39
(1965); T. WILSON, supra note 12, at 61-115.
41. M. BERGER, EQUALITY BY STATUTE: THE REVOLUTION IN CIVIL RIGHTS
6-8 (1967); see also M. KONVITZ, supra note 12, at 41-70 (detailing postwar
amendments and civil rights legislation). In 1865, the first of twelve civil
rights laws created the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands,
commonly known as the Freedmen's Bureau. NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra
note 12, at 359. In its five years of operation, it spent $3.5 million to help open
4239 schools for southern blacks, employing 9307 teachers and instructing
247,333 pupils (only about 6% of the former slave population). H. BOND, supra
note 9, at 29.
42. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1982)).
43. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
44. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
45. M. BERGER, supra note 41, at 6.
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cluding the elimination of school segregation.46 The original in-
tent of the bill, however, "was frustrated by the ambiguous
racial views of Republican moderates and by Northern opin-
ion."47 As finally passed in 1875, the bill declared that "all per-
sons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommoda-
tions, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public con-
veyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public
amusement,"48 and forbade the exclusion of blacks from jury
duty.49 Inadequate enforcement provisions weakened the law,
however, and its meaning was rendered unclear when Senator
Sumner's proposal for school integration was quietly dropped.5°
The Radical Republicans, who controlled the governments
in Arkansas and Missouri, enacted a number of statutory and
constitutional provisions to complement the federal civil rights
laws.51 Although black children attended white schools in
46. NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 12, at 377; Kelly, T77e Congres-
sional Controversy over School Segregation, 1867-1875, 64 A?& HIST. REv. 537,
548-63 (1959).
47. NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 12, at 377.
48. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 44-
45 (1946), superceded in 1948 at 62 Stat. 683, 696, 863, codified at 18 US.C. § 243
(1982)). In 1873, Arkansas had adopted a similar civil rights law. See iijfra
note 51.
49. M. BERGER, supra note 41, at 7.
50. NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 12, at 377; see also Kelly, supra
note 46, at 562-63 (commenting that the new law had little meaning without
the integrated school clause).
51. Compare ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. I, §§ 1-25 (granting protections to
"all persons" or all "citizens") with AnK. CONST. of 1861, art. H, §§ 1-21 (grant-
ing protections only to "free white men"). See also T. WILSON, supra note 12,
at 114-15 (describing an 1867 Arkansas "[a]ct to declare the rights of persons of
African descent," which provided that the laws of Arkansas were applicable to
all persons without distinction of race or color with five exceptions: blacks
could not marry or have sexual relations with whites, vote at elections, serve
on juries, attend school with whites, or serve in the militia); ARK. DIG. STAT.
§§ 578-593 (1903) (enacted 1873 Ark. Acts 15) (broad civil rights bill prohibiting
discrimination by private actors in a wide range of facilities but containing
meager enforcement provisions). This latter law was apparently never en-
forced after the conservatives regained control in 1874. It is not cited in any
Arkansas case and was repealed in 1907. Act of May 13, 1907, act 303, 1907
Ark. Acts 728.
Similar developments occurred in Missouri. See W. PARRISH, supra note
40, at 106-38. Radical Republicans passed a number of laws aimed at creating
some degree of equality for blacks. See, e.g., MO. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 1 (giv-
ing equal right to enjoyment of basic civil rights for "all men"); id. art. I, § 2
(prohibiting slavery); id art. I, § 3 ('"hat no person can, on account of color,
be disqualified as a witness; or be disabled to contract... or be subjected, in
law, to any other restraints or disqualifications in regard to any personal rights
.... "); Mo. St. Convention, Ordinance to Protect Emancipated Negroes from
1985]
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some counties in Missouri during Reconstruction, 52 a bill that
would have integrated all the schools of the state was defeated
in the state legislature.5 3 By 1868, both Missouri54 and Arkan-
sas55 had statutes requiring segregated schools. At least during
early Reconstruction, these laws contemplated separate but
equal schools, 56 but by the end of Reconstruction, black schools
were already unequal and there was growing evidence that the
cost of two separate school systems was unacceptably high.57
During the next eighty years, the school segregation laws gave
Apprenticeship (January 12, 1865), in J. MO. ST. CONVENTION 282 (1865)
(prohibiting apprenticeship or bounding out of blacks "except in pursuance of
such laws as the General Assembly of this State may hereafter enact"). See
generally W. PARRISH, supra note 40, at 106-38 (describing the situation of
blacks in postwar Missouri). In 1867, in response to discrimination against
blacks on public conveyances and elsewhere, a comprehensive civil rights bill
was proposed in the MIlissouri legislature. W. PARRISH, supra note 40, at 112.
One of its proponents, Issac H. Sturgeon, President of the North Missouri Rail-
road, argued that allowing blacks to ride in street cars would soon wear away
prejudice against blacks. Id. The bill, however, was defeated. Moreover,
when the conservatives regained control, they successfully proposed a new
constitution that did not contain the civil rights provisions of the previous con-
stitution. Compare Mo. CONST. of 1865, art. I, §§ 1 & 3 (state bill of rights pro-
tections extended without regard to race) with Mo. CONST. of 1875, art. II
(these provisions are eliminated).
52. Williams, supra note 38, at 147.
53. Id Louisiana, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and South Carolina passed
statutory or constitutional provisions prohibiting segregated schools. See LA.
CONST. of 1864, art. 141; S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. X, § 10; 1864 Minn. Laws ch.
IV; 1866 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 609. These laws were not enforced, however, and
South Carolina and Louisiana changed their laws to require the segregation
that had already developed in practice. LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 248; S.C.
CONST. art. XI, § 7 (1895).
54. See Mo. GEN. STAT. ch. 46, § 20 (1866); id. at ch. 48, § 13.
55. See Act of Feb. 6, 1867, No. 35, § 5, 1866-1867 Ark. Acts 98, 100.
56. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. of 1865, art. IX, § 2 (school funds to be appropri-
ated without regard to color). See generally Williams, supra note 38 (discuss-
ing the black public school system in Missouri from 1865 to 1915).
57. Williams, supra note 38, at 147-52. In 1873, the Missouri cities, towns,
and villages that reported schools for blacks reported an average monthly sal-
ary of $87.72 for male teachers and $46.64 for female teachers in white schools,
while their counterparts in black schools earned an average monthly salary of
$46.70 and $40.00, respectively. Id at 152. Another substantial inequality ex-
isted in counties with fewer than 15 blacks of school age. Until 1874, these
children were generally denied an education, because there were no black
schools and they could not attend white schools. Thereafter, Missouri began to
develop union school concepts that provided segregated education for these
children. Id at 147-48. By the 1870's, many black schools in the South had fa-
cilities equivalent to those for whites. See H. BOND, supra note 9, at 86. The
schools for both races were quite poor. Id at 85-86. The high cost of two sepa-
rate school systems, however, contributed to the crash in enrollment when the
conservatives regained control. See id. at 90 (detailing enrollment decline).
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legitimacy to segregation and discrimination and spawned many
other laws requiring segregation where custom had not already
done so.
B. THE PLEssY ERA: SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, 1874-1954.
1. The Reaction to Reconstruction
By 1875, the postwar civil rights movement had ended.sa
Conservative Democrats returned to power throughout the
South, including Arkansas and Missouri,59 and began to over-
turn Reconstruction-era policies. While all but a few ex-Con-
federates were granted amnesty and enfranchised, blacks were
increasingly disenfranchised through intimidation, poll taxes,
and strict requirements for voting, including literacy and prop-
erty ownership.60 Prosecutions for federal civil rights violations
decreased sharply after the Presidential Compromise of 1876 ef-
fectively transferred enforcement of civil rights laws to the
states.61 The economic depression of the 1870's and 1880's rein-
forced racist reaction to reconstruction-whites everywhere
were unwilling to share social, economic, or educational equal-
ity with blacks.6 2
This reaction was aided by a series of Supreme Court deci-
sions that weakened the Reconstruction-era constitutional
amendments and overturned several sections of the civil rights
laws. In the Slaughter-House Cases,63 the Court limited se-
verely the fourteenth amendment by holding that the amend-
ment's privileges and immunities clause did not protect the
58. NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 12, at 377-78.
59. Id. at 376; T. STAPLES, supra note 17, at 402-41.
60. E. FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES 156-57 (1957); CiTi-
ZENS' COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO OPEN THE DOORS OF
JOB OPPORTUNITY, A PoLIcY OF FAIRNESS AND COMPASSION THAT HAS
WORKED 31 (June 1984) [hereinafter cited as CITIZENS' CobM'N].
61. M. BERGER, supra note 41, at 8 (In 1873, annual federal prosecutions
for violations of the civil rights laws reached a peak of 1,271. By 1878, this
number had dropped to 25.); CITIZENS' ComM'N, supra note 60, at 31.
62. Professor E.F. Frazier describes this reaction as the "rise of the poor
whites." He notes that the emerging industrialists craftily appealed to the ra-
cial prejudice of poor whites to encourage them to vote against the poor
whites' own economic interests. E. FRAZIER, supra note 60, at 156-57, 426-27.
Similarly, Professor Horace Mann Bond notes how, for example, the poor
quality of white schools was blamed on the existence of black schools, rather
than on inadequate funding for both. H. BOND, supra note 9, at 92-115; see also
E. FRAZIER, supra note 60, at 426 ('"The demagogic leaders of the poor whites
attributed their inadequate schools to the fact that money had been wasted in
the education of the Negro.").
63. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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privileges and immunities of state citizenship.64 In United
States v. Cruikshank,65 the Court invalidated an indictment
under section six of the Civil Rights Act of 187066 and held that
the fourteenth amendment did not reach private acts of dis-
crimination.67 In United States v. Harris,68 the Court declared
the criminal conspiracy section of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
187169 unconstitutional. 70
In the Civil Rights Cases,71 one of its most far-reaching de-
cisions, the Court fostered segregation by striking down two
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 that prohibited segre-
gation in places of public accommodation.72 Although the thir-
teenth amendment gave Congress the power to abolish "all
badges and incidents of slavery, '73 the Court held that "social"
discrimination and segregation did not constitute such "badges
64. Id. at 74. Jtistice Field, joined by Chief Justice Chase and Justices
Swayne and Bradley, dissented. Justice Field noted that, since the rights of
national citizenship were already protected by the supremacy clause, U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, the majority opinion improperly rendered the fourteenth
amendment privileges and immunities clause useless:
If this inhibition ... only refers, as held by the majority .... to such
privileges and immunities as were before its adoption specially desig-
nated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to citi-
zens of the United States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which
accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited Congress and
the people on its passage.
83 U.S. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting). Instead, Justice Field noted, the legislative
history and public debates concerning the privileges and immunities clause in-
dicated that the clause was designed to have "profound significance." Id.
(Field, J., dissenting). "[T]he amendment," Justice Field wrote, "refers to the
natural and inalienable rights which belong to all citizens .. " Id. (Field, J.,
dissenting). Justice Bradley and Justice Swayne also wrote long and vigorous
separate dissents.
65. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
66. Id at 548; see Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 140, 141
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982)); United States v. Williams, 341
U.S. 70, 72-82 (1951) (tracing history and discussing scope of 18 U.S.C. § 241).
The Court also concluded that all 16 counts "lack[ed] the certainty and preci-
sion required by the established rules of criminal procedure." Cruikshank, 92
U.S. at 559.
67. See 92 U.S. at 554-55.
68. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
69. REv. ST. § 5519 (1878), reprinted in 3 U.S. COMP. ST. § 5519 (1901) (re-
pealed 1909).
70. 106 U.S. at 635-44.
71. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
72. Id at 8-11. The Court also held that the enforcement powers of § 5 of
the fourteenth amendment reached no further than the state action limits of
§ 1. 109 U.S. at 19.
73. Id. at 20.
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of slavery."74 Justice Harlan, in a dissent that rebutted argu-
ments once again used today against affirmative action, 75 wrote:
It is, I submit, scarcely just to say that the colored race has been the
special favorite of the laws. The statute of 1875, now adjudged to be
unconstitutional, is for the benefit of citizens of every race and color.
What the nation, through Congress, has sought to accomplish in refer-
ence to that race, is-what had already been done in every State of
the Union for the white race-to secure and protect rights belonging
to them as freemen and citizens; nothing more. It was not deemed
enough "to help the feeble up, but to support him after." The one un-
derlying purpose of congressional legislation has been to enable the
black race to take the rank of mere citizens. The difficulty has been
to compel a recognition of the legal right of the black race to take the
rank of citizens, and to secure the enjoyment of privileges belonging,
under the law, to them as a component part of the people for whose
welfare and happiness government is ordained.
76
Justice Harlan's objections, however, were lost on most of
his judicial colleagues. Courts in the Eighth Circuit and
throughout the country quickly joined the majority of the
Supreme Court and held that, although blacks might be enti-
tled to a rough form of equality with whites in principle, they
could not rely on the law to enforce equality in practice. In
Lehew v. Brummell,77 for example, the Missouri Supreme
Court considered white parents' request for an injunction to
prevent four black children from attending white schools. The
court upheld the injunction78 even though the district made no
provision for black students. The black students were thus
forced to travel over three and one-half miles to an adjoining
district, whereas no white student travelled more than two
miles.79 In dicta, the court noted:
There are differences in races... some of which can never be eradi-
74. Id- at 24-25. Eighty-six years later, in Jones v. Alfred H.L Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Court, although not expressly overruling Harris, held
that "Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to
determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority
to translate that determination into effective legislation." Id. at 440-41.
75. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 511.
76. 109 U.S. at 61 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Although Justice Harlan is
often cited as a proponent of the same "color-blind" remedies currently argued
for by Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds, see N.Y. Times,
May 30, 1983, § 1, at 6, col. 1, the majority opinion in the Civil Rights Cases
also takes the view that, in principle, blacks were equal to whites before the
law, 109 U.S. at 25. Unlike Justice Harlan, however, the majority expressed
the view that it is not the role of government to regulate society to further
equal treatment in practice. Id. at 18-19, 22.
77. 103 Mo. 546, 15 S.W. 765 (1891).
78. Id at 553, 15 S.W. at 767.
79. Id at 547-48, 15 S.W. at 766.
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cated. . . . If we cast aside chimerical theories and look to practical
results, it seems to us it must be conceded that separate schools for
colored children is a regulation to their great advantage. . . The fact
that the two races are separated for the purpose of receiving instruc-
tion deprives neither of any rights. It is but a reasonable regulation of
the exercise of the right.
8 0
Similarly, in Younger v. Judah,8 L the Missouri Supreme Court
relied on the Civil Rights Cases8 2 in holding that the fourteenth
amendment did not prohibit a theater owner from reserving
the better seats exclusively for whites.8 3 Preferential treat-
ment of whites, the court said, "accords with the custom and
usage prevailing in this state. Such custom has the force and
effect of law .... ",84
2. The Separate-But-Equal Doctrine in Education
In 1896, the Supreme Court ensured segregation and ine-
quality for successive generations of blacks when it held in
Plessy v. Ferguson8 5 that "separate but equal" rail facilities did
not violate the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments. The
"separate but equal" language was a misnomer, however, be-
cause the Court indicated that equality in principle but not in
practice was all that could be expected:
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the ab-
solute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of
things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based
upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equal-
ity, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to
either.
8 6
80. Id. at 551-52, 15 S.W. at 766.
81. 111 Mo. 303, 19 S.W. 1109 (1892); see also 35 CENTRAL L.J. 269 (1892)
(containing annotation discussing similar cases).
82. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
83. 111 Mo. at 308-09, 19 S.W. at 1110.
84. Id. at 312, 19 S.W. at 1111.
85. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The case arose when Homer Plessy, who was one-
eighth black, boarded a white coach and refused to leave. He was charged
with violating Louisiana's separate coach law, lost a challenge to its constitu-
tionality, and petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Id. at 538-40.
86. Id. at 544.
The Court also quoted the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
which had held that
when this great principle [of equality before the law] comes to be ap-
plied to the actual and various conditions of persons in society, it will
not warrant the assertion, that men and women are legally clothed
with the same civil and political powers, and that children and adults
are legally to have the same function and be subject to the same treat-
ment; but only that the rights of all, as they are settled and regulated
by law, are equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protec-
tion of the law for their maintenance and security.
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The school segregation laws in effect throughout the South
gave the Plessy Court much precedent for segregation and little
precedent for equality.8 7 By 1896, over forty years of experi-
ence with these "separate but equal" school laws demonstrated
that separate schools for blacks-in the Eighth Circuit and else-
where-were unequal and inadequate88 Moreover, as Justice
Harlan's fiery dissent noted, even if the separate facilities were
physically equal, "[t]he arbitrary separation of citizens, on the
basis of race . . . is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent
with the civil freedom and the equality before the law estab-
lished by the Constitution."8 9
For over sixty years after Plessy, the Supreme Court and
the Eighth Circuit frequently reiterated the separate-but-equal
theory. In McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,9°
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered an Oklahoma
statute that mandated segregated railway facilities without re-
quiring identical facilities for the races. 91 Noting that
"[p]ractical considerations, which are potent in reaching a cor-
rect interpretation of any statute, cannot be ignored in applying
the principle of equality of service to the two races in
Oklahoma,"92 the court upheld the statute. It concluded that
"equality of service between the two races in Oklahoma con-
templates substantial similarity of service, and this only when
conditions and circumstances under which it is required are
substantially the same."9 3 Judge Sanborn, in dissent, criticized
the majority's holding that the separate-but-equal coach law
Id (quoting Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 206 (1849)).
87. See B. REAMs & P. WILSON, supra note 39; see also H. BOND, supra
note 9, at 84-115 (noting solidification of segregated social structure after Re-
construction); H. BULLOCK, A HISTORY OF NEGRO EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH:
FROM 1619 To THE PREsENr 37-39 (1967) (noting that state laws gave Southern
whites a means to reestablish the traditional positions of blacks). See gener.
ally Savage, The Legal Provisions for Negro Schools in Missouri from 1865 to
1890, 16 J. NEGRO HisT. 309 (1931).
88. See generally H. BOND, supra note 9, at 92-115 (documenting increas-
ingly disproportionate funding); H. BULLOCK, supra note 87, at 176-85 (observ-
ing that disparity between the two school systems became apparent by 1910,
manifested by shorter terms for black students and lower expenditures for
black schools); E. FRAZIER, supra note 60, at 429-49 (noting that the educa-
tional provisions and expenditures for black children were inferior to those for
white children).
89. 163 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
90. 186 F. 966 (8th Cir. 1911), affd, 235 U.S. 151 (1914). Oklahoma was in-
cluded in the Eighth Circuit at that time.
91. The statute required equal but not identical facilities. 186 F. at 970-71.
92. Id at 971.
93. I&
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provided blacks adequate equality before the law:94
This separate coach law of the state of Oklahoma, with its spe-
cious requirement that the separate coaches or compartments it re-
quires shall be "equal in all points of comfort and convenience,"...
defies the spirit, defeats the purpose, violates the express prohibition
of the fourteenth amendment, is unconstitutional and void.95
Within three years of Plessy, the Supreme Court applied
the separate but equal doctrine to a pair of school cases. In
Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education,90 the
county board of education had terminated funding for a black
public high school for "economic reasons" 97 while taxing the
county to subsidize a white high school.98 Nonetheless, the
Court held that this was not a constitutional violation. Writing
for a unanimous Court, Justice Harlan emphasized that the fed-
eral government should not interfere with management of state
systems of education and taxation "except in the case of a clear
and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme
law of the land."99 Similarly, in Berea College v. Kentucky,10 0 a
divided Supreme Court 0 1 upheld a Kentucky statute that made
it a criminal violation to maintain an integrated college. Berea
College, a private institution, was willing to provide the oppor-
tunity for blacks and whites to attend college together, but the
state and the Supreme Court would not allow it. 1 °2
Backed by precedents from the nation's highest court, Mis-
souri courts condoned segregated state schools of disparate
94. Id at 977 (Sanborn, J., dissenting).
95. Id at 983 (Sanborn, J., dissenting).
96. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
97. 1& at 532. Justice Harlan assumed as valid the state court finding that
the termination was not rooted in racial animus and concluded that, because
the establishment of high schools is purely discretionary and because the
plaintiffs had elected the wrong remedy in requesting an injunction to close
the white schools, the funding disparity was not a violation. Id at 544-45.
98. Id at 531.
99. Id at 545.
100. 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
101. Justices Harlan and Day dissented.
102. 211 U.S. at 53-55. Justice Harlan, dissenting, attacked the majority for
the artificial distinction it drew in implicitly approving integrated teaching by
natural persons but not by corporations. Id. at 60-65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
He then argued that the Court should have addressed the main issue
presented, namely, whether blacks and whites may learn together in Ken-
tucky. Id. at 65-67 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In adjudging the statute void, Jus-
tice Harlan invoked higher principles of natural law, arguing that the
Almighty gave "[t]he capacity to impart instruction to others . . . for benefi-
cent purposes." Id at 67 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan also regarded
the statute as a violation of the fourteenth amendment right to enjoy one's fac-
ulties and to use them lawfully. Id at 67-78 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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quality. In State ex reL Hobby v. Disman,0 3 the Missouri
Supreme Court considered a request for a writ of mandamus to
compel the transfer of black students to a white school on the
ground that the appearance, construction, and arrangement of
the black schools were deficient. 0 4 Although the court deter-
mined that the black school lacked an auditorium and a cafete-
ria steam table and had a small playground and separate
buildings, 0 5 it decided that these shortcomings were either in-
significant or not racially motivated and concluded that the
plaintiffs had not demonstrated that "substantially the same
conditions as to physical facilities do not generally exist" in the
white district' 0 6 To the court, "equality" in separate schools
meant substantial equality. 0 7
Litigation over Missouri's system of higher education
reached the same result. In State ex reL Toliver v. Board of Ed-
ucation of St Louis,0 8 the Missouri Supreme Court reversed a
black plaintiffs successful attempt to transfer from a black
teacher's college to the state's white counterpart. Although the
court conceded the disparate quality of the schools' laboratories
and noted some differences in facilities, library, and curricu-
lum, it minimized these differences and concluded that the fa-
cilities were substantially equal.'0 9
The impact of the Plessy doctrine on black education is
well documented. 1 0 In 1916, the United States Department of
103. 250 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. 1952).
104. Id at 138.
105. Id. at 139-40.
106. Id at 141.
107. 1d.
108. 360 Mo. 671, 230 S.W.2d 724 (1950).
109. Id. at 680, 230 S.W.2d at 730.
In Bluford v. Canada, 32 F. Supp. 707 (W.D. Mo. 1940), appeal dismissed,
119 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1941), state officials refused to admit a black female ap-
plicant to Missouri's graduate journalism school. Although the state had not
provided comparable programs for black students, the court held that it would
sustain the state's motion to dismiss unless the petitioner amended her peti-
tion to allege that she had requested a graduate journalism program at the
state's black university and that the black university had had time to develop
such a program. 32 F. Supp. at 710-11. Although the state court followed the
Supreme Court's analysis set out in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337, 346-51 (1938), the practical result would have been no black journal-
ism school at all or a one-woman black program, neither of which could offer
the black applicant equal opportunity.
110. Professors Reams and Wilson discuss the school segregation laws and
selective other segregation laws in 37 states, including all of the present
Eighth Circuit states except North and South Dakota. By 1900, segregated
schools for blacks were required by law in 19 of those 37 states, including Ar-
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Interior published a comprehensive study of black education in
sixteen southern states, the District of Columbia, and Mis-
souri.'11 The report concluded that "[t]he Negro schoolhouses
are miserable beyond all description" 112 and that separate
schools fostered misunderstanding and stigmatized blacks as in-
ferior."i 3 Separate but equal education was indeed unequal.""
kansas and Missouri. See B. REAMS & P. WILSON, supra note 39, at 9 (Ala-
bama); id. at 27 (Arkansas); id. at 41-42 (California); id. at 68-71 (Delaware);
id. at 90 (Florida); id. at 115 (Georgia); id. at 166-67 (Indiana); id. at 186 (Kan-
sas); id at 202 (Kentucky); id. at 262 (Maryland); id. at 295-99 (Michigan); id.
at 335 (Mississippi); id. at 351 (Missouri); id. at 493 (North Carolina); id. at 564-
66 (South Carolina); id. at 604 (Tennessee); id. at 630-31 (Texas); id. at 690
(Virginia); id. at 703 (West Virginia). Some of these states had prohibited seg-
regated schools during Reconstruction but provided for them after the
Supreme Court gave the green light in the Civil Rights Cases and the
Slaughterhouse Cases. See, e.g., id. at 225-26 (Louisiana); id. at 564-65 (South
Carolina). New York and Pennsylvania did not require segregated schools, but
the law permitted them. Id. at 418-23, 538-39. In these states, and in many
others such as New Jersey, id. at 399, segregated schools developed in practice.
See generally Jackson, The Development and Character of Permissive and
Partly Segregated Schools, 16 J. NEGRO EDUC. 301 (Summer 1947). Segregation
was required in Ohio until 1887, when a law was passed prohibiting segregated
schools. B. REAMS & P. WILSON, supra note 39, at 510-11. This mere prohibi-
tion of segregation in principle, without provisions for desegregation in prac-
tice, was ineffective, and segregation in Ohio schools continued. Id. at 501-18.
Iowa also provided for separate schools for blacks until after the Civil War. At
that time, the state ratified the fourteenth amendment under what Reams and
Wilson suggest was a conviction that the amendment would prohibit school
segregation. Id. at 175-76.
111. BUREAU OF EDUC., DEP'T OF INTERIOR, NEGRO EDUCATION: A STUDY
OF THE PRIVATE AND HIGHER SCHOOLS FOR COLORED PEOPLE IN THE UNITED
STATES (Bulletin Nos. 38-39, 1916 (2 vols.)) [hereinafter cited as 1916 BUREAU
OF EDUC. STUDY].
112. 1 id. at 24.
113. 1 id. at 1-7; 2 id. at 9-11, 24.
114. The study noted that in 1912, expenditures on teachers' salaries in ele-
mentary schools were $10.32 per white student but only $2.89 per black stu-
dent. 2 id. at 9. These states, in 1912, spent $6,429,991 for secondary or higher
schools for whites but only $355,720 for blacks. 2 id. at 11. The latter figure
was 5.5% of the total spent for whites, even though blacks were over 29% of
the population in these states. 2 id. at 9. The 16 southern states combined had
only 64 public high schools for blacks, 1 id. at 37; 2 id. at 15, even though in 10
of these states combined there were 1,238 public high schools for whites, 1 id.
at 37. Opportunities for blacks to obtain college, professional, industrial, agri-
cultural, or teacher training were minimal. 2 id. at 16-20. The inadequacy of
educational facilities for blacks is also reflected in the literacy rates: in 1912,
33% of the black population was illiterate, whereas only 7.7% of the white pop-
ulation was illiterate. 2 id. at 9.
In Arkansas, in 1912-1913, $12.95 was spent per white child for teachers'
salaries but only $4.59 per black child. 2 id. at 107. Seven percent of whites
were illiterate, whereas 26.4% of blacks were illiterate. 2 id. Although there
were 99,383 black children aged 6 to 14 in Arkansas in 1912-1913, only about
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From 1915 to 1951, inequality, inadequacy, and racism in the
schools grew.11 5 For many years, however, the courts refused
to recognize the statistics that confirmed the inequities in the
Plessy doctrine.116
58% attended school. 2 id at 110. In contrast, over 80% of school-age whites
attended school. 2 id. In the entire state, there were only five public high
schools for blacks, instructing only 360 students. 2 id. No black institutions
were adequately equipped for college, trade, agricultural, or teacher training.
2 id at 110-12.
Although the situation in Missouri in 1910-1915 was better, black schools
were still inadequate. Over 17% of Missouri blacks aged 10 and above were
illiterate, NEGRO POPULATION, supra note 3, at 425, compared to a 2.9% illiter-
acy rate for native whites of the same age, id. In 1910, only 54.7% of Missouri's
black children aged 6 to 20 attended schools. ri at 391. Only one third of all
black children lived in areas with well-established public school systems. 2
1916 BUREAU OF EDUC. STUDY, supra note 111, at 379. By 1915, the disparity in
expenditures between white and black students was small, Williams, supra
note 38, at 165 (expenditures on black schools 96% of those on white schools),
but the maintenance of separate school systems fostered racism and was ex-
pensive. 1 1916 BUREAU OF EDUC. STUDY, supra note 111, at 107; 2 id. at 9-11,
24. Although Missouri led most other former slave states in education pro-
grams, the state lagged behind typical northern and western states in school
expenditures, see E. FRAZIER, supra note 60, at 437, school attendance, see NE-
GRO POPULATION, supra note 3, at 391, and literacy rates, see id. at 430.
115. Because so many excellent studies of this period are available, only a
brief review is made here. In 1939-1940, the former slave states spent $58.69 on
schooling for each white child but only $18.82 for each black child. E. FRA-
ZIER, supra note 60, at 437. Black school facilities were worth, on average, one-
fourth the value of white facilities. H. BULLOCK, supra note 87, at 182. In
1929, teachers in black schools earned about two-thirds as much as teachers in
white schools; by 1950, the proportion had risen to 85%. Id. at 181. In 1939-
1940, the average school term for blacks was 156 days; for whites, it was 173.5
days. E. FRAZIER, supra note 60, at 447. In 1930, 16.3% of blacks aged 10 and
above were illiterate, whereas only 1.8% of native-born whites were illiterate.
2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 15TH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1930 POPuLA-
TION 1219 & table 1 (1933).
In Arkansas, in 1930, blacks composed 25.5% of the school population but
received only 10.2% of educational outlays. H. BOND, supra note 9, at 169. In
Arkansas, in 1950, whites completed a median of 8.7 years in school, whereas
nonwhites completed only 5.6 years. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1960 STATISTI.
CAL ABSTRACT 111 (table 143). In 1947, 11% of nonwhites aged 14 and above
were illiterate, whereas only 1.8% of native whites in that age group were illit-
erate. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1954 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 124 (table 138).
In 1930, one typical southern state (North Carolina) spent almost $200,000
dollars more to transport white students-much of it to maintain segrega-
tion-than it spent in total on teachers' salaries for the 190,817 black school
children enrolled in the state. H. BOND, supra note 9, at 165. In 1954-1955, on
the eve of the Brown I and Brown II decisions, .001% of school-age blacks in
the lower South attended school with whites. B. REAus & P. WILSON, supra
note 39, at 484.
116. Yale historian C. Vann Woodward points out that the Southern segre-
gation laws, with the exception of the path-breaking school segregation laws,
began to develop only in the late 1880's. They were made possible by Supreme
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The separate-but-equal doctrine was devastating for black
Court decisions and responded to the growing political influence of poor
whites, who increasingly came into contact with blacks under conditions which
did not clearly indicate white superiority. C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF
THE NEW SOUTH 1877-1913 (1951); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER
OF JIM CROW (1955).
Spurred on by the Supreme Court's approval of the separate-but-equal
doctrine, former slave states, including Arkansas and Missouri, enacted nu-
merous statutes to require segregation in places where custom had not already
done so-on streetcars, buses, and railroads and in waiting rooms, prisons,
mental health institutions, and entertainment facilities. The racism behind
these statutes is perhaps best reflected in an Arkansas statute, which provided
that no bunk, bed, bedding, or other furnishing once used by a black prisoner
could be subsequently assigned for the use of a white prisoner. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 46-145 (1947) (repealed, 1969 Ark. Gen. Acts 1646, 1672 (1st ex. sess.
1968)).
Reams and Wilson list a number of other, nonschool segregation statutes
in the 37 states studied. They note, however, that most of the segregation laws
were local and are not readily obtainable. B. REAMS & P. WILSON, supra note
39, at 229; see also J. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW (1959)
(discussing discrimination in public accomodations, interstate travel, elections,
employment, education, housing, criminal and domestic law, and the armed
forces); Note, The Matter of Racial Differences and Local Police Legislation, 5
Loy. L. REV. 73 (1949) (discussing local police ordinances requiring segregation
and providing preferential treatment for whites). This was the case in Arkan-
sas and Missouri. In St. Louis, Missouri, for example, voters passed a referen-
dum in 1916 requiring city blocks to remain segregated. Usher, Negro
Segregation in St. Louis, 6 NEW REPUBLIC 176, 176-77 (Mar. 18, 1916). By 1948,
segregation by custom in Missouri was so pervasive that a court took judicial
notice of the fact. See Frank v. Herring, 240 Mo. App. 425, 434, 208 S.W.2d 783,
788 (1948).
State laws filled out the picture by requiring segregation in state facilities
and in other areas where custom was not sufficient to ensure complete segre-
gation. The number of Arkansas and Missouri statutes legally requiring segre-
gation peaked in the 1940's and 1950's. Most of these statutes remained on the
books until the 1970's. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-801 to -816 (1973 Supp.)
(enacted, 1957 Ark. Acts 271; repealed, 1975 Ark. Gen. Acts 1626) (state sover-
eignty commission set up to oppose implementation of Brown); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 7-401 to -404 (1947) (enacted, 1923 Ark. Gen. Acts 62; repealed, 1967
Ark. Gen. Acts 566, 568) (establishing all-black tuberculosis sanatorium for all
black TB patients); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 46-122 (1947) (enacted, 1909 Ark. Acts
1133, 1134; repealed, 1969 Ark. Gen. Acts 1646, 1672 (1st ex. sess. 1968)) (only
whites allowed to guard white convicts); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 46-137 (1947) (en-
acted, 1943 Ark. Acts 312; repealed, 1969 Ark. Gen. Acts 1646, 1672 (1st ex.
sess. 1968)) (requiring segregation of first offenders); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 46-144
(1947) (enacted, 1903 Ark. Acts 160; repealed, 1969 Ark. Gen. Acts 1646, 1672
(1st ex. sess. 1968)) (separate cells required for black and white convicts); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 46-145 (1947) (enacted, 1903 Ark. Acts 160; repealed, 1968 Ark.
Gen. Acts 1646, 1672 (1st ex. sess. 1968)) (no bed, bunk, beddings, or other fur-
nishing ever used by black convict to be used by white convict); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 46-146 (1947) (enacted, 1903 Ark. Acts 160; repealed, 1969 Ark. Acts
1646, 1672 (1st ex. sess. 1968)) (handcuffing white and black prisoners together
prohibited); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 52-625 (1947) (enacted, 1919 Ark. Acts 107; re-
pealed, 1973 Ark. Gen. Acts 842, 845) (coal mines required to maintain sepa-
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Americans. It was not until the 1930's and 1940's that courts
rate wash houses for different races); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-104 to -105 (1947)
(enacted, ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 94, § 4 (1837); repealed, 1973 Ark. Gen. Acts 842-
845) (marriages of whites with blacks or part-blacks void; person knowingly
conducting such marriage guilty of misdemeanor); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-1218
to -1221 (1947) (enacted, 1891 Ark. Acts 15, 15-16 and 1893 Ark. Acts 200; re-
pealed, 1973 Ark. Gen. Acts 842, 845) (railroads required to segregate trains,
waiting rooms, and facilities); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-1614 to -1619 (1947) (en-
acted, 1903 Ark. Acts 178; repealed, 1973 Ark. Gen. Acts 842) (segregated elec-
tric and street railroads); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-1747 to -1750, 73-1752 to -1753
(1947) (enacted, 1937 Ark. Acts 433; repealed, 1973 Ark. Acts 842, 845-46) (seg-
regation of races required on buses); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-1119 (1947) (en-
acted, 1913 Ark. Acts 1238; repealed, 1973 Ark. Gen. Acts 842, 846) (segregation
of white and black convicts on county highway projects required); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 80-509(c) (1947) (enacted, 1931 Ark. Acts, 476, 532; never repealed)
(segregation of races required in public schools of state); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 80-518 (1960) (enacted, 1875 Ark. Acts 54, 80; found unconstitutional when
used to maintain segregated schools, Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F.2d 97 (8th Cir.
1958)) (private high school may be taught in public building); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 80-544 to -547 (1960) (enacted, 1959 Ark. Acts 2000, 2000-01 (2d ex. sess.
1958); repealed, 1973 Ark. Gen. Acts 842, 846) (authority to close the schools if
integration is required by federal authorities); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1519 to -
1524 (1960) (enacted, Ark. Initiative Measure 1956, No. 2; held unconstitutional
in Dove v. Parham, 181 F. Supp. 504 (E.D. Ark.), affd, 282 F.2d 256 (8th Cir.
1960)) (pupil placement law enacted to avoid school desegregation); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 80-1530 (1947) (enacted, 1959 Ark. Acts 1827, 1831-32; never re-
pealed) (no child required to enroll in integrated school); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 84-2724 to -2726 (1947) (enacted, 1937 Ark. Acts 826; repealed, 1973 Ark.
Gen. Acts 842, 846) (track establishments required to segregate races); Act of
Sept. 12, 1958, act 5, 1959 Ark. Act 2004 (2d ex. sess.) (pro rata share of state
funds ordinarily allocable to public schools payable to private schools when
public schools closed to block desegregation). For examples of statutory dis-
crimination other than segregation, see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-806 (1947) (en-
acted, 1911 Ark. Pub. Acts 295; repealed, 1973 Ark. Gen. Acts 842, 845)
(concubinage between white and black made a felony, punishable by up to one
year in prison at hard labor for each offense).
Segregation-related constitutional provisions remaining into the 1950's and
1960's include ARK. CONsT. amend. 44 §§ 1-4 (giving assembly power to prevent
desegregation under guise of protecting states' rights and providing that any
public employee who assists integration may be sent to prison). For additional
segregation-related statutes from earlier years, see ARK. DIG. STAT. § 12474
(1937) (putting the authority of the state behind the customary practice of seg-
regation and discrimination: "Any person, firm, company or corporation eject-
ing any white or colored patron for refusing to sit in the seats so designated
shall not be liable for damages in any of the courts of this State."); ARK. DIG.
STAT. § 13679 (1937) (tax assessor to indicate races); ARK. DIG. STAT. § 807
(1921) (requring segregated industrial schools); ARK. DIG. STAT. §§ 2601-2605
(1921) (making mixed race concubinage a felony and providing that any white
woman who gives birth to part-black child is prima facie guilty of felony); Act
of Feb. 17, 1913, No. 59, § 2, 1913 Ark. Acts 180, 180-82 (providing, without
mention of blacks, that whites may join in petition for granting of liquor li-
cense); ARK. DIG. STAT. § 7536 (1903) (granting authority to establish segre-
gated teacher college).
There are fewer Missouri segregation statutes. See supra note 54 and ac-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:735
took the first meager steps to redress inequality and discrimina-
tion. The refusal to take affirmative steps to eliminate discrim-
ination meant that blacks as a class made little or no progress
in education until Brown v. Board of Education.1 1 7
3. The Separate and Unequal Doctrine in Employment
The Plessy doctrine of separate but equal not only institu-
tionalized segregation in education, it also perpetuated racial
discrimination in employment. 118 At the end of the Civil War,
many Radical Republicans recognized the need to address racial
discrimination in employment. 119 A postwar study of condi-
tions in the south reported that private and public discrimina-
tion in the employment of blacks was recreating a system of
peonage little removed from slavery. 120 To help remedy this
problem, five days after the official certification of the thir-
teenth amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was introduced
in Congress.' 2 1 Two phrases of section one of the bill were
aimed in part at racial discrimination in employment.122 The
first, now 42 U.S.C. § 1981, provided that blacks "shall have the
companying text (school segregation statute); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 3361, 4651
(1939) (miscegenation a penal offense); Mo. REV. STAT. § 9390 (1939) (segrega-
tion in colony for feebleminded); Mo. REV. STAT. § 10474 (1939) (local authori-
ties may segregate races at playgrounds, libraries, and public parks); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 10632 (1939) (segregated teachers' institute); Mo. REV. STAT. § 9477
(1929) (same).
117. See infra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
118. See generally G. BANCROFT, THE AMERICAN LABOR FORCE: ITS
GROWTH AND CHANGING COMPOSITION (1958); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, TIlE SO-
CIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: AN HISTORICAL VIEW, 1790-1978, 55-81 (Current Population Reports,
Special Studies, series p-23, No. 80, 1979) (detailing black labor, employment,
and business conditions from 1890 to 1975); E. FRAZIER, supra note 60; C.
GREENE & C. WOODSON, supra note 21; 1 H. HILL, BLACK LABOR AND TIlE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1977); E. RUDWICK, BLACK WORKERS AND ORGAN-
IZED LABOR (1971); S. SPERO & A. HARRIS, THE BLACK WORKER (1931); C.
WESLEY, supra note 21; Anderson, Economic Patterns in Black America, in
NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1 (1982); Harris,
Education and the Economic Status of Negroes in the United States, in 100
YEARS OF EMANCIPATION 129 (Rand McNally Public Affairs Series 129, 1964);
Maslow & Robison, Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for Equality, 1862-
1952, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 394 n.163 (1953) (collecting authorities).
119. 1 H. HILL, supra note 118, at 65-77; Larson, The Development of Sec-
tion 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 56, 60 (1972).
120. 1 H. HILL, supra note 118, at 65-66.
121. 1 id. at 65.
122. 1 id.; Larson, supra note 119, at 60 (discussing the Supreme Court's ac-
ceptance of this conclusion in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 427
(1968)).
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same right... to make and enforce contracts."123 The second,
now 42 U.S.C. § 1982, provided that blacks "shall have the same
right ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property, as is enjoyed by white citizens."' 2 4 Con-
gress later reenacted the Act of 1866, after the fourteenth
amendment was ratified, to remove any doubt of its constitu-
tionality and to provide for criminal penalties for any viola-
tions.125 Other statutes arguably addressing employment
discrimination were enacted;126 enforcement, however, was
nonexistent. Of the 7,312 criminal prosecutions federal authori-
ties brought under the new civil rights laws from 1870 to
1897,27 none of the reported cases involved employment dis-
crimination.12S In 1913, over a quarter of a million blacks were
still held as illegal slaves on Southern farms.129
123. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (reenacted, Enforce-
ment Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144, codified at § 1977 of the Re-
vised Statutes of 1874, currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981); see also Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 n.8 (1976) (legislative history indicates that 42
U.S.C. § 1981 is drawn from both § 16 and § 18 of the 1870 act).
124. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (reenacted, Enforce-
ment Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144, codified at § 1978 of the Re-
vised Statutes of 1874, currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982). See generally
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422 n.28 (1968) (42 U.S.C. § 1982 is
derived from § 1 of the 1866 Act). Although § 1982 today has little relevance
to employment discrimination, it had great relevance to this problem in the
predominately agricultural society of 1866. See, eg., United States v. Morris,
125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903) (holding that the right to lease and cultivate land is
protected by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
125. Enforcement Act of 1870, :ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144.
126. In 1871, Congress passed the Klu Klux Klan Act, cI. 22, 17 Stat. 13
(1871). Section 1 of the law (currently codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985,
(1986)) could have been used to address racial discrimination in employment,
as it has been since the late 1960's, but it was not. See B. ScHLEi & P. GRoss-
MAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 678-97 (2d ed. 1983).
127. Maslow & Robison, supra note 118, at 370 (citing DAVIS, THE FEDERAL
ENFORCEMENT ACrs, STuDIES IN SouTHERN HISTORY AND PoLITICs, 223-24
(1914) (study of the administration of the Reconstruction Era federal civil
rights laws)). Between 1871 and 1875, 3654 of these prosecutions were brought.
See also supra note 61.
128. Because almost all of these prosecutions were unreported, however, it
is unclear whether employment discrimination cases were brought. Many of
the reported cases involve the lynching of blacks, see, eg., United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (invalidating indictment for lynching of blacks
who attempted to assemble peacefully), or attempts to reenslave blacks, see,
eg., In re Turner, 24 Fed. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247) (two days
after Maryland adopted constitutional provision abolishing slavery, a young
black girl was bound to her former master as an "apprentice").
129. W. DuBois, The Rural South, 13 PUBLICATIONS AM. STATISTICAL A. 80,
81 (1912). Professor Charles H. Wesley briefly described the Arkansas race ri-
ots of 1919, in which hundreds of blacks, working virtually as slaves under pe-
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Although nearly 1.2 million blacks had secured employ-
ment in the manufacturing, mining, and transportation indus-
tries by 1900,130 gains by blacks in employment were gradually
eliminated by increasingly overt racial discrimination that the
courts claimed they were powerless to redress. Between 1881
and 1900, there were at least fifty strikes by white workers
against the hiring of blacks.131 Many employers established
preferential hiring policies for whites132 and two-tiered wage
scales with lower pay for blacks. 133 Unions routinely refused to
onage systems, were murdered when they attempted to gain freedom. C.
WESLEY, supra note 21, at 286-87. Many of the blacks were then prosecuted
for attempting to defend themselves, and many agreed to return to slavery to
avoid prosecution. Id. In Georgia in 1921, eleven black laborers were mur-
dered by a forced labor camp owner in order to prevent the peonage camp
from being discovered by federal officers. Id. at 287; C. GREENE & C. WOOD-
SON, supra note 21, at 209. In Smith v. United States, 157 F. 721 (8th Cir. 1907),
the court upheld the convictions of nine whites who operated a forced labor
camp for blacks in Missouri. The black laborers were kept in a guarded cell at
night and forced to work all day while armed guards stood by. Id. at 727-28.
Often, however, prosecutions against individuals who enslaved blacks
were unsuccessful. For example, in Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207
(1905), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Anti-Peonage
Act of 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1994), but
overturned Clyatt's conviction for enslaving a black on the ground that,
although Clyatt had enslaved the black, he had not returned the black to slav-
ery as alleged by the indictment because the black had not previously been a
slave, Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 218-22.
130. Worthman & Green, Black Workers in the New South, 1865-1915, in 2
KEY ISSUES IN THE AFRO-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 47, 52 (N. Huggins ed. 1971).
During the 40 to 50 years after emancipation, blacks were well-represented in
the trades and crafts, especially in the South. C. GREENE & C. WOODSON,
supra note 21, at 168-85. By 1910, 15% of all carpenters, 35% of all brick ma-
sons, and 38% of all plasterers were black. Worthman & Green, supra, at 53.
Increasingly after 1900, however, discrimination against blacks by employers,
unions, educational institutions, and white competitors, anxious to take over
work formerly done by blacks, forced blacks out of the skilled trades. C.
GREENE & C. WOODSON, supra note 21, at 178-85. For example, some cities re-
fused to hire contracting firms that employed blacks. See, e.g., id. (noting that
Richmond, Virginia, threatened to take a job from a white contractor "because
he employed Negro workmen").
131. 1 H. HILL, supra note 118, at 15.
132. See, e.g., 1 H. HILL, supra note 118, at 15 (noting that white labor un-
ions forced employers to hire whites only).
133. The Final Report of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Fair Employ-
ment Practice Committee indicates: "In July 1942 hourly entrance rates of
adult male common laborers averaged 47.4 cents per hour for Negro workers
as compared with 65.3 cents per hour for white workers. Examples of differ-
entials in such industries as iron and steel, meat packing, fertilizer, manufac-
turing and leather, and for various occupations are numerous enough to base a
conclusion that discrimination exists at all wage levels." Fair Employment
Practice Committee, Final Report XII (June 28, 1946).
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admit black workers.1 4 The vast majority of blacks were re-
stricted to menial, nonsupervisory jobs. i s5
In 1903 came the first published opinion to uphold a prose-
cution against individuals who practiced racial discrimination in
employment. In United States v. Morris,3 6 the defendants
were indicted 137 for conspiring to prevent blacks, on account of
their race, from leasing or cultivating farmland in Arkansas.
The United States Attorney claimed that the ability to earn a
living free from racial discrimination by private actors was a
right secured by the thirteenth amendment and section one of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.138 United States District Judge Ja-
cob Trieber agreed. He noted that the Civil Rights Act of 1866
had been passed under authority of the thirteenth amendment
and that the amendment properly granted Congress the power
to legislate against public or private interference with an indi-
vidual's enjoyment of fundamental rights "if the deprivation of
these privileges is-solely on account of his race or color."139
That same year, in Hodges v. United States,i 40 the United
States Attorney brought another indictment for racial discrimi-
134. 1 H. HILL, supra note 118, at 16-20.
135. See NEGRO POPULATION, supra note 3, at 529-51 (table 22); see also C.
GREENE & C. WOODSON, supra note 21, at 204-05 & diagram 10 (in 1910, nearly
80% of all gainfully employed blacks were employed in agriculture or domestic
and personal service). In 1910, although over 10% of the United States adult
population was black, less than 1/2% of all supervisory or managerial employ-
ees in manufacturing, mining, oil and gas, and building and hand trades were
black. NEGRO POPULATION, supra note 3, at 529-51 (table 22). Even in agricul-
ture, in which they had extensive experience and expertise and constituted
nearly 23% of the workforce, blacks constituted less than 4% of all supervisory
or managerial employees. See id. at 506 (table 6). In the public sector, less
than 2% of all police and firefighters were black. See id. at 551 (table 22). In
seven southern states, including Arkansas (where blacks constituted more
than one-fourth of the population), there was not one regular black police of-
ficer. G. MYRDAL, supra note 12, at 543 n.a; see also id. at 535 ("Practically all
public officials in the South are whites. The principle is upheld that Negroes
should not be given positions of public authority even on a low level."). Sev-
eral states had laws prohibiting the hiring of blacks to positions in which they
might have authority over whites. Maslow & Robison, supra note 118, at 387
n.131. For example, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 46-122 (1947) provided that only white
men could be hired to guard white convicts at state prison camps.
136. 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903).
137. The defendants were indicted under REV. ST. § 5508, reprinted in 3
U.S. CoMP. ST. § 5508 (1901) (currently codified as revised at 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1982)). See also supra note 66.
138. 125 F. at 322.
139. Id. at 330.
140. 203 U.S. 1 (1906), overruled, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 443 n.78 (1968).
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nation in employment in the Eastern District of Arkansas.
Eight blacks had been hired at a local sawmill. Shortly thereaf-
ter, a violent crowd of armed whites marched on the mill and
demanded that the blacks quit or be fired. After the blacks
quit, a grand jury indicted three of the whites.141 Judge Trieber
confirmed the United States's power to prosecute the action,
and the defendants were convicted, fined, and imprisoned. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was unconstitutional as applied,
because the thirteenth amendment did not empower Congress
to make it a federal offense for private individuals to prevent
blacks from performing employment contracts. 142 The defend-
ants argued that if the section protected blacks but not whites
from employment discrimination, then it was an improper form
of reverse discrimination against whites. 1 43 If the section pro-
tected all individuals regardless of race from employment dis-
crimination, then it improperly granted the federal government
powers that were reserved to the states.144 In reversing the
convictions, the Supreme Court noted that the blacks' only
remedy must be under state law.145 Arkansas had at the time a
civil rights law, 46 passed by Radical Republicans in 1873, that
might have been used to redress employment discrimination
against blacks, but the Arkansas legislature repealed it within a
year of the Hodges decision. 147
Justices Harlan and Day, dissenting in Hodges, asserted
that the proponents and ratifiers of the thirteenth amendment
141. As in Morris, the defendants were indicted under REV. ST. § 5508, re-
printed in 3 U.S. COMP. ST. § 5508 (1901) (currently codified as revised at 18
U.S.C. § 241(1982)).
142. Hodges, 203 U.S. at 7. One year later, the Court, on the authority of
Hodges, once again summarily reversed an unreported racial discrimination ac-
tion upheld by Judge Trieber. Boyett v. United States, 207 U.S. 581 (1907).
143. Hodges, 203 U.S. at 8. The reverse discrimination argument has al-
ways been the key argument of those who oppose civil rights laws. In the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Court indicated that protecting blacks
against discrimination would improperly make blacks the "special favorite of
the laws." Id. at 25. Justice Harlan, despite the invocation of his name by the
modern proponents of the reverse discrimination argument, asserted that it
was cynical to suggest that blacks were the special favorite of the laws when
the law had brutally discriminated against them for years and whites had actu-
ally been the special favorite of the laws. Id. at 61; see also supra note 76 and
accompanying text.
144. Hodges, 203 U.S. at 8, 16, 18-19.
145. See id. at 14-15.
146. ARK. STAT. §§ 578-593 (1904).
147. Act of May 13, 1907, act 303, 1907 Ark. Acts 728.
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had intended that it have an "affirmative operation"' 48 to pro-
tect blacks from discrimination in private or public employ-
ment.149 Denying blacks federal protection against those who
aim to deprive them of constitutional rights would, the dissent-
ers suggested, result in blacks' becoming a permanent subclass
of society, unable to earn an adequate living.' °
Justice Harlan's prediction proved correct. Discrimination
against blacks became so intensive and widespread that many
scholars describe the period from 1900 to 1940 as the nadir of
civil rights for blacks.15' The law, in effect, became an affirma-
tive action policy for whites.15 2
4. The Beginning of the End
The second third of the century brought slow but definite
progress against racial discrimination in education and employ-
ment. In 1934, the first meager steps to redress inequality in
education were taken when the NAACP began a coordinated
attack against segregation in education.153 In light of the glar-
ing inequality of segregated schools, the initial plan was to chal-
148. 203 U.S. at 29.
149. Id. at 29-30, 37-38.
150. Id. at 29-30, 36-38.
151. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 84-91 (1976); see also M. KONvrTz, supra
note 12, at 155-251 .(noting judicial tolerance of segregation in public accomoda-
tions, employment, education, and housing in the period, despite the existence
of state civil rights laws).
152. For example, much New Deal legislation institutionalized existing job
discrimination and excluded workers in the main black industries (agriculture,
domestic labor) from wage and hour regulations. 1 I-L HILL, supra note 118, at
95-100; see also id. at 96 (collecting studies).
In 1933, the first policy of nondiscrimination on the basis of race in federal
employment was established. Unemployment Relief Act of 1933, ch. 17, 48
Stat. 22, repealed by Act of Sept. 16, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 8(c), 80 Stat.
378, 648 (as part of codification of 5 U.S.C.). This policy, however, only applied
to jobs created under the Act. In 1940, this prohibition was extended by exec-
utive order to other areas of federal employment. Exec. Order No. 8587, 3
C.F.R. 303, 304 (Supp. 1940). Many states had previously adopted laws prohib-
iting discrimination in government employment, and sometimes in private em-
ployment, on the basis of race, religion, or national origin. Bonfield, The
Origin and Development of American Fair Employment Legislation, 52 IowA
L. REV. 1043, 1051-61 (1967). These laws were the first of many failed experi-
ments with the "color-blind" employment discrimination remedies once again
being advocated today. See id. Despite the assertion of equality for blacks in
principle, in practice increasing government involvement in the economy per-
petuated discrimination. See L HILL, supra note 118, at 96-100.
153. See generally R. JACK, HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE 63-78 (1943) (brief history of NAACP
fight to end segregation in education).
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lenge the inequality rather than the unconstitutionality of
segregation. The NAACP first focused on graduate and profes-
sional schools. In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,15 4 the
Court was required to decide whether Missouri's refusal to ad-
mit the black petitioner to the state's all-white law school with-
out providing a separate law school for blacks violated the
equal protection clause. 155 The Supreme Court held that it did
and ordered that the petitioner be admitted.156
Twelve years later, in Sweatt v. Painter,157 the Court went
one step further by holding that the black petitioner was enti-
tled to attend the previously all-white University of Texas Law
School instead of Texas's hastily developed law school for
blacks because the black law school was unequal.158 Although
the Court declined to invalidate the separate-but-equal doc-
trine, 59 it suggested that certain intrinsic elements made the
black law school so inherently unequal that equality could
never be obtained.160
In 1949, a federal district court in Arkansas, in Pitts v.
Board of Trustees of DeWitt Special School District,161 ap-
proved a black petitioner's request for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief from grossly unequal school facilities.16 2 Black
students in the area attended Class C schools, whereas whites
attended Class A schools, which had better qualified teachers
and superior libraries.163 Black students were transported to
school in a converted Army ambulance driven by one of the
154. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
155. 1& at 342-43.
156. Id at 352.
157. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
158. Id. at 634.
159. Id at 636.
160. Id. at 634. These elements included the "reputation of the faculty, ex-
perience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing
in the community, traditions and prestige." Id
On the same day the Court decided Sweatt, it ruled in McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), that
Oklahoma could not treat 68-year-old black graduate student George McLau-
rin differently from white students by seating him alone outside the class-
room, on an obscure library mezzanine, and in a separate cafeteria. Id. at 639-
41. The Court held that McLaurin had been "handicapped in his pursuit of ef-
fective graduate instruction. Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to
study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and in
general, to learn his profession." Id. at 641.
161. 84 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Ark. 1949).
162. Id. at 980-81.
163. Id. at 980.
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students,'r and young black children attended an elementary
school without running water or toilet facilities. 165 The school
year for blacks was shorter than for whites, and the school
building for blacks was worth 4.2% of the value of the white
building.166 The district court granted the relief requested 67
but noted the necessity of proceeding "slowly and with great
care."' 68 The court gave the defendants "a reasonable time" to
provide black students with substantially equal educational
facilities. 69
The first effort to reverse the trend of preferential treat-
ment for whites in employment came in the 1940's as some
states and municipalities began to enact fair employment
laws. 70 Unfortunately, these laws lacked enforcement mecha-
nisms and were merely public statements calling for a volun-
tary end to employment discrimination.
Federal efforts of the period also proved weak. In response
to reports of widespread discrimination in defense industries,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order No.
8802, which established the federal Fair Employment Practices
Committee (FEPC).171 Roosevelt's orders, however, like the
similar orders of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Ken-
nedy,172 were merely "public relations pronouncements"'173 doc-
umenting widespread employment discrimination against
164. Id. at 979.
165. Id. at 980.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 988.
168. Id. at 980-82.
169. Id. at 981.
170. Bonfield, supra note 152, at 1047, 1051, 1061-78; Maslow & Robison,
supra note 118, at 392-99. See generally R. BARNETT & J. GARAI, WHERE THE
STATES STAND ON CIviL RIGHTS (1962) (state-by-state survey of civil rights
laws, including employment laws). At the state level, "New York adopted the
first statute that according to current conceptions would constitute a modern
fair employment Act" in 1945. Bonfield, supra note 152, at 1071. "By the end
of 1959, sixteen states had fair employment laws substantially modeled on the
1945 New York Act." Id. at 1073.
171. Over the next four years, black employment in defense industries in-
creased from 3% to 8%. SEE CITIZEN's CON91'N, supra note 60, at 33-44.
172. The orders of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Ken-
nedy have been thoroughly discussed in other articles. See Goldstein, The Im-
portance of the Contracted Compliance Program" Historical Perspective,
reprinted in Oversight Hearings on the OFCCP's Proposed Affirmative Action
Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomn. on Employmnent Opportunities of
the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 453-500 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as 1983 Hearings]; CITIZEN'S CONM'N, supra note 60, at 32-38;
1 IL HILL, supra note 118, at 373-81; Maslow & Robison, supra note 118, at 393
n.160.
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blacks. Little actually changed for the black worker as a result
of the orders.
The 1960 report of President Eisenhower's FEPC acknowl-
edged the failure of voluntary efforts to end employment dis-
crimination and stated that affirmative action to redress
discrimination against blacks was needed, because, in addition
to the problem of overt discrimination, "the indifference of em-
ployers to establishing a positive policy of nondiscrimination
hinders qualified applicants and employees from being hired
and promoted on the basis of equality.' 74 Shortly after taking
office, President John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order No.
10925, which called for "affirmative action to enforce" equal
employment opportunity for blacks. The opponents of racial
discrimination were not satisfied with the limited force of the
order, however, and successfully called for enactment of the
comprehensive Civil Rights Act of 1964.
II. AN ERA OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EDUCATION
AND EMPLOYMENT, 1954-1980
A. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
1. The Freedom-of-Choice Era: From Brown to Green
In Brown v. Board of Education,'17 5 the Supreme Court ini-
tiated a new era 76 in civil rights by declaring that "in the field
of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no
place. Separate educational facilities are inherently une-
qual.' 77 The Court delayed until the following term, however,
the question of appropriate relief. In Brown 11,178 the Court re-
manded the pending cases to the district courts "[b]ecause of
173. See, e.g., 1 H. HILL, supra note 118, at 380 (noting limited scope of
President Eisenhower's executive orders).
174. CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 60, at 36 (emphasis in original).
175. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
176. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE X (1975). See generally J. WILKINSON,
FROM Brown TO Bakke (1979); Kurland, Brown v. Board of Education Was the
Beginning, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 309 (1979) (historical discussion and summary
of principal Supreme Court school desegregation cases).
177. 347 U.S. at 495. On the same day, the Court decided Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954), which relied on the fifth amendment to eliminate segrega-
tion from District of Columbia schools. The Court held that segregated educa-
tion "imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due
Process Clause." Id. at 500. Although the fifth amendment has seldom since
been the focus of desegregation litigation, Bolling must be recognized, with
Brown, as a harbinger of vast social change.
178. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for
further hearings."'179 Although the Supreme Court's decision to
make the district courts responsible for desegregation had the
salutary effect of preserving local autonomy and drawing on
the remedial insight of local school officials, it often had the
unfortunate drawbacks of delay and unsympathetic supervision.
In retrospect, the Supreme Court may also have erred in au-
thorizing incremental desegregation starting with the high
schools, where courts and planners anticipated less resistance
to integration.I8 0 The Court, in effect, granted opponents time
to circumvent the intent of Brown. With the exception of the
Little Rock case,'8 1 the Supreme Court did not hear another
school desegregation case for eight years after Brown.1a2
A few communities achieved desegregation without court
order; 8 3 most, however, tried to prevent desegregation, some-
times in defiance of local governments. Delay was the rule, and
speed the exception. Brewer v. Hoxie School District No. 46184
is a typical case. The public schools of Lawrence County, Ar-
kansas, served about 1,000 white and twenty-four black stu-
dents in the state-required segregated facilities. Without
waiting for repeal of the state law, the county school board ini-
tiated its own desegregation plan after Brown II. Those op-
posed to desegregation, however, intimidated the black students
and the school board through trespass at the schools, threats,
and inflammatory speeches at rallies in which speakers con-
doned violent opposition and called for mass resistance. 8 5
Thus, in a dispute over the attendance of only twenty-four
179. Id. at 299.
180. See eg., W. HAWLEY, R. CRAIN, L. ROssELL, ht SwnjE, R. FERNAR.
DEZ, J. SCHOFIELD, R. TOMPKiNS, W. TRENT & M. ZLOTNIK, STRATEGIES FOR
EFFEcrivE DESEGREGATION 52-54 (1983); Hawley, Achieving Quality Integrated
Education-With or Without Federal Help, 64 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 334, 335
(1983).
181. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
182. Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963); McNeese v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
183. Rural desegregation in large consolidated school districts may have
largely been a matter of economics; economies of scale in facilities and trans-
portation were too great to be ignored for these sparsely populated districts
with limited tax bases. Thus, for example, the communities of Charleston,
Sheridan, and Fayetteville, Arkansas, integrated before the rupture at Little
Rock See J. Vervack, Road to Armageddon: Arkansas and Brown v. Board of
Education, May 17, 1954 to September 2 1957, 15-17 (1978) (unpublished MA.
thesis, University of Arkansas).
184. 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
185. Id. at 93.
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black students, school for hundreds of students was temporarily
discontinued and attendance severely curtailed.18 6
The battle over public school segregation was truly joined,
however, in Little Rock.18 7 Three days after Brown I, the Lit-
tle Rock School Board announced its intent to study the meth-
ods and implications of desegregation, and in the spring of 1955,
a few days before Brown II, the board announced a freedom-of-
choice desegregation plan that was to start with the high school
senior class in the 1957-1958 school year. 8 8 The district court
approved the plan noting that it would "lead to an effective and
gradual adjustment of the problem."' 8 9 The court of appeals,
finding an "unqualified basis" for this conclusion, affirmed. 19 0
Problems, however, continued. In the fall of 1957, public oppo-
sition to desegregation in Little Rock escalated as Arkansas
Governor Orval E. Faubus declared white schools "off limits"
186. Id. at 94. At trial, the district court enjoined the trespasses, threats,
and intimidation. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46 v. Brewer, 137 F. Supp. 364, 365-66
(E.D. Ark. 1956).
187. Desegregation in Little Rock may be traced through the reported case
law. Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1956), affd, 243 F.2d 361
(8th Cir. 1957); Aaron v. Cooper, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 934-41 (E.D. Ark. 1957),
affd sub nom. Thomason v. Cooper, 254 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1958); Aaron v.
Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957), affd sub nom. Faubus v. United
States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958); Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (E.D.
Ark.), rev'd, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.), affd sub nom. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958); Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1958); Aaron v. Cooper, 169 F.
Supp. 325 (E.D. Ark. 1959); Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark.
1959), affd sub. nom. Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959) (per curiam); Aaron
v. Tucker, 186 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Ark. 1960), rev'd sub nom. Norwood v.
Tucker, 287 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1961); Clark v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661 (8th
Cir. 1966), reh'g denied, 374 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1967); Clark v. Board of Educ.,
426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971); Clark v. Board
of Directors, 328 F. Supp. 1205 (E.D. Ark. 1971), affd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Clark v. Board of Educ., 449 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 936 (1972), affd, 471 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1972) (mem.); Davis v. Board of
Educ., 328 F. Supp. 1197 (E.D. Ark.), affd in part, rev'd in part, 449 F.2d 500
(8th Cir. 1971), affd, 635 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1980), on remand, 520 F. Supp. 108
(E.D. Ark. 1981), affd, 674 F.2d 684 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 881 (1982);
Clark v. Board of Educ., 705 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1983); Little Rock School Dist.
v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1, 560 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Ark. 1983);
Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1, 584 F.
Supp. 328 (E.D. Ark. 1984); Little Rock School Dist. v. Knight, 725 F.2d 690
(8th Cir. 1983) (mem.); Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special
School Dist. No 1, 738 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1984). See generally U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS (1977)
(general history of the Little Rock litigation with summary of plans proposed
and of community responses).
188. Aaron, 163 F. Supp. at 15.
189. Aaron, 143 F. Supp. at 866.
190. Aaron, 243 F. 2d at 364.
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to blacks and called out the National Guard to bar the admit-
tance of nine black students to Little Rock Central High
School.' 91 President Eisenhower responded by dispatching fed-
eral troops to guarantee the admittance of the black students.
The troops stayed for the remainder of the school year. The
district court enjoined Governor Faubus from using the Arkan-
sas National Guard to obstruct or interfere with court orders,192
and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.193
In the face of the public hostility, local officials sought
postponement of the freedom-of-choice desegregation plan in
February 1958. The district court reviewed the evidence of inci-
dents of tension and disruption and found that, in the interest
of whites and blacks, a "peaceful interlude" was necessary, re-
quiring the suspension of the desegregation plan for two and
one-half years.194 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed, emphasizing that the constitutional rights of a minority
cannot yield to practical objections or mob veto.195 In what is
still its strongest language to date, the Eighth Circuit, through
Judge M.C. Matthes, declared that "the time has not yet come
in these United States when an order of a Federal Court must
be whittled away, watered down, or shamefully withdrawn in
the face of violent and unlawful acts of individual citizens in
opposition thereto."'196
Local opposition to desegregation continued, however.19
Opponents secured a state injunction to prevent the opening of
the "partially integrated high schools" of Little Rock. 98 The
federal district court set aside the injunction and the Eighth
191. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 9.
192. Aaron, 156 F. Supp. at 226-27.
193. Faubus, 254 F.2d at 806-08.
194. Aaron, 163 F. Supp. at 32.
195. Aaron, 257 F.2d at 40.
196. Id (italics in original).
197. Many whites opposed any desegregation and their opposition took the
form of law. In November 1956 voters of the state of Arkansas adopted three
initiatives: a state constitutional amendment directing the legislature to op-
pose in every constitutional manner the Brown mandates; a resolution of in-
terposition calling on all states and citizens to adopt a constitutional
amendment preventing federal involvement in public education; and a pupil-
assignment law. See Aaron, 257 F.2d at 35. In January 1957 the state legisla-
ture established a State Sovereignty Commission, relieved school children of
compulsory attendance in desegregated schools, required prointegration orga-
nizations to register and report to the State Sovereignty Commission, and au-
thorized local school districts to spend school funds to defend integration
litigation. Aaron, 163 F. Supp. at 15.
198. Thomason, 254 F.2d at 808.
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Circuit affirmed. Later that year, however, the Arkansas legis-
lature empowered Governor Faubus to close the schools in
1958-1959. After the federal courts found the act unconstitu-
tional,19 9 the school board attempted to lease the system to a
segregated private school. This move was also nullified by the
courts.20 0 Under increasing court pressure to desegregate, the
school board tried various pupil assignment techniques20 1 and
its freedom-of-choice plan to stall true desegregation. 20 2 Not
until 1971, after the Supreme Court's decisions in Raney20 3 and
Green,20 4 was significant progress made toward integrating the
Little Rock public schools.20 5
199. Aaron, 173 F. Supp. at 952.
200. Aaron, 261 F.2d at 108.
201. Clark, 426 F.2d at 1038-40.
202. Id at 1035.
203. Raney v. Board of Educ., 381 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1967).
204. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
205. When the Eighth Circuit court reconsidered the Little Rock cases
years later en banc, Clark v. Board of Educ., 449 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1971), it
reviewed a plan approved by the district court that involved pairing, cluster-
ing, and contiguous and noncontiguous zoning for integration. Grades 6
through 12 were to be desegregated by transporting students to their respec-
tive schools according to age group. Elementary integration was to be delayed
for one more year. The black parents argued that the plan needlessly delayed
elementary integration and placed an unequal share of the transportation bur-
den on black students; the board contended that elementary integration
should be delayed for a longer period and that the board should not be com-
pelled to transport students who live more than two miles from their schools.
I& at 495.
The court of appeals stated that it was "reassured by the board's declara-
tion that all secondary schools will be thoroughly integrated as to faculty, class
composition and extracurricular activities, and that the school administration
will be sensitive to the aspirations of black students." I& at 496. It approved
the construction of a new building that was planned for a white neighborhood
in 1970; it found that "the school will be completely integrated under the Dis-
trict Court plan," but it cautioned that future construction must receive ad-
vance approval by the district court. Id. The court also stated that
nondiscriminatory reassignment criteria for integration of faculty and staff
could no longer be delayed and that elementary schools must be unitary by
the following year. I& at 497-99. Although the court had declined in its previ-
ous review either to require or forbid busing, Cark, 426 F.2d at 1046, the court
now affirmed the district court's busing order, requiring "the district to fur-
nish transportation to secondary students assigned to a school more than two
miles from their homes," Clark, 449 F.2d at 499. It also approved an exception
to that policy for students who continued to attend the secondary school clos-
est to their homes. Id
The most recent development in the Little Rock saga occurred on Novem-
ber 19, 1984, when the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas entered an order consolidating the Little Rock school district with
the Pulaski County and Northern Little Rock school districts. The district
court found that consolidation was necessary because each of the school dis-
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The limitations of Brown Iis remedies for integrating pub-
lic schools are evident in many Eighth Circuit cases during this
period. The Supreme Court counseled no specific remedial
tool, and district and appellate courts continued to rely on vol-
untary measures, including freedom-of-choice plans, to achieve
desegregation. In Norwood v. Tucker,2 0 6 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals evaluated the operation of pupil placement
methods under Arkansas's law, which had previously been held
facially valid.207 The court enjoined local officials from
manipulating pupil placement to perpetuate segregation,2 0 but
it let stand the concept of freedom-of-choice plans as long as
school boards "'take affirmative steps, on their own initiative'
to facilitate and accomplish operation of the school district on a
non-discriminatory basis."20 9
tricts was engaging in practices that tended to resegregate each of the districts.
Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1, 597 F.
Supp. 1220, 222-26 (E.D. Ark. 1984).
206. 287 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1961).
207. See Parham v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1959). Arkansas's pupil
placement laws, ARu- STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1519 to -1524 (1960) (set out in Dove v.
Parham, 176 F. Supp. 242, 244 n.4 (E.D. Ark. 1959)), provided criteria by which
local boards of education or superintendents could assign or transfer their
pupils. The Eighth Circuit found that, on the face of the statute, "there is no
basis to say, in legal construction, that the Act is designed, or that it can only
operate, to maintain segregation and to prevent integration in a school sys-
tem." Parham, 271 F.2d at 136 (footnote omitted).
208. Norwood, 287 F.2d at 806.
209. I& at 809 (quoting Aaron, 169 F. Supp. at 337) (emphasis added by
Norwood court).
In Clark, 369 F.2d at 665, the Eighth Circuit court stated- "We do not be-
lieve that a general attack on the constitutionality of the 'freedom of choice'
method of ending school segregation is well taken at this time." See also Ra-
ney v. Board of Educ., 381 F.2d 252, 256 (8th Cir. 1967) (school building con-
struction not enjoined; substantial integration steps shown), rev'd on other
grounds, 391 U.S. 443 (1966); Yarbrough, 380 F.2d at 964-66 ("meaningful start"
toward desegregation made); Kemp , 352 F.2d at 21 ("freedom of choice" gen-
erally acceptable but has "fatal faults" as used here).
In Kelley v. Altheimer, Ark. Pub. School Dist. No. 22, 378 F.2d 483 (8th
Cir. 1967), the Eighth Circuit approved one freedom-of-choice plan. Until the
plan was initiated in 1965-1966, Altheimer, which was 67% nonwhite, operated
totally racially segregated schools. Black and white students were educated in
separate building complexes and transported in separate buses on duplicative
routes. When pupils were given a choice of schools, little changed. During the
first year, six blacks out of a total of 1,408 students selected white schools, and
no whites transferred. During the second year, 47 blacks transferred while the
number of white transferees remained at zero. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin
the construction of new segregated facilities, student and staff segregation, and
racial discrimination. The district court declined to invalidate the plan. Id. at
487-88. The Eighth Circuit approved freedom-of-choice plans in principle, but
ruled that the free choice must be real-a choice between schools, not between
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The promise of freedom-of-choice plans was never fulfilled.
In Kemp v. Beasley (Kemp II),210 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed the freedom-of-choice desegregation plan of
El Dorado, Arkansas, and concluded that there was "an appar-
ent failure by both parties to cooperate in carrying out the
mandate of this court for an immediate and efficacious plan of
desegregation."'2 11 After three years of operation, 212 a combined
junior and senior high school and six elementary schools re-
mained wholly black.2 1 3 The Court warned that "transitional
periods ... are no longer meaningful excuses for school boards
ordered to get on with their task of equal education for all." 21 4
Although the school board had pledged a "biracial bus system,"
only two of twenty-one buses were "integrated" in the then-
current school year.215
black and white schools. The court ordered that the board of education pro-
vide students with either an annual choice or a racially neutral assignment,
that it refrain from interfering with this choice, and that it desegregate faculty
and staff. Id at 489.
The court also ordered changes in the district's transportation system and
desegregation in the planning and construction of school facilities. Id. at 496-
97, 499. It noted that school bus systems were a "principal factor in perpetuat-
ing school segregation in many areas of the South." Id. at 497. By running two
school buses on the same roads to pick up neighbors of different races for dif-
ferent schools, the schgol wasted money and discouraged desegregation. The
court ended this practie and directed the formulation of a new busing plan.
Id. at 499. In addition, the court called for reliance on recently published De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare (H.E.W.) guidelines, 45 C.F.R. pt.
80 (1966), promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1964), and the Court stressed that the district court was to
retain jurisdiction "so that the goal of a desegregated, non-racially operated
school system is rapidly and finally achieved." Kelley, 378 F.2d at 489.
Acceptance of freedom-of-choice plans was accompanied by the rejection
of the oft-cited dictum that the Constitution does not require integration.
Kemp v. Beasley (Kemp 1), 352 F.2d 14, 21 (8th Cir. 1959) (rejecting dictum of
Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955)). This position accords
with those in other circuits, Walker v. County School Bd., 413 F.2d 53, 54 (4th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970); United States v. Jefferson County
Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 861-73 & n.58 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
840, affd on reh'g, 380 F.2d 385, 389 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc), and the
Supreme Court, Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437 (1968); see also
Kemp v. Beasley, 389 F.2d 178, 182 (8th Cir. 1968) (Kemp 1H) (affirmation of
Eighth Circuit position); Yarbrough v. Hulbert-West Memphis School Dist.,
380 F.2d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 1967) (same).
210. 389 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1968).
211. Id. at 180 (footnotes omitted).
212. Id. at 183.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 181.
215. Id. at 185-86.
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2. Toward More Effective Remedies: From Green to St
Louis
The Supreme Court's reversals in Raney v. Board of Edu-
cation 16 and Green v. School Board of New Kent County2 17
sounded the death knell for freedom-of-choice desegregation
plans. In refusing to accept freedom-of-choice plans as a consti-
tutional remedy, the Supreme Court in Green ruled that good
faith efforts at desegregation were inadequate. Henceforth,
courts should only approve plans "that [promise] realistically to
work, and [promise] realistically to work now."218 The Green
Court evaluated rural desegregation efforts in a Virginia county
populated by equal numbers of blacks and whites living in inte-
grated neighborhoods. The New Kent County School Board
maintained segregated schools until 1965,219 when it initiated a
freedom-of-choice plan. In striking down the 1965 plan, the
Court noted that, although 115 black children had elected to
transfer in the third year of the plan, eighty-five percent of the
black students remained in all-black schools and white students
had unanimously declined to transfer. 220 The Court refused to
approve a simply racially neutral plan. In Raney, the Court
likewise noted that, after three years of "freedom-of-choice," no
whites had transferred and over eighty-five percent of the
blacks remained in segregated schools. The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals was unduly conservative, the Court con-
cluded, in deciding that the adequacy of the plan had not been
challenged in the district court;221 on the contrary, the merits
had been tested and, in the Court's opinion, the plan perpetu-
ated a dual school system.222
Despite the trend away from freedom-of-choice plans, such
a plan was approved in Kemp v. Beasley (Kemp III). - The
Eighth Circuit found that progress in desegregation was heart-
216. 391 U.S. 443, 446 (1968).
217. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
218. Id- at 439 (emphasis in original).
219. Id at 433. The Pupil Placement Act, VA. CODE. §§ 22.232.1-.12 (1964).
authorized the state's Pupil Placement Board to supervise voluntary transfers,
but no blacks applied for transfer to the New Kent white schools until 1964.
Green, 391 U.S. at 433. Virginia's Pupil Placement Act was repealed by Act of
Apr. 5, 1966, ch. 590, 1966 Va Acts 867.
220. Green, 391 U.S. at 441.
221. Raney, 391 U.S. at 447.
222. Id
223. 423 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1970).
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ening.224 Two high schools and two junior high schools were no
longer racially identifiable, and faculty integration was proceed-
ing.2 25 Segregation persisted in the elementary schools, how-
ever, and the court ordered immediate action there because
"'[a]ll deliberate speed' for desegregation is no longer constitu-
tionally permissible. '226 The court also pointed out that it had
not passed on the neighborhood school concept, it had not
found that busing was a constitutional imperative, and it had
not ruled that precise racial percentages were required.227
With the weak constitutional foundation of freedom-of-
choice desegregation plans exposed in Green and Raney, the
need for effective remedies to combat school segregation was
immediate. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion228 provided the district courts with the remedial tools for
effective desegregation. Although noting that, "[a]s with any
equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of
the remedy,"229 the Supreme Court in Swann established four
specific remedies to achieve school desegregation: ratios, bus-
ing, alteration of attendance zones, and optional majority-to-mi-
nority transfers.
The Swann Court, in approving the district court's use of
the seventy-one to twenty-nine percent ratio in integrated
schools, stated that courts should use ratios as a "starting
point" in the process of shaping desegregation remedies.230 It
concluded that ratios were rooted in an awareness of the racial
composition of the school system as a whole.231 The Court also
approved the use of busing as a remedial tool. Although it de-
clined to formulate rigid guidelines for student transporta-
224. Id. at 858 ("The District has come a long way and it has done so, ap-
parently, with little sign of any resegregation tendency.").
225. Id at 856. High school advances were accomplished by pairing and
transportation, whereas the junior high schools benefited from freedom of
choice.
226. Id. at 857. In another case from the Green period, the Eighth Circuit
also emphasized its unwillingness to tolerate further delays. In Christian v.
Board of Educ., 440 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1971), the court considered plaintiffs'
complaint of dilatory response by the school district to plaintiffs' interrogato-
ries which, they alleged, would have confirmed impermissible patterns of pupil
assignment. The court agreed, declaring that "plaintiffs seeking vindication of
their constitutional rights in cases of this nature need to have quick and accu-
rate information." Id. at 612.
227. Kemp III, 423 F.2d at 857.
228. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
229. Id at 16.
230. Id. at 25.
231. Id
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tion,232 it noted that thirty-nine percent of the nation's public
school children rode buses to school in 1969-19702 3 and con-
cluded that "It]he importance of bus transportation as a normal
and accepted tool of educational policy"3 was apparent.
The Court in Swann also approved the remedial alteration
of attendance zones as part of an overall desegregation plan.
Acknowledging that such plans "may be administratively awk-
ward, inconvenient, and even bizarre,"2' 5 it observed that some
remedies must go beyond "racially neutral" attendance policies:
"When school authorities present a district court with a 'loaded
game board,' affirmative action in the form of remedial altering
of attendance zones is proper to achieve truly non-discrimina-
tory assignments."' ' 6 Finally, the Court approved an "optional-
majority-to-minority transfer" provision 237 in the district
court's 'desegregation plan that alleviated the problems of con-
centrations of minority group members in certain neighbor-
hoods and the relative scarcity of whites for integrating the
schools. The "one-race school," the Court said, is not in and of
itself "the mark of a system that still practices segregation by
law."238 The Court noted, however, that school officials bear
the burden of justifying the existence of such schools.2
After Swann, the Supreme Court's path was more circui-
tous and its support for the legacy of Brown less apparent. In
232. Id. at 29.
233. Id.
234. Id. For the states comprising the Eighth Circuit, telephone interviews
with state school officials confirm that in 1982-1983 approximately 1.6 million
students (or 55% of those enrolled) were transported to school at a cost of ap-
proximately $318 million. Of this total, the number transported for desegrega-
tion is small and is comparable with national statistics that show that less than
three percent of students are bused for desegregation purposes. Days, Turn-
ing Back the Clock- The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights, 19 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309, 321 (1984).
235. Swann, 402 U.S. at 28.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 26.
238. Id.
239. The Eighth Circuit has explored Swann's remedial aspects in several
cases. In Yarbrough v. Hulbert-West Memphis School Dist. No. 4, 457 F.2d 333,
335 (8th Cir. 1972), the Eighth Circuit explicitly approved racial ratios. The
plan approved by the district court called for a 30% minimum of the minority
race in each school, whether white or black, with monthly transfers to pre-
serve this ratio. The Eighth Circuit affirmed but limited transfers to once per
semester. Id. at 335. It distinguished Swann's proscription of fixed ratios by
stating that the ratio was simply a minimum threshold beyond which no
school could fall. Id
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Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I),24o the Court emphasized the
importance of local autonomy in controlling school opera-
tions241 and declared that the extent of the remedy for segrega-
tion is limited by the extent of the constitutional violation. 242
Although this emphasis seems contrary to Brown's central
teaching, several elements of the Milliken I remedy, including
the breadth of the consolidation involved, the involuntary na-
ture of the consolidation, and the relatively slight evidence of
interdistrict violations, distinguish Milliken I from other in-
terdistrict cases that seem to track Brown more closely. In ad-
dition, decisions such as Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman (Dayton I),243 Pasadena City Board of Education v.
Spangler,24 4 Washington v. Davis,245 and Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.24 6 suggest that the
Supreme Court was revaluating desegregative remedies
through its definition of constitutional violations themselves.
In these cases and others, the Court formulated a requirement
of segregative intent as a predicate to such civil rights ac-
tions.247  This reevaluation was apparent in 1973 in the
Supreme Court's first northern de jure discrimination case,
Keyes v. School District No. 1.248 Although Keyes was the first
nonunanimous decision since 1954, the Court agreed that de
jure segregation in one part of the city was "a predicate for a
finding of the existence of a dual school system.' '249
Despite the ambiguous messages of these decisions, the
Supreme Court soon renewed its support for effective desegre-
gation in Milliken 11.250 The Milliken II Court reviewed the
240. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
241. Id. at 741-42.
242. Id. at 744.
243. 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
244. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
245. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
246. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
247. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Supreme Court analo-
gized the case at bar to school desegregation cases in which the courts adhere
to the basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a
law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to
a racially discriminatory purpose. That there are both predominantly
black and predominantly white schools in a community is not alone
violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The essential element of de
jure segregation is "a current condition of segregation resulting from
intentional state action."
Id. at 240 (citing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205 (1973)).
248. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
249. Id. at 201.
250. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
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criteria that govern the exercise of equitable remedial pow-
ers2 1 and approved wide-ranging remedial and compensatory
educational programs to overcome deficiencies in educational
opportunities for minorities. 2 These programs included in-
service training for teachers and administrators, guidance and
counseling programs, revised testing procedures, and a remedial
reading and communication skills program.2 In authorizing
these programs, the Court declared that "[p]upil assignment
alone does not automatically remedy the impact of previous,
unlawful educational isolation; the consequences linger and can
be dealt with only by independent measures.... The root
condition shown by this record must be treated directly by spe-
cial training at the hands of teachers prepared for that task."2'
In addition to broadening the remedies themselves, the
Court also loosened its "segregative intent" restriction on reme-
dies. In Columbus Board of Education v. Penick* and Board
of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 256 the Court returned
to federal district and appellate courts a broader discretion to
define constitutional violations. In Columbus, the Court found
it "well within the requirements of Washington v. Davis and
Arlington Heights"257 for the district court to infer segregative
intent from "[a]dherence to a particular policy or practice, 'ith
full knowledge of the predictable effects of such adherence
upon racial imbalance in a school system.' "2 Concerning the
breadth of remedy, the Supreme Court quoted and approved
the district court's observation that "[a]ctions and omissions by
public officials which tend to make black schools blacker neces-
sarily have the reciprocal effect of making white schools
whiter."259
During this period of uncertain direction from the
Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a
series of cases that imposed broad remedies, including its first
northern desegregation case. Through policy decisions on edu-
cation, housing, highway construction, and zoning, segregation
251. Id. at 280-81.
252. Id at 282; see also id at 272 & n.5 (briefly describing educational
components).
253. Id. at 272.
254. Id at 287-88.
255. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
256. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
257. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 443 U.S. at 465.
258. Id
259. Id at 466 n.16.
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had found its way into cities and suburbs of the north, and its
presence triggered a new generation of litigation. The first of
these cases involved the Omaha public schools. In the Eighth
Circuit's first review of the Omaha case, United States v. School
District of Omaha,260 the court recounted the nature of the evi-
dence of school segregation: although twenty percent of the
district's 60,502 school children were black, over half attended
schools that were over eighty percent black, whereas nearly
three-fourths of the white students attended schools that were
over ninety-five percent white.261 In addition, the court cited
evidence of segregated faculty,2 62 deteriorating black facili-
ties,263 and a two-tiered school construction program.264 In fact,
thirty-seven of thirty-nine new schools built from 1951 to 1973
were predominantly one-race schools. 265 Nebraska had not
been a slave state, and neither it nor Omaha had enforced ra-
cism by statute as had Arkansas and Missouri. 266 Nevertheless,
the school district was liable for intentionally segregating
schools, the court reasoned, because "a presumption of segrega-
tive intent arises once it is established that school authorities
have engaged in acts or omissions, the natural, probable and
foreseeable consequence of which is to bring about or maintain
segregation. '267
To aid the development and implementation of a desegre-
gation plan, the court of appeals devised several policy guide-
lines. Reassignment of students attending integrated schools
was to be avoided, the court held, because "[i]t makes little
sense to reassign students now attending integrated schools in
their neighborhood to schools in other sections of the city. '268
The plan should not increase black enrollments above twenty-
260. 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975).
261. 521 F.2d at 533.
262. Id. at 537-38.
263. Id. at 544-45.
264. Id. at 543.
265. Id. at 543.
266. See, e.g., supra note 116.
267. 521 F.2d at 535-36.
268. Id. at 547. The court defined integrated schools as those schools with
black enrollments between 5% and 35%. Id. Recent studies suggest that after
schools are desegregated, urban housing patterns also show progress toward
desegregation. See, e.g., D. Pearce, R. Crain & R. Farley, Lessons Not Lost:
The Effect of School Desegregation on the Rate of Residential Desegregation in
Large Cities 2-3, 18-20 (1984) (unpublished paper) (communities with city-wide
desegregation experienced significant decreases in housing segregation, in-
creases in neighborhood stabilization, and changes in real estate marketing
practices).
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five percent in schools where black enrollments were then be-
low that threshold. The court noted that "[t]his policy will dis-
courage the labeling of additional schools as %lack,' [and] will
hopefully discourage 'white flight,"' 26 9 thus furthering integra-
tion in the district. In schools with black enrollment between
twenty-five and thirty-five percent, attendance policies were
not to "significantly" increase the black-to-white ratio and in no
event were to allow it to exceed thirty-five percent.270 Trans-
fers that would increase segregation in either sending or receiv-
ing schools were not permitted, and school officials were to
consider using approved integration techniques, including pair-
ing or clustering of schools, realignment of school assignment
zones, and the relocation of portable classrooms.27'
In Omaha 11,272 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
viewed its mandate in light of the "segregative intent" opinions
in Pasadena and Washington.27 3 The district court had ap-
proved a modified version of the school board's plan,2 74 and on
review the court of appeals, anticipating Columbus and Dayton
II, found "nothing in these opinions that would cause us to re-
vise our earlier opinion."2 75 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari2 76 and remanded for reconsideration in light of Arlington
Heights.2 77 In Omaha III,278 the circuit court reviewed its find-
ing of intentional segregation and concluded that "a discrimina-
tory purpose has been a motivating factor in the School
District's actions... because the natural and foreseeable con-
sequence of the acts of the School District was to create and
maintain segregation in five different areas."27 9 In light of the
Supreme Court's instructions, the court of appeals remanded
the case to the district court to determine the incremental seg-
regation produced by the constitutional violation and to match
the remedy to the violation.2s0
269. Omaha , 521 F.2d at 547.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. United States v. School Dist. of Omaha (Omaha I/), 541 F.2d 708, 709
(8th Cir. 1976) (en banc), vacated, 433 U.S. 667 (1977).
273. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text
274. United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 418 F. Supp. 22, 25 (D. Neb.),
affd, 541 F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1976).
275. Omaha I, 541 F.2d at 709 (citation omitted).
276. School Dist. of Omaha v. United States, 433 U.S. 667, 669 (1977).
277. Id. at 669.
278. United States v. School Dist. of Omaha (Omaha II), 565 F.2d 127 (8th
Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978).
279. 565 F.2d at 128 (citation omitted).
280. Id.
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After an extensive review of the history of the litigation
and of the evidence supporting the finding of a violation, the
district court concluded, in an unpublished opinion, that the
school district had failed to present sufficient evidence to estab-
lish that the scope of the remedy exceeded the scope of the vio-
lations.281 With the scope of the remedy approved, the Omaha
schools were successfully desegregated, and the district court
declared the system unitary in September 1984.282
Another Eighth Circuit case of the period, Booker v. Spe-
cial School District No. 1,283 raised the special issue of segrega-
tion of blacks and Native Americans in the Minneapolis public
schools. 284 In 1972, the district court found that the schools
were intentionally segregated and approved a modified plan
that included minority enrollment guidelines, faculty desegre-
gation, judicial supervision of school construction, and the sub-
mission of semiannual progress reports to the court.285 After
the Supreme Court decided Pasadena, Dayton I, and the "seg-
regative intent" cases,28 6 the school board sought dissolution of
the district court's injunction, citing the elimination of "incre-
mental segregation" (separation that is facially nondiscrimina-
tory but foreseeably results in segregation). 28 7 The court of
appeals refused to dissolve the order, concluding that the dis-
trict court was not clearly erroneous in refusing to apply the
Dayton and Pasadena standards to the Minneapolis public
schools. The circuit court agreed with the district court that
the line between "original" and "incremental" segregation was
elusive and that the remedy of racial ratios (single minority en-
rollments of thirty-five percent or combined minority enroll-
ments of forty-two percent) was not overbroad, especially when
adjusted upward to thirty-nine and forty-six percent.2 88
The scope of the remedy was the principal issue in two
281. United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, No. 73-0-320, slip op. at 22 (D.
Neb. June 26, 1979).
282. United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, No. 73-0-320, order at 2-3 (D.
Neb. Sept. 17, 1984) (dismissing case on grounds that district achieved unitary
status).
283. 585 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1978).
284. Id. at 350.
285. Booker v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 351 F. Supp. 799 (D. Minn. 1972).
See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN MIN-
NEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA (1977) (background materials on local problems and
summary of desegregation plans).
286. See supra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
287. Booker, 585 F.2d at 352.
288. Id. at 353-55.
[Vol. 69:735
CIVIL RIGHTS
other major Eighth Circuit cases in this period.289 In Morrilton
School District No. 32 v. United States, 90 the district court re-
quired an interdistrict remedy because of state involvement in
the consolidation and segregation of local school districts.
Although Arkansas's consolidation policy was race-neutral on
its face, state law had required separate schools for blacks and
whites until the Brown decision in 1954.291 As a result, stu-
dents and staff were extensively segregated. The Eighth Cir-
cuit agreed with the district court that the school-district map
resembled a "crazy quilt, and the resemblance results from the
gerrymandering of district lines in years past in deference to
the requirement of segregation."292 The circuit court promptly
approved the district court's consolidation of several surround-
ing districts,293 relying especially on Swann and Milliken I. In
addition, the court prescribed deadlines of successive years for
the integration of the secondary and elementary schools and
provided for the election of an interim school board.2 1 In ap-
proving the plan, the court also noted that the district court's
order requiring minority enrollments between thirteen percent
and thirty-three percent was a discretionary gesture to elimi-
nate discrimination and was not designed to perpetuate a par-
289. In United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.), cerL denied, 423
U.S. 951 (1975), the court of appeals considered a school-consolidation case.
Kinloch School District No. 18 had been a single segregated school district un-
til 1937, when it was separated into white and black districts. 515 F.2d at 1367.
Kinloch, the resulting black district, had the lowest assessed valuation per pu-
pil in St. Louis County, inferior buildings and equipment, a smaller library,
lower teachers' salaries, a higher teacher-turnover rate, and a more limited
curriculum. Id. To address these inequalities, the district court ordered the
Ferguson School District to annex the Berkeley and Kinloch Districts. Id. at
1368. The disparate tax rates in the school districts-$3.80, $4.97, and $5.38 per
$100 assessed value, respectively-posed an administrative problem that the
district court remedied by imposing a uniform $6.03 levy. Id. at 1371. The
Eighth Circuit rolled back the levy to $5.38, the highest of the three levies. Id.
at 1373. The court cited Swann regarding the broad equitable authority of the
federal courts in framing desegregation remedies and noted that federal con-
stitutional guarantees supersede state policies when the two conflict. Id. at
1372 (citing North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971),
and Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 429 F.2d 364, 368 (8th Cir. 1970)).
290. 606 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1979), cerL dismissed, 440 U.S. 1050 (1980), cert.
denied; 444 U.S. 1071 (1980).
291. 606 F.2d at 225-26; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-509(c) (1947). In fact, the re-
quirement is still technically on the books. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-509(c)
(1980).
292. Id. at 226 (quoting the district court).
293. Id. at 230.
294. Id at 231.
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ticular racial ratio.295
In the case of a St. Louis school district, a group of black
parents originally filed suit in 1972 under the fourteenth
amendment, alleging racial segregation.296 The district court
found no constitutional violation and concluded that the board
of education had achieved a unitary school system in the years
of 1954 to 1956 through its "neighborhood school policy. '297
The Eighth Circuit reversed in Adams v. United States2 98 and
noted that the St. Louis schools exemplified state-ordered seg-
regative measures reaching back to the antebellum period.29
The court of appeals in Adams considered four remedial
desegregation plans prepared by the parties' expert wit-
nesses.30 0 The court approved a set of constitutionally permissi-
ble alternatives and remanded the case to the district court
with suggestions for remedial techniques, including student ex-
changes with the county school districts, magnet and specialty
schools, permissive intradistrict student transfers, establish-
ment of an educational park, and compensatory or remedial
programs.30 ' On remand, the district court approved a plan em-
bodying many of the remedial techniques suggested by the
court of appeals. 30 2 Because of the potential involvement of
suburban school districts in the litigation, the district court en-
295. Id. at 230-31.
296. Liddell v. State of Missouri (Liddell VII), 731 F.2d 1294, 1298 (8th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 82 (1984). See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE ST. LouIS AND KANSAS CITY AREAS
(1981) (report of Mo. Advisory Committee; general overview of local politics
and history of relevant litigation).
297. Liddell v. Board of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1304, 1360-61 (E.D. Mo. 1979),
rev'd, 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1980).
298. 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980).
299. 620 F.2d at 1280-81. Separate schools for blacks and whites in St.
Louis were first authorized in 1865, Act of Feb. 17, 1865, § 13, 1865 Mo. Laws
170, and incorporated into the state constitution in 1945, Mo. CONST. art. IX,
§ 1(a) (1945). Although unusable after 1954, the authorization remained until
1976. See Liddell 620 F.2d at 1280; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (amended Aug. 3,
1976). Even after a neighborhood-school plan was implemented in 1955, after
Brown I and Brown II, the schools remained racially identifiable. Liddell, 620
F.2d at 1281.
300. Brief descriptions of these plans appear at 620 F.2d at 1292-97.
301. Id. at 1295-97.
302. Once again the defendants appealed and the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed in Liddell v. Board of Educ. (Liddell III), 667 F.2d 643 (8th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1982). The court also affirmed the dis-
trict court's allocation of costs that required the state to pay one-half the cost
of the desegregation plan. Liddell v. Board of Educ. (Liddell V), 677 F.2d 626,
628 (8th Cir.), affg 491 F. Supp. 351, 353 (E.D. Mo. 1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
877 (1982).
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tered an order in 1982 disclosing the interdistrict plan that
would be used if the suburban districts were found to be consti-
tutional violators.30 3 Before the liability hearings could be held,
however, the parties reached a settlement that included the city
school district and -a number of suburban districts.3° 4 The set-
tlement used many of the remedial techniques approved by the
Eighth Circuit in Adams.30 5 As primary constitutional viola-
tors, the state and city were obliged to share the costs of the
plan.
Under the settlement, black schoolchildren in St. Louis
have several educational options. If they already attend inte-
grated neighborhood schools in the city, they may continue to
attend these schools. If not, the students may transfer into
these integrated schools if positions become available.3° The
quality of city schools will be improved by special programs, in-
cluding an improved pupil-teacher ratio, more certified teach-
ers, improved library services, the inclusion of art, music, and
physical education in the elementary curriculum, more pre-
school centers, and better planning and program
development.3 07
Black city students may also voluntarily transfer to county
schools.308 Approximately 2,500 students transferred in 1983-
1984 and approximately 5,200 students have applied for transfer
in 1984-1985.3 09 Black city students may also, however, con-
tinue to attend their all-black neighborhood schools, the quality
of which will be significantly improved by remedial and com-
pensatory programs authorized in Milliken 11.310 These pro-
grams include class-size reduction, remedial programs, parental
involvement, and educational alternatives for black students
unable to attend magnet schools.31 ' In addition, black students'
motivational needs will be met by introducing academic role
models and by establishing student committees to focus on mo-
303. Liddell VII, 731 F.2d at 1300.
304. Id.
305. Id.; see supra note 301 and accompanying text.
306. Liddell VII, 731 F.2d 1294, 1302-04 (1984) (specifically approving por-
tion of Settlement Plan allowing voluntary interdistrict student transfers sug-
gested in prior Liddell litigation).
307. Id. at 1312-13.
308. Id. at 1301-09.
309. Statistics gathered by the Office of the Clerk of the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from St. Louis's Voluntary Interdis-
trict Coordinating Council.
310. Liddell VII, 731 F.2d at 1312-18 (citing Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 283).
311. 731 F.2d at 1316.
1985]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
rale, attendance, and behavior issues. 312
As a final option, black city students may attend city mag-
net schools and integrative programs with white county stu-
dents.313 Magnet schools in the plan feature individualized
teaching, low pupil-teacher ratios, and specialized programs tai-
lored to students' interests.31 4 Maximum efforts will be made
to attract white county students to the magnet schools so that
white students will not be drawn out of presently integrated
city schools. Nearly 8000 students enrolled in these programs
in 1982-1983, and 12,000 to 14,000 are expected in city magnet
schools by 1987.315
The settlement agreement has a life of five years. At the
end of that period, if the participating suburban districts have
met the goals of the plan, they will receive a final judgment
that will satisfy their desegregation obligations. 316 Of St.
Louis's 53,618 schoolchildren, 41,470 are black.317 At the end of
five years, if the plan is fully implemented, approximately
15,000 black students will be enrolled in county schools, 318 cre-
ating new social and educational opportunities for white and
black student alike. Between 5000 and 7000 black students will
attend city magnet schools with an equal number of white stu-
dents, 10,000 to 12,000 black students are expected to attend in-
tegrated schools in the City of St. Louis, and the remaining
black students will attend upgraded and enriched all-black city
schools. 319
As these cases make clear, the Eighth Circuit has made
considerable progress toward desegregation. Despite this pro-
gress, however, litigation continues and problems remain. If
history is any guide, it may be some time before deep-seated ra-
cial tensions disappear and racial equality and desegregation in
education become realities.320
312. Id. at 1312.
313. Id. at 1309-12.
314. Id. at 1311.
315. Id. at 1309-10.
316. Id. at 1300.
317. Statistics gathered by the Office of the Clerk of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
318. Liddell VII, 731 F.2d at 1302.
319. Id. at 1309-10 (magnet schools). The author has derived the other en-
rollment figures inferentially, using enrollment totals and Liddell VII 731
F.2d at 1301-02, 1309-10, 1315, 1316.
320. Further comment on contemporary desegregation efforts is inappro-
priate in light of the pendency of several cases in the Eighth Circuit. Specifi-
cally, aspects of the St. Louis case are still before the district court, the Little
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B. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EMPLOYMENT
1. Eighth Circuit Cases in the Pre-Bakke Era
During the period before the Supreme Court decided Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke,321 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals considered affirmative action in a
number of contexts. Some of these contexts affected employ-
ment only incidentally, as in the school desegration cases.322
Most of the cases, however, have arisen under statutes directed
specifically at employment, such as Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.323
Rock case is before the District Court, which has expressed interest in a plan
to consolidate area school districts, Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County
Special School Dist. No. 1, 584 F. Supp. 328, 352-53 (E.D. Ark.), rev'd on other
grounds, 738 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1984), and the District Court for the Western
District of Missouri has ordered the desegregation of the Kansas City schools,
Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420, slip op. at 35-36 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 17, 1984).
321. 438 U.S. 265; see infra notes 400-01 and accompanying text.
322. See infra notes 324-37 and accompanying text.
323. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-12
(1982), grants federal courts broad authority to remedy employment discrimi-
nation. Upon finding intentional discrimination, a court may enjoin the of-
fending employment practice, "and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring
of employees .... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri-
ate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). Two other provisions in the statute circum-
scribe the court's equitable authority. Section 20OOe-2(h) preserves an
employer's right to apply different standards for compensation or other terms
and conditions of employment based on a "bona fide seniority or merit sys-
ter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982). Section 2000e-2(j) provides that nothing in
Title VII
shall be interpreted to require... preferential treatment to any indi-
vidual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin ... on account of an imbalance which may exist with
respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer...
in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State,
section, or other area, or in the available work force in any commu-
nity, State, section, or other area.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982).
Although neither the fourteenth amendment nor 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982)
contains similar provisions, the Eighth Circuit has evaluated affirmative action
cases litigated thereunder with these provisions of Title VII in mind. See, e.g.,
Warsocki v. City of Omaha, 726 F.2d 1358, 1359-60 (8th Cir. 1984); Setser v.
Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 965-68 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1064 (1981).
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a. Affirmative Action in Employment as a Means of School
Desegregation
Although not litigated under Title VII,324 the school deseg-
regation cases addressed affirmative action in employment. In
these cases, courts confronted school systems that assigned only
white teachers to white students and only black teachers to
black students. Black teachers typically were paid less than
their white counterparts and were forced to teach larger
classes.325
Change, in many cases, came slowly. In the early school
cases, the Eighth Circuit merely observed that Brown and Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act required an integrated teaching
staff.32 6 In Clark v. Board of Education,327 the court took a
small step forward and required the board of education to "take
accelerated and positive action to end discriminatory practices
in staff assignment and recruitment. ' 328 The court, however,
stopped short of imposing a "set timetable with fixed mathe-
matical requirements. '3 29
In Kelley v. Altheimer,330 the school board, despite numer-
ous opportunities to desegregate its school faculties, had contin-
ued to hire and assign on a racially discriminatory basis.3 31 The
court of appeals therefore directed in May 1967 that complete
desegregation of the faculty be accomplished no later than the
beginning of the 1969-1970 school year. When Kemp v. Beasley
came before the court of appeals a second time,332 the court
found faculty desegregation two years behind schedule.3 33 The
school board argued that affirmative remedies for faculty segre-
gation that took into account a teacher's race constituted un-
324. The school desegregation cases arose primarily under the fourteenth
amendment, with some cases also invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) and Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1982). See, e.g.,
Brown 1, 347 U.S. 438, 488 (1954); Yarbrough v. Hulbert-West Memphis School
Dist. No. 4, 380 F.2d 962, 963 (8th Cir. 1967); Kelley v. Altheimer, 378 F.2d 483,
485-86 (8th Cir. 1967); Clark v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661, 665 (8th Cir. 1966).
325. See, e.g., Morrilton School Dist. No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d 222,
227 (8th Cir. 1979); Kelley v. Altheimer, 378 F.2d 483, 491 (8th Cir. 1967).
326. See, e.g., Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770, 778-80 (8th Cir. 1966);
Kemp v. Beasley (Kemp 1), 352 F.2d 14, 22-23 (8th Cir. 1965).
327. 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966).
328. Id. at 669.
329. Id at 669-70.
330. 378 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1967).
331. Id at 491-94.
332. Kemp v. Beasley (Kemp II), 389 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1968).
333. See id. at 189.
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lawful "racial discrimination in reverse."334 The court rejected
this argument, emphasizing that "[c]ourts will not say in one
breath that public school systems may not practice segregation,
and in the next that they may do nothing to eliminate it."33 It
also ordered the board to submit to the district court its list of
vacancies and reassignments to fulfill its constitutional obliga-
tion.336 In subsequent school employment cases, the court of
appeals continued to require that faculty desegregation plans
include specific affirmative steps to be taken pursuant to a time
schedule, that job descriptions and hiring criteria be promul-
gated, and that uniform ratios of black to white faculty mem-
bers be adopted.337
b. Affirmative Action in Employment Discrimination Cases
In employment discrimination cases in general, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals frequently has used nonnumerical af-
firmative remedies to achieve compliance with civil rights laws.
Such action is not always necessary, of course. For example, if
an employer is making good faith efforts to comply with Title
VII,3 38 the court of appeals has found injunctive relief unneces-
sary3 39 and has simply remanded to the district court, which re-
tains jurisdiction to ensure the continued implementation of an
employer's own equal employment opportunity policy.30 Ab-
sent such signs of progress and good faith, however, the court
334. Id at 187-88.
335. Id. (quoting Wanner v. County School Bd., 357 F.2d 452, 454-55 (4th
Cir. 1966)).
336. See id. at 191.
337. See, e.g., United States v. Hazelwood School Dist., 534 F.2d 805, 819-20
(8th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 301 (1977); United States v.
School Dist. of Omaha, 421 F.2d 530, 546 (8th Cir. 1975).
338. See supra note 323.
339. In addition to the forms of injunctive relief discussed infra notes 344-
98 and accompanying text, 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(g) (1982) authorizes reinstate-
ment and back pay.
340. See, ag., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421,
429 (8th Cir. 1970). In enacting the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress empha-
sized voluntary compliance, private settlements, and the elimination of unfair
practices without resort to the court's injunctive powers. 433 F.2d at 429; 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in
1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2393.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the employer often
achieve a settlement that remedies past discriminatory practices. A consent
decree between the EEOC and an employer does not necessarily moot a plain-
tiff employee's claims, however, and the court has ordered relief beyond such
decrees when necessary. See, eg., Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721,
725-26 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973).
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has found injunctive relief necessary and has used it to order
employers to develop objective, nondiscriminatory hiring and
promotion standards. The need for such standards arises in the
frequent case in which the employer has followed a subjective
hiring policy in a racially discriminatory manner.341 The court
has also ordered employers to periodically report to the Justice
Department and the district court on their progress in hiring
qualified black employees. 342 Employers are frequently or-
dered to maintain records, available for government inspection,
explaining their reasons for selecting white applicants over
available black applicants. When an employer's past recruiting
practice has been discriminatory, the court has ordered affirma-
tive minority recruiting by requiring that notices of job open-
ings be directed to potential black applicants and to black
organizations. 343
United States v. Sheet Metal Workers344 is an example of
the application of nonnumerical affirmative remedies in Title
VII cases. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals required in
Sheet Metal Workers that qualified black employees be placed
on a union referral list that would insure that they were re-
ferred on the same basis as white employees. The United
States Attorney General had brought suit alleging that two
union locals, both of which had excluded blacks from member-
ship before 1964, were continuing to discriminate. 345 Both lo-
cals focused their post-1964 organizational efforts on white
contractors with white employees. They also discouraged their
341. See, e.g., Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 563 & n.15, 573 (8th
Cir. 1982); Wells v. Meyer's Bakery, 561 F.2d 1268, 1271, 1273 (8th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Hazelwood School Dist., 534 F.2d 805, 809, 819 (8th Cir.), va-
cated and remanded on other grounds, 433 U.S. 299, 302 (1976); Rogers v. In-
ternational Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1345-46 (8th Cir.), vacated and remanded,
423 U.S. 809 (1975); United States v. N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354, 368, 377 (8th Cir.
1973); Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 1973).
342. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist., 534 F.2d at 819; NL. Indus., 479 F.2d
at 378, 380-82.
This reporting requirement does not always cure the problem. For exam-
ple, in EEOC v. Contour Chair Lounge Co., 596 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1979), a con-
sent decree required the defendant to make semiannual reports to the EEOC
as to hirings and discharges, indicating names, races, sexes, job classifications,
and rates of pay of persons hired or discharged. Although the defendant did
not comply with this requirement over most of the life of the consent decree,
it did file a report after the suit was filed indicating it had hired 11 white per-
sons and only one black. Id. at 812.
343. Hazelwood School Dist., 534 F.2d at 819-20; N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d at 378
& n.19; United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d 123, 139 (8th Cir. 1969).
344. 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
345. Id. at 127-31.
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members from working on jobs where black contractors or
black tradesmen were employed. The locals had instituted a
public relations program to inform the community that their
apprenticeship training programs were nondiscriminatory but
had not done the same concerning the right to membership or
use of the referral systems. The referral rules perpetuated past
discrimination by their emphasis on past experience within the
referral system.34 6
The court of appeals held that black workers were aware
of these policies and that it was unreasonable to expect them to
seek to join either local or use the referral systems under those
circumstances.34 7 It was therefore unnecessary and unrealistic
to require a finding that individual black tradesmen had sought
to use the referral systems or to join the unions but had been
rejected. The court ordered the locals to modify their collective
bargaining agreement to recognize the experience of black
workers outside of the agreement. s48 Those blacks with
equivalent experience in the industry were to be permitted to
register with the unions and placed in highest priority referral
groups. The locals were also ordered to publicize that their re-
ferral systems were nondiscriminatory.34 9
Nonnumerical remedies do not, however, exhaust the af-
firmative means used by the Eighth Circuit to combat employ-
ment discrimination. The court of appeals has also used
numerically based remedies when considering employment dis-
crimination suits, especially if no other means exists to remedy
the present effects of past discrimination. For example, in
Carter v. Gallagher,s3 ° minority employment applicants to the
Minneapolis Fire Department brought suit contending that the
346. Id.
347. Id. at 132.
348. Id. at 133.
349. In describing the remedy, the court noted:
In requiring the modifications, we impose no quotas, we grant no
preferences.
Nor do we deprive any non-Negro craftsman of bona fide senior-
ity rights. ... We do make it possible, however, for qualified Ne-
groes-those who have been deprived of the opportunity to gain
experience in the construction industry or to gain experience under
the collective bargaining agreement-to be placed in the group where
they will have an equal opportunity to be referred for work.
Id at 133-34 (footnote omitted).
350. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.)(panel and en banc opinions), cert denied, 406
U.S. 950 (1971).
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city was practicing illegal employment discrimination. 351 The
district court found liability352 and established a hiring prefer-
ence or "quota" for twenty minority persons who qualified on
the basis of existing or revised examinations. 35 3 The city ap-
pealed, attacking this preference as unconstitutional discrimi-
nation against white applicants who scored higher on entrance
examinations. 35
4
A panel of the court of appeals struck down the hiring
preference provision as unconstitutional reverse discrimina-
tion.355 Acknowledging that courts have broad equitable pow-
ers to fashion remedies for discrimination, the panel
nonetheless concluded that section 1981 and the fourteenth
amendment prohibit all employment discrimination based on
race-against whites or blacks. A remedy, the court noted, can-
not deprive others of a constitutionally protected right.350
The court of appeals, en banc, reversed the panel, stating
that the district court had "the authority to order the hiring of
20 qualified minority persons. '35 7 The court en banc did, how-
ever, modify the lower court's order to assure that the order
was implemented without denying the constitutional rights of
others. The district court's absolute preference became a quali-
fied preference requiring that one out of every three persons
hired by the fire department be a qualified minority person un-
til at least twenty minority persons had been hired.358
In reversing the panel, the court en banc challenged the
principles underlying the panel's "color-blind" interpretation of
the fourteenth amendment. The court recognized that erasing
the effects of past discrimination may conflict with the employ-
ment interest of white persons with superior test scores but
deemed it more important to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination by accounting for the respective numbers of an
351. The Eighth Circuit's consideration of the remedy relied heavily on
precedents under Title VII. 452 F.2d at 329.
352. Judge Earl R. Larson established the city's liability for race discrimi-
nation because none of the 535 Minneapolis firefighters were black, Indian, or
Mexican-American, even though blacks constituted 6.44% of the Minneapolis
population in 1970. Id. at 323.
353. Judge Larson's decree was not reported, but it was quoted in full in
the panel opinion. See id at 318-22.
354. Id. at 324.
355. Id. at 324-26.
356. Id at 324.
357. Id. at 331.
358. Id
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employer's black and white employees.s 9 The Supreme
Court's opinion in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education360 had reflected this view by acknowledging that a
combination of the awareness of the racial composition of a
school system and the use of mathematical ratios are a starting
point in the process of shaping a remedy. The Eighth Circuit
panel had contended that Swann's endorsement of ratios was
applicable to school cases only. The en banc majority disagreed.
The question dividing the Carter court was whether race
discrimination could be remedied by focusing solely on individ-
ual rights. In the school context, the Supreme Court has not
focused on individual rights; on the contrary, it has held that a
white student does not have a constitutional right to attend the
neighborhood public school.361 The focus instead has been on
the right of black students, as a class, to attend a unitary, non-
discriminatory school system.362 The en banc majority in
Carter held that the discrimination in employment was, like
that in education, systemic. The court acknowledged the racial
composition of the fire department and of the city generally.363
It concentrated on the right of black people to be employed as
firefighters, free of discrimination imposed on them historically
as a class.3 64 The Carter en banc majority also directly chal-
lenged the notion that a remedial hiring ratio necessarily re-
sults in hiring "less qualified" minority persons over more
qualified whites. Qualifying examinations do not rank appli-
cants with precision and predictive significance. 3a5
359. Id at 330.
360. 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971).
361. Green v. School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439-42 (1968).
362. See Brown , 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954); Brown I, 349 U.S. 294, 300.01
(1955).
363. Carter, 452 F2d at 328 & n.2.
364. Id. at 329-30. A related consideration for the court was the recognition
that the department's past discriminatory policies were well-known in the
community, especially by minority persons. Id. at 331. It was thus reasonable
to use hiring ratios to give minority members "some positive assurance that if
qualified they will in fact be hired on more than token basis." Id.
365. Id. (citing generally Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under
Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring
and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1637-69 (1969) ("Contrary to popular
belief, the likelihood that scores on any particular aptitude test will correlate
significantly with performance on any particular job is very slim indeed." Id.
at 1643.)); see also Duncan, The Future of Affirmative Action: A Jurispruden-
tial/Legal Critique, 17 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 503, 529-31 & n.94 (1982) (con-
tending that the notion of "merit" is troublesome and examinations such as
the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) do not necessarily predict compe-
tence); Little, Affirmative Action" A Measure of Inherent Transience, 31 U.
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Affirmative action in promotion often raises even more
controversy than affirmative action in hiring.366 Such remedial
adjustments to promotions often interfere with settled expecta-
tions of nonminority employees; these expectations, however,
often stem from an employer's past discrimination. The Eighth
Circuit has therefore ordered promotion goals and ratios when
necessary to remedy discriminatory promotion policies despite
possibly unsettling consequences.
For example, the court of appeals has altered seniority sys-
tems that were based on racial discrimination 367 and has im-
FLA. L. REV. 671, 691-92 (1979) (questioning whether specialized admission
tests predict success in a profession closely enough to justify their use); Poole,
Argument, On Merit, 1 LAW & INEQUALITY 155 (1983) (arguing that the con-
cept of merit is inherently biased and unfair).
Since this litigation, the department has been integrated at the entry
level. As of July 6, 1984, there were 46 minority employees in the depart-
ment, or 9.4% of the total personnel. Thirty-four of a total 237 entry-level
firefighters, or 14.3%, are black, Hispanic, or American Indian. The number of
minority promotions to fire captain, however, presents a different picture: 87
of the department's 88 fire captains are white. City of Minneapolis Affirma-
tive Action Management Program, Quarterly Report (July 6, 1984).
366. See, e.g., B. ScHLEI & E. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 1403-04 (2d ed. 1983) (noting that few courts order promotion quotas);
Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A Gen-
eral Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1598, 1678-79 (1982) (pointing out that affirmative action at the promotion
stage has a greater potential for political and other forms of resistance by
white employees than do programs to eliminate discrimination at the hiring
stage); Smith, Affirmative Action in Extremis: A Preliminary Diagnosis of
the Symptoms and the Causes, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1337, 1352-53 & nn.38-45
(1980) (asserting that an inevitable conflict exists between affirmative action
and seniority systems); Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious
Remedies, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 238-40 (1980) (arguing that programs that
take away vested rights as opposed to affecting only the possibility of future
benefits may require a more substantial justification).
367. The court altered a company's seniority system that had been based
on racially segregated work departments in United States v. N. L. Indus., 479
F.2d 354, 380 (8th Cir. 1973). The court found that the company's seniority sys-
tem and its method of selecting foremen was discriminatory. Only three of
the company's 100 foremen were black, and they supervised only labor depart-
ment employees. Id. at 367. A pool of 32 qualified black employees existed,
and less qualified whites had been promoted to foreman. The company's de-
partment seniority system perpetuated departmental discrimination by dis-
couraging blacks from transferring to jobs in all-white departments.
The Department of Justice requested that the first 15 foreman vacancies
be filled from a list of qualified black employees. Id. at 377. It also requested
that half of all additional foreman vacancies be filled by qualified black em-
ployees. The court rejected this remedy but revised the foreman selection sys-
tem, emphasizing objective standards, and a one-black-to-one-white ratio until
15 blacks were promoted. The Court concluded that this ratio was appropriate
because 25% percent of the company's production workforce, the group from
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posed ratios to remedy racially discriminatory promotion
practices based on testing.368 Firefighters Institute for Racial
Equality v. City of St. Louis369 represents one of several strug-
gles to implement nondiscriminatory tests for promotions. In
Firefighters Institute, the United States joined a group of black
firefighters in alleging racially discriminatory practices in hir-
ing and promotions in the St. Louis Fire Department. A con-
sent decree approved by the district court set a black hiring
goal of fifty percent for entry level vacancies over a five-year
period.370 The district court also approved the promotional
exam for fire captain, however, despite a finding of disparate
impact,3 71 and both the United States and the black plaintiffs
appealed. The Eighth Circuit found that the exam failed to test
an essential characteristic for promotion to fire captain: super-
visory ability.372 The court of appeals remanded to the district
court for the development of a valid ekam.
On remand, the district court enjoined the city from pro-
moting anyone to fire captain before the development of a valid
examination or, in the alternative, required that fifty percent of
the vacancies be filled by qualified blacks pending the develop-
ment of a valid examination. 37 It subsequently revised the or-
der to provide that promotions be made based on a racially
identified list of all firefighters with the requisite five years of
experience, used in conjunction with a valid technique for test-
which foremen were selected, was black. The ratio was temporary; once im-
plemented, no future promotions would involve racial preferences.
368. For a general discussion of discriminatory testing, see the Supreme
Court's landmark decision, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
369. 410 F. Supp. 948, 957, amended nunc pro tun, 418 F. Supp. 383 (E.D.
Mo. 1976), affd in par, rev'd in part; and remanded in part, 549 F.2d 506 (8th
Cir.), cer- denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977), rev'd and remanded qfter remand, 588
F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 443 U.S. 904 (1979), vacated and re-
manded after remand, 616 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938
(1981).
370. Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506,
508 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1977).
371. The mean score for blacks was 69.72, whereas the mean for whites was
76.59. Only 25.5% of those blacks taking the exam passed, whereas 43.6% of
the whites passed. Id at 510 n.4.
372. Id. at 511-14. The court based this finding on the EEOC guidelines for
validating examinations. Id. at 512 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(a) (1975)).
373. Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 588 F.2d 235,
237-38 (8th Cir. 1978). The district court later revised its order, expressing its
"deep disappointment with the intransigence of all parties and their continued
unwillingness to conscientiously and industriously seek an acceptable proce-
dure for filling the numerous vacancies existing in the position of Fire Cap-
tain." Id. at 238 (quoting district court order).
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ing supervisory ability.3 7 4 One white and one black candidate
would be paired from separate seniority lists, and the candidate
with the highest evaluation would be promoted. 375 The black
plaintiffs opposed this measure because it failed to guarantee
that any black firefighters would be promoted.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit observed that the city had
apparently decided not to appoint anyone to fire captain perma-
nently until a valid nondiscriminatory exam was developed.3 76
The city, however, had made little progress in developing such
an examination,3 77 and the number of black fire captains had
decreased from four to one.3 7 8 Twelve black firefighters had
qualified for promotion based on the discriminatory exam, and
forty-three others had attained the prerequisite five years of
service making them eligible to test for promotion during the
five years since the litigation began. The court of appeals con-
cluded that numerically based preferential treatment was nec-
essary in order to redress the rights of the victims of
discrimination. 379 The court ordered the immediate promotion
of the black firefighters who were qualified, along with, at the
district court's discretion, twelve qualified white candidates. 380
The court also required that, until a valid promotional ex-
amination was developed, assignments to acting fire captain re-
flect a fifty percent black ratio as far as practicable.38 ' Shortly
after the district court's immediately preceding order, the court
noted, the city had started using firehouse seniority as the basis
for selecting acting fire captains.382 Unless a fair percentage of
black firefighters who had suffered such past discrimination
served as acting fire captains, the circuit court held, the past
discrimination would be perpetuated.383
On remand, the district court directed the city to develop a
valid promotional exam by January 1, 1979.384 The city submit-
ted a timely validation report outlining a new examination.38 5
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 240 & n.8.
377. Id. at 240.
378. Id. at 240 & n.7.
379. Id. at 241.
380. Id.
381. Id at 241-42.
382. Id.
383. See id. at 242.
384. Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350,
353 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).
385. 616 F.2d at 353.
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Although the United States expressed some reservations about
the proposed examination, it suggested that the city proceed
with the exam to determine any disparate impact.3 The city
accepted.387 After the administration of the examination, the
mayor, without consulting either the plaintiffs or the city attor-
ney's office, announced the test results and immediately ap-
pointed one new black and twenty-three new white fire
captains.3881 Concerned about the exam's validity,3 9 the United
States secured a temporary restraining order in the district
court blocking further appointments.39 The district court de-
nied preliminary injunctive relief and vacated its restraining or-
der.391 It found that, although the plaintiffs had established a
prima facie case that the exam had a discriminatory impact, the
city had rebutted that case by establishing the validity and job-
relatedness of the examination process.392
The United States and the black firefighters group ap-
pealed. The Eighth Circuit found that the plaintiffs were, con-
trary to the district court's finding, likely to succeed on the
merits of their claim that the exam was discriminatory.393 The
court, for the short term, required that a number of black
firefighters be promoted to fire captain retroactively to the date
of the twenty-four new appointments.3 94 For the longer term,
the court directed that either the city provide further evidence
that the examination was valid or develop a new and valid ex-
amination. 395 The court ordered the immediate promotion of
386. Id.
387. Id-
388. Id- at 354.
389. The city had informed the United States on March 13, 1979, that the
results of the multiple choice portion of the test showed a substantial differ-
ence in the mean scores of blacks and whites. Id. at 353-54.
390. Id- at 354.
391. Id-
392. Id. at 355.
393. See id. at 355-62.
394. See id. at 362. The court determined, as a practical matter, that ap-
pointing eight black fire captains in this manner would be appropriate, bring-
ing the percentage of black fire captains to 16.6%. See id. at 363. It
determined that the assessment center portion of the examination, which
tested supervisory ability using simulation exercises, would come the closest to
comporting with the EEOC validation guidelines and thus would be the fairest
way to select the eight black firefighters. See id. The figure of 16.6% black
fire captains was an important step in bringing the percentage of black fire
captains closer to the percentage of black firefighters in the department. Id.
At that time, 22% of the department's 900 uniformed personnel were black
and 27% of the entry-level firefighters were black. Id. at 363 n.22.
395. See id. at 363.
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thirty firefighters to vacant captain positions and the filling of
the first thirty additional vacancies as soon as they occurred,
using a ratio of promoting one black firefighter for each two
whites promoted.3 96
The program proved to be temporary and successful. St.
Louis now has a valid promotion exam for filling fire captain
vacancies. 397 As of July 1984, approximately twenty-five per-
cent of the department's fire captains were black.398
2. The Supreme Court's Trilogy of Bakke, Weber, and
Fullilove
In each term from 1978 to 1980, the Supreme Court issued
a decision that addressed "reverse discrimination" challenges to
affirmative action programs.399 In these important cases, the
Supreme Court confirmed the basic principles applied by the
Eighth Circuit in the Carter and Firefighters Institute deci-
sions. All of the decisions rejected the "color-blind" interpreta-
tion of the fourteenth amendment and the 1964 Civil Rights
Act advocated in Carter.
396. See id at 364. The court's reasons for filling these vacancies so
promptly were:
1) it was necessary for the efficiency of the fire service that this depart-
ment be at full strength;
2) delays in promoting black firefighters to fire captain would inevitably
affect their opportunity for promotion above the rank of fire captain;
3) "a field of candidates eligible for promotion" existed "because all the
firefighters who completed the assessment center portion of the examination
had met the department's requirement of five years' satisfactory service ('an
average rating of "Adequate" or above on the most recent Service Rating') as a
firefighter or fire prevention inspector" and "all of the persons who took the
assessment center portion of the examination had received a passing grade in
the multiple-choice portion of the examination;"
4) the city had been using firefighters to perform fire captains' duties; and
5) a new examination could be prepared, given, and graded before more
than 30 additional vacancies occurred. Id. at 364.
397. Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, No. 74-OC(1),
slip op. at 8 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 12, 1983) (finding that examination procedure is
content valid pursuant to EEOC guidelines and decisions of the Eighth
Circuit).
398. Statistics gathered from the City of St. Louis Civil Rights Comm'n,
July 1984, by the Office of the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit. Thirty-one of the department's 94 fire captains are black.
Of the 608 total nonprobationary firefighters in the department, 151 are black.
Id.; see also Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, No. 74-
30C(1), slip op. at 5 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 12, 1983).
399. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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In Bakke, the Court decided that the University of Califor-
nia-Davis medical school had not shown that its use of a quota
or absolute preference reserving sixteen slots for minority ap-
plicants was necessary to promote a substantial state interest,' °
but the Court made it clear that racial preferences are permis-
sible if there has been a finding of past discrimination, as op-
posed to a sense of societal discrimination in general.4*0 The
Court in Weber held that Title VII does not prohibit race-con-
scious voluntary affirmative action plans that are developed, for
example, through collective bargaining and are designed to
eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated
job categories.40° In Fullilove, the Court again made it clear
that a "color-blind" jurisprudence was not necessarily the way
to approach questions about remedies for racial discrimination.
The Court upheld Congress's ten percent minority business set-
aside of public works contracts,403 viewing this affirmative ac-
tion program as a legitimate exercise of Congress's power to
spend for the general welfare. The Court noted that, "[a]s a
threshold matter, we reject the contention that in the remedial
context the Congress must act in a wholly 'color-blind' fash-
ion."4°4 Consequently, "[w]here federal anti-discrimination
laws have been violated, an equitable remedy may in the appro-
priate case include a racial or ethnic factor."40 5
Although there is no clear consensus of opinion in the
400. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20.
401. See id. at 307-10. Justice Brennan's concurring and dissenting opinion
put it simply:.
[C]laims that law must be "colorblind" or that the datum of race is no
longer relevant to public policy must be seen as aspiration rather than
as description of reality... . [W]e cannot. . . let color blindness be-
come myopia which masks the reality that many "created equal" have
been treated within our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by
their fellow citizens.
Id at 327 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Blackmun observed:
I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative-ac-
tion program in a racially neutral way and have it successful. To ask
that this be so is to demand the impossible. In order to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way.
And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them
differently.
I&. at 407 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion).
402. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09.
403. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 489-92 (1980).
404. Id at 482.
405. Id- at 483. Also noteworthy in the Chief Justice's opinion in Fullilove
is the candid realization that remedies for past racial discrimination inevitably
involve some kind of burden on nonminority persons. Referring in this case to
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Supreme Court concerning affirmative action, several general
principles are evident from Bakke, Weber, and Fullilove. A
remedy for past racial discrimination may involve racial prefer-
ences if the measure is remedial in purpose. That is, the mea-
sure must be based on a finding of some kind identifying past
racial discrimination more specific than discriminatory condi-
tions in society generally.40 6 The remedy should be properly
tailored to address the past discriminatory practice without un-
necessarily burdening nonminority persons. As a result, no ab-
solute preferences or total exclusions of nonminority persons
are permissible; the remedy should not involve the discharge of
whites to replace them with blacks. 40 7 The remedy also should
be limited in time and flexible in its implementation. The rem-
edy should not maintain a racial balance but eliminate a racial
imbalance. The plan should have a discernible end.408
3. Eighth Circuit Cases in the Post-Bakke Era
a. Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans
The Eighth Circuit has heard several cases in which a dis-
gruntled white employee or applicant has challenged an em-
ployer's voluntary affirmative action plan as unconstitutional
"reverse discrimination." In Setser v. Novack Investment Co.,409
a white male applicant sued under section 1981, alleging that he
had been refused employment due to reverse discrimination. 4 10
The district court entered final judgment for the employer, and
the minority set-aside provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977,
42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1982), he wrote:
It is not a constitutional defect in this program that it may dis-
appoint the expectation of nonminority firms. When effectuating a
limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior dis-
crimination, such a "sharing of the burden" by innocent parties is not
impermissible .... Moreover, although we may assume that the com-
plaining parties are innocent of any discriminatory conduct, it was
within congressional power to act on the assumption that in the past
some nonminority businesses may have reaped competitive benefit
over the years from the virtual exclusion of minority firms from these
contracting opportunities.
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484-85.
406. Id. at 448 U.S. at 486-88; Weber, 443 U.S. at 198-99, 208-09; Bakke, 438
U.S. 307-10.
407. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484-85; Weber, 443 U.S. at 208; Bakke, 438 U.S. at
319-20.
408. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09.
409. 638 F.2d 1137, vacated in part, 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
410. 638 F.2d at 1139. Setser also alleged that he had been refused employ-
ment with Novack Investment in retaliation for his filing a discrimination
charge with the EEOC. See id. at 1139, 1146-47.
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Setser, the applicant, appealed. A -panel of the Eighth Circuit
held that the employer's reliance on its affirmative action plan
was not an absolute bar to Setser's cause of action and re-
manded the case.4 11 Upon rehearing en banc, the court of ap-
peals first clarified that section 1981 does not prohibit race-
conscious affirmative action and that the standards for review-
ing affirmative action plans under Title VII govern the review
of plans under section 1981.412 The court then stated that a
plaintiff in a reverse discrimination suit does not necessarily es-
tablish a prima facie case by satisfying the four-pronged Mc-
Donnell Douglas test 413 because, under Weber, race is a
permissible consideration for an employer acting pursuant to a
bona fide affirmative action plan.414 The employer has the bur-
den of producing evidence that its affirmative action program is
remedial, is in response to a conspicuous racial imbalance in its
workforce, and is reasonably related to the remedial pur-
poses.415 The employee then has the burden of showing that
the affirmative action plan was motivated by something other
than a remedial reason or that the plan unreasonably exceeds
its remedial purposes. 416
The Setser opinion outlines the factors the Eighth Circuit
considers in determining whether affirmative action plans are
permissible under Weber. A plan, the Setser court noted, may
not result in the discharge of white workers and their replace-
ment with new black employees. 417 A plan should also not cre-
ate an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees, nor
be used longer than is necessary to achieve affirmative action
goals.418
411. Id. at 1143-46.
412. Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 965-67 (8th Cir. 1981) (en
banc).
413. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the
Supreme Court set forth the plaintiff's initial burden of proof in establishing a
prima facie case of racial discrimination as follows:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority;, (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (ii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802.
414. Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d at 968-69.
415. Id
416. Id at 969.
417. Id.
418. Id.; see also United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
208 (1979) (stating that affirmative action plan involved does not unnecessarily
trammel the interests of white employees).
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied these same
principles to Valentine v. Smith,419 a case decided the same
day. In Valentine, an applicant for employment at Arkansas
State University (ASU) brought a "reverse discrimination" suit
based on her rejection by the University and the hiring of a
black woman. The court of appeals held that, although Valen-
tine had demonstrated that the motivating factor in rejecting
her was ASU's race-conscious choice pursuant to its affirmative
action plan, this motivation did not offend the fourteenth
amendment, Title VII, or section 1981.420 The ASU plan was
justified by findings of past discrimination by a federal district
court and the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare.421 Further, the plan was substantially related to its reme-
dial objective. ASU set a goal of raising the percentage of black
faculty to five percent within four years by providing that
twenty-five percent of the faculty hired between 1976 and 1979
would be black.422 The Valentine court concluded that the
plan's remedial measures did not endure longer than necessary,
did not stigmatize by hiring unqualified applicants, and did not
unnecessarily burden whites by barring them from faculty posi-
tions or derogating vested rights.4 23
A more difficult situation arises when an affirmative action
plan collides with other rights provided in a collective bargain-
ing agreement.424 In Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Construction Co.,425 a
white male ironworker and union steward challenged his layoff
in part on "reverse discrimination" grounds. The employer was
working on a construction project with the St. Louis Post Of-
fice and was subject to a federal affirmative action plan that set
419. 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1981). Both cases came down July 21, 1981.
420. Id. at 511-12.
421. Id. at 509.
422. Id. at 510.
423. Id. at 510-11. In a parallel case, the court recently upheld Omaha's af-
firmative action plan for its fire department under the Setser criteria. In War-
socki v. City of Omaha, 726 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1984), Warsocki, a white male,
challenged the provision of Omaha's plan requiring that 40% of the applicants
placed on a referral list be members of minority groups or women. The court
of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit, agreeing that the
city both had clearly demonstrated that its affirmative action plan was a reme-
dial response to a conspicuous racial imbalance in its workforce and had made
a sufficient showing that its plan was substantially related to its remedial ob-
jective. Id. at 1360-61.
424. This is the issue addressed recently by the Supreme Court in
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984). See infra
notes 525-27 and accompanying text.
425. 655 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1981).
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goals for certain minority hours of employment in each
trade.4 6 In 1975, the goal for minority ironworkers was 9.0% to
10.4%.4 7 The firm determined that it did not need four iron-
workers on the project, but, to comply with the plan, it needed
to retain one minority ironworker.4 - Sisco, as the union stew-
ard, was entitled under the collective bargaining agreement to
be the last one laid off.4 9 The only black ironworker and the
white foreman were retained, and Sisco was transferred to
other projects and later laid off.430 Sisco sued his employer, al-
leging that his discharge was racially motivated in violation of
Title VII and section 1981.4 3 1 The district court dismissed his
claim, and he appealed.
Applying the standards of Setser, the court of appeals up-
held the firm's action pursuant to the firm's affirmative action
plan.4 32 The firm showed that it had adopted the affirmative
action plan in response to government pressure to remedy the
racial imbalance in the ironworkers' trade, that it had reduced
its workforce for nonracial reasons, and that the plan was care-
fully tailored to its remedial objective.433 The plan was tempo-
rary and flexibly framed in terms of goals of certain
percentages of minority hours worked.43 The plan did not un-
fairly burden Sisco or other whites; he had not been replaced
by a black ironworker. 435 He was transferred to another pro-
ject, and a qualified black worker with more jobsite seniority
was retained in preference to Sisco and another white male.
4 3
b. Court-Imposed Affirmative Action Plans
In addition to approving voluntary affirmative action plans,
the Eighth Circuit has imposed numerically based affirmative
426. Id. at 147. The affirmative action plan was adopted pursuant to Execu-
tive Order No. 13246, which requires nondiscrimination in employment by gov-
ernment contractors and subcontractors (part 11) as well as the presence of
nondiscrimination provisions in federally assisted construction contracts (part
III). See Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339-48 (1964-1965), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 125-33 (1982).
427. Sisco, 655 F.2d at 146.
428. Id at 148.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 149.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id-
436. Id.
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remedies when necessary to redress past discrimination.437 In
Paxton v. Union National Bank,438 the court of appeals re-
versed a district court judgment, finding that black employees
at the bank were not promoted to positions for which they
were qualified and that, when they were promoted, they con-
sistently received lower salary increases than comparable white
employees.4 39 The defendant bank offered little in the way of
explanation.440
The court of appeals directed the bank to adopt objective
promotion criteria, written job descriptions, and guidelines for
the use of supervisory recommendations. 441 It also directed the
district court to give the plaintiffs monetary damages for lost
promotions and to provide for their promotion to the first va-
cancy that occurs for which they would be qualified.442 It noted
that the district court could impose hiring goals if it determined
they were necessary after all parties had been heard on the
issue.443
In Taylor v. Jones,444 the Eighth Circuit approved a court-
imposed numerically based affirmative remedy in a slightly dif-
ferent context. In Taylor, the employer's past discriminatory
conduct was established under an individual disparate treat-
437. In EEOC v. Contour Chair Lounge Co., 596 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1979), the
court of appeals affirmed a district court's order approving and extending a
consent decree that required the employer to "use its best efforts to increase
its Black utilization rate by hiring one Black for each of its new White employ-
ees for the period of this agreement." Id. at 812. The consent decree had been
based on a finding by the EEOC that blacks as a class had been discriminated
against by the defendant and on negotiations between the defendant and the
EEOC in light of this finding. Id. at 816.
438. 688 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'g 519 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Ark. 1981),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1772 (1983).
439. 688 F.2d at 565-66.
440. The court observed:
In those few instances where the bank did attempt to offer specific
nondiscriminatory reasons, the explanations were often inconsistent
and contradictory. If a black person had more education than the
white person receiving a promotion, the bank claimed that it made its
selection on the basis of experience. Conversely, if a black employee
had more experience than the white promoted, the bank claimed that
education was the key to performing that job. And if the black em-
ployee had more experience and a better education, the bank often
simply stated that the white employee was better qualified without
giving a reason for the decision.
Id at 566.
441. Id. at 573.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 574.
444. 653 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1981).
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ment theory rather than under a class action or disparate im-
pact theory. Taylor, a black woman, had been employed with
the Arkansas National Guard, first as a recruiter and then as a
mailroom clerk."5 She resigned and eventually brought suit,
alleging that she had been underclassified, underpaid, denied
transfers and promotions, and subjected to racial epithets and
slurs.446
The district court found the National Guard had intention-
ally discriminated against Taylor." 7 It found that her demotion
from recruiter to mailroom clerk was racially motivated and
that the racial atmosphere existing in the Arkansas National
Guard forced her resignation." 8 It ordered that the plaintiff be
reinstated as a recruiter or given a comparable position with
back pay" 9 and directed the defendant to hire at least one
black person for every two white persons hired until the level
of black employees reached sixteen percent.4 s°
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit upheld the finding of liability
and the remedy.4 51 The court noted that ordering the employer
to hire more blacks was the most effective and perhaps the
only way to eradicate the serious racism pervading the plain-
tiffs workplace. 452 The remedy met the other Setser criteria as
well: it was sufficiently flexible, temporary, and not unfairly
burdensome to whites.45 3
As these cases demonstrate, several consistent themes
emerge from two decades of experience with affirmative reme-
dies for employment discrimination. The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals has, when necessary, approved or directed the use of
numerically based remedies such as goals or ratios. It has not,
however, approved of absolute quotas or preferences and has
relied on less stringent remedies when such alternative reme-
445. Id at 1196-97.
446. Id.
447. See Taylor v. Jones, 489 F. Supp. 498, 500, mod ifed, 495 F. Supp. 1285
(W.D. Ark. 1980), affd in par rev'd in par; 653 F.2d 1183 (8th Cir. 1981).
448. See 489 F. Supp. at 500.
449. See id. at 501.
450. Taylor v. Jones, 495 F. Supp. 1285, 1296 (W.D. Ark. 1980), aff'd in par,
rev'd in par 653 F.2d 1183 (8th Cir. 1981). This level was not unreasonable, as
blacks constituted 16% of the Arkansas population and 23% of the Guard. See
495 F. Supp. at 1293.
451. See Taylor, 653 F.2d at 1198-1205.
452. See id. at 1204-05.
453. Id. at 1204. Although the court emphasized these factors in analyzing
the remedy, it did not specificially cite Setser, which had been decided just a
month before.
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dies are adequate. There are inevitably cases where the inter-
ests of the victims of past discrimination will conflict with the
interests of those who have benefited from past discriminatory
practices. In such instances the Eighth Circuit has consistently
given priority to the interests of the victims.
4. The Success of Affirmative Action
At the same time courts were using affirmative action as a
civil rights tool, the executive and legislative branches initiated
several affirmative action programs of their own. In 1967, the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance stopped relying on inef-
fective nondiscrimination policy statements and began to use
numerical employment goals, timetables, and ratios to remedy
and prevent employment discrimination. 454 After these initia-
tives withstood repeated challenges in the courts,455 the oppo-
nents of affirmative action turned to Congress. During the 1972
debates over comprehensive amendments to Title VII, these op-
ponents proposed several amendments to limit the contract-
compliance program and to eliminate goals and timetables.45 6
The amendments were rejected,457 and Congress ultimately
passed legislation that in fact extended affirmative action to the
454. See, e.g., CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 60, at 43-48 (examples of more
effective plans). The Office of Federal Contract Compliance was established
in 1965 pursuant to Executive Order No. 11246. See Exec. Order No. 11246, 3
C.F.R. 339-48 (1964-1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 125-33 (1982).
455. See, e.g., Rosetti Contracting Co. v. Brennan, 508 F.2d 1039 (7th Cir.
1975); Association of Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altschuler, 490 F.2d 9
(1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); Northeast Constr. Co. v. Rom-
ney, 485 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471
F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442
F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F.
Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970).
456. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 1662 (1972) (amendment offered by Sen. Er-
vin prohibiting federally required "discrimination in reverse" through percent-
ages, goals, ranges, etc.); see also CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 60, at 51-52
(discussing this and other proposed amendments).
457. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 1676 (defeat of Ervin amendment). Instead,
Congress approved an amendment that explicitly approved the actions of the
OFCCP in ordering minority employment goals and timetables, Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 13, 86 Stat. 103, 113
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1982)), and retained the statutory language in
Title VII under which courts had ordered affirmative relief, compare Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 241, 259 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982)) ("the court may . . . order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate") with Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103, 104 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982)) (identical language). See also CITIZENS' COMM'N,
supra note 60, at 52 & n.116 (describing congressional action).
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federal government itself458 and that prohibited discrimination
against the handicapped, disabled veterans, and Vietnam era
veterans.
459
The 1972 amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 also gave the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion the power to bring suit against those practicing racial dis-
crimination. 460 The EEOC and the Justice Department
thereafter sought affirmative action remedies in the courts and
entered into a number of consent decrees aimed at opening em-
ployment opportunities for blacks.46 1 During the 1970's, the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights released studies approving af-
firmative action and documenting employment gains for blacks
in industries adopting affirmative action.462 Congress again ap-
proved affirmative action in the Public Works Employment Act
of 1977, which required that at least ten percent of the funds
458. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§ 11, 86 Stat. 103, 111-12 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (1982)).
459. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-112, tit. V, § 501, 87 Stat. 355,
390-91 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793 (1982)); Vietnam Era Vet-
erans' Readjustment Assistance Acts of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-540, ti. V, § 503,
86 Stat. 1074, 1097-98 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 2012(a) (1982)); Viet-
nam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-508,
tit. IV, § 402, 88 Stat. 1578, 1593 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 2012(a) (1982)).
For a history of preferential policies for veterans in public employment,
see LIBRARY OF CONGRESS REPORT FOR HOUSE COMM. ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS,
84TH CONG., 1sT SEss., THE PROVISION OF FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS
258-65 (Comm. Print No. 171, 1955). The Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, ch.
287, 58 Stat. 387, 387-88 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 2108, 3309, 3310
(1982)), gives a 10% bonus on federal civil service examinations to disabled vet-
erans and a 5% bonus to other veterans and specifies that for certain jobs (for
example, building guard, elevator operator) no nonveteran is to be considered
unless no veterans are available. This is sometimes referred to as "super-
preference."
460. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5,86
Stat. 103, 107 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) to -6(e) (1982)).
461. See, e.g., CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 60, at 59-61.
462. In 1973, the bipartisan U.S. Commission on Civil Rights published its
"Statement on Affirmative Action for Equal Employment Opportunities,"
which indicates:
The necessity for goals and timetables arose out of a long and painful
experience in which lip service was paid by employers who then did
little to correct the situation. It also arose out of the realization that
procedures for assuring equal employment opportunity can accom-
plish little unless they are tied closely to results.
CrIEs' COM'N, supra note 60, at 57-58 (emphasis in original) (quoting
statement). A 1978 Commission report, "Social Indicators of Equality for Mi-
norities and Women," reflected the gains made by minority groups from 1960
to 1976. See CrrIzENS' COMM'N, supra note 60, at 122.
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granted be expended for minority businesses, 463 and in section
310 of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which established a
minority recruitment program for federal employment.464
Affirmative action programs have achieved the opening of
jobs for blacks at other-than-menial levels and the creation of
an appreciable black middle class.465 The percentage of black
families in the middle class increased from only twelve percent
of all black families in 1960 to thirty percent by 1980.466 The
proportion of black professional, technical, and craft workers
grew from eleven percent of all such workers in 1960 to
twenty-one percent in 1980.467 Black police officers and
firefighters grew from less than three percent in 1960 to nearly
nine percent by 1980.468 By 1981, "the ratio of black undergrad-
uate enrollment to black population for the first time [became]
virtually the same as the ratio of white undergraduates to
white population. '469
463. Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, tit. I, § 103,
91 Stat. 116, 116-17 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1982)).
464. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, tit. III, § 310, 92
Stat. 1111, 1152 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7201 (1982)).
465. NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1983, ii-Iii
(1983). In 1984, a comprehensive study of affirmative action concluded:
"While neither a panacea nor a substitute for economic growth, education, job
training and ambition, affirmative action has made significant contributions to
improved occupational status for many minorities and women, a closing of the
gap attributable to discrimination." CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 60, at 122.
Many critics of affirmative action have argued that affirmative action's
role in increasing the number of black families in the middle class is evidence
that affirmative action helps the wrong people. The opposite view is that In-
creasing the number of middle-class blacks is a worthy goal because the "black
middle-class. . . is. . .a bastion of strength and a source of motivation within
Black America." NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, supra, at ii-iii. In 1982, black
middle-class families constituted only 30% of all black families, whereas white
middle class families constituted 56% of white families. Id. at iii.
466. NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, supra note 465, at iii.
467. Rustin, Book Review, ATLANTIC, Oct. 1984, at 122 (reviewing A.
PINKNEY, THE MYTH OF BLACK PROGRESS (1984)).
468. Compare 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1960 CENSUS OF POPULATION,
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION, pt. 1, U.S. Summary, at 1-545 (table
205) (In 1960, of 276,976 police, sheriffs and marshalls, only 9391, or 3.4%, were
black. Of 138,694 firefighters, only 2616, or 1.9%, were black.) with BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULA.
TION 1-101 (table 125) (In 1980, of 583,398 police and firefighters, 46,771, or
8.7%, were black.) In both 1960 and 1980, adult blacks constituted approxi-
mately ten percent of the total United States population. Id. at ch. B, 1-22 (ta-
ble 40). "Affirmative action efforts . . . have particularly targeted police and
fire departments and construction trades in part because of their especially
poor records in employing minorities and women." CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra
note 60, at 127.
469. 1983 Hearings, supra note 172, at 431 (statement of William T. Cole-
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Two studies released in 1983 concluded that blacks made
"greater gains in employment at those establishments con-
tracting with the federal government-and thus subject to the
OFCCP affirmative action requirements-than at non-contrac-
tor companies." 470 Major corporations, including AT&T, IBM,
Sears & Roebuck, and Levi Strauss, reported significant em-
ployment gains for minorities under affirmative action pro-
grams.471 Perhaps of even greater importance is a 1983 survey
on affirmative action. In it, a number of major corporations re-
ported that affirmative action had helped break down racial
stereotypes, improved employee morale, streamlined personnel
policies, and, at some companies, even expanded business.472 A
concerted effort by the courts and administrative agencies to
achieve affirmative action goals has contributed to these suc-
cesses. Affirmative action programs have begun to achieve the
goal of equal opportunities for all.
III. REEXAMINATION AND RETREAT-1981 TO 1985
A. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
From 1954 until 1982, the executive branch generally sup-
ported the decisions of the Supreme Court and the courts of ap-
peals calling for desegregation. 473 The Department of Justice
joined black plaintiffs as a party474 and as amicus curiae 47 5 in
man, Jr., chairman, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., dated
June 11, 1981).
470. CrTIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 60, at 123 (unpublished OFCCP study);
id. at 124-25 (study submitted to Department of Labor by Professor Jonathan
Leonard of the University of California at Berkeley entitled "The Impact of
Affirmative Action").
471. Id- at 126-29.
472. Id. at 130, 140-46. Some companies, however, pointed out that govern-
ment administrators of affirmative action programs sometimes place form over
substance by being overly concerned with procedural detail. Id. at 137-38.
This is a legitimate concern, and measures should be taken to improve the ad-
ministraton of affirmative action. This is not, however, a reason for abolishing
affirmative action.
473. See U.S. COMW'N ON CRVIL RIGHrS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROtWN 15-
29 (1977) [hereinafter cited as TWENTY YEARs AFTER BROi].
474. See ag., Liddell v. Board of Educ., 677 F.2d 626 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 877 (1982); United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975). Beginning in the early 1970's, the Jus-
tice Department initiated "statewide" school desegregation litigation in Geor-
gia, Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Because of this
statewide approach, more districts were desegregated in this period than in
any other. Norman, The Strange Career of the Civil Rights Division's Com-
mitment to Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 983, 987 & n.17 (1984).
475. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971);
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suing to desegregate the elementary and secondary schools and
in requesting that involuntary busing be used to achieve inte-
gration. In addition, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare developed effective guidelines for desegregation, 476 and
the Civil Rights Commission consistently supported a wide
range of remedies.477
Until 1981, the United States Congress also supported
school desegregation. Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provided technical assistance for schools seeking to develop or
implement desegregation plans 478 and authorized the Depart-
ment of Justice to initiate or join in litigation to desegregate of-
fending school districts.479 Title VI of that Act allowed the
executive to terminate federal aid to school districts that con-
tinued to operate segregated schools. 48 0  In 1972, Congress
adopted the Emergency School Aid Act48 ' as Title VII of the
Education Amendments of 1972.432 By 1981, $512 milhon was
available for this program.48 3
With a new administration in 1980 came new policies. The
Department of Justice stated that it would no longer ask for or
support desegregation decrees that called for involuntary bus-
ing to achieve desegregation. 48 4 The President, the Vice Presi-
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
476. TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN, supra note 473, at 34-35.
477. Id. at 173-74.
478. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. IV, § 403, 78 Stat. 241,
247 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2 (1982)).
479. Id. at § 407, 78 Stat. at 248 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6
(1982)).
480. See id. at tit. VI, §§ 602-605, 78 Stat. at 252-53 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1982)); TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN, supra note 473, at
34. In 1964, 98% of all black children in 11 southern states still attended all-
black schools. Title VI changed this. By 1972, fewer than 9% of the black chil-
dren in these states remained in all-black schools. CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS11IP
CONFERENCE FUND, AN OATH BETRAYED: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S
CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT RECORD IN EDUCATION iii (1983).
481. Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. VII, 86 Stat. 235, 354 (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1619 (1976)), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-561, tit. VI, § 601(b)(2),
92 Stat. 2143, 2268 (effective 1979).
482. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (codified as amended at scattered sec-
tions of U.S.C.).
483. To Reinstate the Emergency School Aid Act: Hearing on H.R. 2207
Before the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Education of
the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1983),
(Statement of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan) [hereinafter cited as Hear-
ings on H.R. 2207].
484. Court-Ordered School Busing: Hearings on S. 528. S. 1005, S. 1147, S.
1647, S. 1743, and S. 1760, Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the
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dent, and the Secretary of Education concurred with this policy.
In 1982, the Department of Justice supported the constitution-
ality of a state initiative that would have nullified the effect of
a voluntary desegregation plan in Seattle, Washington. The
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 592-93 (testimony of Wil-
liam Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division,
Department of Justice) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Court.Ordered School
Busing]. Assistant Attorney General Reynolds statech
[Tihe Department will henceforth, on a finding by a court of de jure
racial segregation, seek a desegregation remedy that emphasizes the
following three components, rather than court-ordered busing: one,
removal of all State-enforced racial barriers to open access to public
schools; two, insurance that all students--white, black, Hispanic, or of
any other ethnic origin-are provided equal opportunities to obtain an
education of comparable quality; and, three, eradication to the fullest
extent practicable of the remaining vestiges of the prior dual systems.
[Tihe Department will thoroughly investigate the back-
ground of every racially identifiable school in a district to determine
whether the racial segregation is de jure or de facto.
In deciding to initiate litigation, we will not make use of the
Keyes presumption but will define the violation precisely and seek to
limit the remedy only to those schools in which racial imbalance is
the product of intentionally segregative acts of State officials.
All aspects of practicability, such as disruption to the education
process, community acceptance, and student safety, will be weighed in
designing a desegregation remedy.
. S]ome desegregation approaches that seem to hold promise
for success include voluntary student transfer programs, magnet
schools, enhanced curriculum requirements, faculty incentives, in-ser-
vice training programs for teachers and administrators, school clos-
ings in systems with excess capacity and new construction in systems
that are overcrowded, and modest adjustments to attendance zones.
. We do not contemplate routinely reopening decrees that
have proved effective in practice.
On the other hand, some school districts may have been success-
ful in their efforts to dismantle the dual systems of an earlier age.
Others might be able to demonstrate that circumstances within the
system have changed to such a degree that continued adherence to a
forced busing remedy would serve no desegregative purpose.
There is another dimension to the administration's current school
desegregation policy that deserves mention. Apart from the issue of
unconstitutional pupil assignments, experience has taught that identi-
fiably black schools sometimes receive inferior educational attention.
Whatever the ultimate racial composition in the classroom, the
constitutional guarantee of equal educational opportunity prohibits
school officials from intentionally depriving any student, on the basis
of race, color, or ethnic origin, of an equal opportunity to receive an
education comparable in quality to that being received by other stu-
dents in the school district.
1d. at 592-93.
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Supreme Court subsequently held that the initiative violated
the equal protection clause, despite the administration's support
for the measure. 48 5 The Department of Justice also filed a brief
in the twenty-eight-year-old Nashville, Tennessee, case with
the United States Supreme Court, joining the effort of the
school board to limit busing that had been approved by the
Sixth Circuit.48 6
With urging from the Administration, the Congress in 1981
folded the Emergency School Aid Program into the Block
Grant Program for Elementary and Secondary Schools, 487 re-
sulting in a dramatic cut in federal funds available to assist in
desegregation. 48 8 Each house of Congress has from time to
time voted against "forced busing" to achieve racial balance in
schools. In addition, with the support of the Justice Depart-
ment, legislation was introduced in both houses of Congress to
restrict the power of federal courts to require busing. The leg-
islation passed in the Senate but failed in the House.48 9
485. See Memorandum for the United States at 5-6, Washington v. Seattle
School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
486. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners
(on petition for writ of certiorari from United States Supreme Court), Kelly v.
Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 687 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 834 (1983).
487. Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-35, ch. 2, 95 Stat. 463, 469-80 (codified at scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
488. Hearings on H.R. 2207, supra note 483, at 44-45. St. Louis, Missouri,
and Kansas City, Missouri, lost $7 million and $3.2 million in aid respectively
as a result of this change. Id. at 115, 116.
489. The restriction was contained in an amendment to S. 951, a bill au-
thorizing appropriations for the Department of Education for fiscal year 1982.
The amendment was based on legislation entitled, "The Neighborhood School
Act of 1982." It limited the extent to which federal courts may order the
transportation of schoolchildren to schools other than those nearest their
home, and it provided that the Department of Justice shall not bring or main-
tain an action to require the transportation of students other than to the
school nearest the student's home, except students requiring special education
because of a handicap. Limitations on Court-Ordered Busing-Neighborhood
School Act: Hearings on S. 951 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 124-70 (1982) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on S. 951].
The Justice Department generally supported those sections of the bill limiting
the jurisdiction of lower federal courts and argued that they were constitu-
tional. It objected to the limitations on its authority as being unnecessary. Id.
at 121-28 (letter from Attorney General William French Smith). The bill was
opposed by three former United States Attorneys General: Elliot Richardson,
id at 74-80, Benjamin R. Civiletti, id. at 80-85, and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach,
id. at 85-86, and by David R. Brink, president of the American Bar Association,
id. at 94-104. All questioned the act's constitutionality and opposed it on policy
grounds.
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A close analysis of this antibusing movement shows that it
is premised- on faulty reasoning and inconclusive facts.
Although public opinion polls suggest that both blacks and
whites oppose involuntary busing of students to achieve deseg-
regation,490 the question is typically framed as whether the re-
spondent favors or opposes busing, in general, to achieve racial
balance. When the parents of children who are bused for de-
segregation are polled, their views are far more positive about
busing.491 Moreover, there is general agreement that involun-
tary busing to achieve the integration of public schools in the
rural South is in the public interest. Before desegregation, ru-
ral communities often had two small schools, one black and one
white, and two separate busing systems, one black and one
white, with the buses for each system going down the same
roads. Most districts now have unitary schools and transporta-
tion systems. United States District Judge James B. McMillan
aptly observed: "The bus was the vehicle by which schools
were originally segregated .... If you had not had the school
bus, the segregated school system could not have been built."492
Although busing is expensive, fifty-five percent of all pub-
lic school students in the United States are regularly bused to
and from school. Students are bused because many states have
found that it is less expensive and more efficient to build con-
solidated schools than to maintain smaller schools in every ru-
ral township or community. Less than seven percent of
students who are bused (and less than three percent of all pub-
lic school students) are bused to achieve desegregation, and less
than two-tenths of one percent of the money spent for public
elementary and secondary education is spent on busing stu-
dents to achieve integration.493
The allegations that involuntary busing is unsafe and that
it endangers the health of children by keeping them on the
highways for long hours is unsupported by evidence. The me-
dian travel time for students who are bused is less than fifteen
minutes, and only fifteen percent of bused children travel more
than thirty minutes.494 Busing to achieve integration is every
bit as safe as busing to achieve economy and efficiency. In
490. House Hearings on S. 951, supra note 489, at 31.
491. HR. REP. No. 12, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
House Report on Desegregation].
492. Hearings on Court-Ordered School Busing, supra note 484, at 514 (tes-
timony of Judge James B. McMillan).
493. House Hearings on S. 951, supra note 489, at 172; see supra note 234.
494. House Hearings on S. 951, supra note 489, at 172.
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either case, children will spend the same time each day riding
the bus. Moreover, it is safer for children to ride to school on a
bus than it is to walk.495
Many contend that the money used to bus students to
achieve desegregation should be used to improve the quality of
education in the school system. This is an appealing argument,
because the quality of schools needs improvement. Unfortu-
nately, school systems that have had decades to improve black
schools have failed to do so. Moreover, review of budgetary
data confirms that less money was spent on all-black schools
than on those that had majority white student populations. 49
Most importantly, spending additional money to improve the
quality of black education may meet as much resistance as bus-
ing. No unit of government is willing to assume the responsi-
bility to raise the additional funds required. On the federal
level, the present Department of Justice believes that enhanced
quality is a good idea but believes that state and local govern-
ments should bear the financial burden.497 State governments
495. Hearings on Court-Ordered School Busing, supra note 484, at 515.
496. See H. BOND, supra note 9, at 152-56 (noting that from 1871 to 1933, at
least two former slave states, Alabama and North Carolina, spent two to six
times as much on white schools as on black schools).
497. Assistant Attorney General Reynolds testified before the House Judi-
ciary Committee:
Mr. Edwards .... We want to go back for a moment to desegregation
plans. You state, Mr. Reynolds, that your desegregation plans are an
approach-I am using your own words now-that:
Emphasize the voluntary desegregation tools with particular
attention to upgrading the educational environment in those ar-
eas of the school system that have received less than adequate at-
tention by State and local authorities.
Correct?
Mr. Reynolds. That is correct.
Mr. Edwards. Now, tell us how you are going to achieve this upgrad-
ng. Have you commissioned studies on this? Are you going to put
Federal money into State and local schools? Is that your recommen-
dation to President Reagan?
Mr. Reynolds. Well, the exact manner in which the particular reme-
dial package will evolve in any particular case I guess will depend in
large part on the particular case. We are working with the Depart-
ment of Education now in that particular area, studying the whole
question of disparity of education and the kind of considerations that
one takes into account and what would be the effective means of ef-
fectuating a remedy.
I would expect that State and local funds would certainly be a
large element of that particular package, rather than Federal funding.
Authorization Request for the Civil Rights Div. of the Dept. of Justice: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 312 (1982) (exchange between
Rep. Edwards and Asst. Atty. Gen. William Bradford Reynolds).
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argue that they should not be required to spend substantial
state funds to integrate local schools but should be allowed to
concentrate their "limited" funds on state-wide educational
programs.498 Local boards of education justifiably argue that
they lack the necessary money because of stringent limitations
on their ability to raise taxes and because white citizens are un-
willing to vote funds to improve black schools. 499
Some black parents also urge the improvement of black
schools in preference to the integration of school systems.-'M
To them, control of the schools appears to be perhaps a more
important goal than desegregation. They argue that remedies
that strive to achieve racial balance should be abandoned be-
cause progress under Brown has been slow and because all-
black schools promote racial pride.501 Their argument is also
suspiciously appealing, however, to white separatists who wish
to overturn the Brown decision.
Certainly parental involvement, power, and control over
the education of their children is as important to black parents
as it is to white parents. But, as the historical analysis of this
Article has shown, black empowerment does not occur through
segregation. Democracy and equality of opportunity can only
exist in an integrated society.
Still others argue that busing has led to increased racial
isolation. There is no factual basis for this argument. Many
more children are attending integrated schools today than at-
tended them before courts approved busing as a necessary
desegregative tool. There are, to be sure, some white parents
who are so opposed to having their children attend a school
with a significant black population that they will send their
children to private schools or move from the city to a white
suburban district. But white flight occurs regardless of
whether the city has a significant black population. Two such
examples can be found in Minnesota: the populations of St.
Paul and Minneapolis, both over ninety percent white, have de-
498. Brief for the State of Missouri at pp. 14-15, Liddell VI.
499. With the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the St. Louis school
case, however, the State of Missouri is now funding a substantial portion of the
desegregation plan. See Liddell v. State of Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1323 n.21
(8th Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 82 (1984). In the last 24 years, St. Louis vot-
ers defeated 13 bond issues. 731 F.2d at 1318.
500. See Brief for the North St. Louis Parents and Citizens for Quality Ed-
ucation passim, Liddell VII.
501. See Bell, A Reassessment of Racial Remedies, 62 PHI DELTA KAPPAN
177, 177-79 (1980).
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clined by more than thirty percent in the last twenty years. 50 2
White flight also occurs in cities with large black populations,
and it occurs long before busing to achieve school integration is
seriously considered,50 3 as it did in Chicago, Illinois. 50 4 More
parents may flee when faced with a plan that calls for their
children to attend largely black schools outside of their neigh-
borhoods, but it cannot be said with confidence that a large part
of white flight is attributable to desegregation.
What is certain is that courts cannot be faithful to the Con-
stitution yet refuse to desegregate schools simply because some
white parents object to their children either attending school
with black children or being bused out of their neighborhoods
to a school with a significant black population.505 The Eighth
Circuit has, where possible, tailored desegregation plans to pre-
serve already integrated neighborhood schools.50 Such consid-
erations, however, cannot outweigh the dictates of the
Constitution.
Opponents of busing argue that court-ordered busing has
failed to improve the test scores of black students in integrated
schools. They contend that busing therefore has not worked.
Supporters dispute both this premise and its conclusion. Sup-
porters and opponents alike have developed reams of statistics
to support their respective views. A review of the studies indi-
cates that the test scores of slightly over half of the black stu-
dents do improve, particularly for students who enter
integrated schools at an early age. The test scores of white stu-
dents attending these schools are not adversely affected.50 7
502. Compare BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 730
(1983) with BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 388 (1956).
Population declined in St. Paul from 311,349 to 270,230 and in Minneapolis
from 521,718 to 370,951 between 1950 and 1980.
503. House Report on Desegregation, supra note 491, at 16-17.
504. Compare BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 700
(1983) (Chicago population makeup) with BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY
AND CITY DATA BOOK 372 (1956) (same). From 1950 to 1980, Chicago's total
population declined from 3,620,962 to 3,005,072, and its nonwhite population
grew from 14.1% to 49.67% of the general population. This trend had already
begun before desegregation remedies were common; by 1960, the total popula-
tion had declined to 3,550,404 and nonwhite population had risen to 23.6%. See
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 484 (1967).
505. See supra text accompanying notes 187-205.
506. See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1296 (8th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); United States v. School Dist. of Omaha,
521 F.2d 530, 546-47 (8th Cir. 1975); Clark v. Board of Educ., 449 F.2d 439, 499
(8th Cir. 1971) (en banc).
507. House Report on Desegregation, supra note 491, at 10-13.
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Students who attend integrated schools are also more likely to
attend integrated colleges and thereafter to find jobs with com-
panies that employ both black and white workers.5° s Indeed,
students who attend integrated elementary and secondary
schools and who go directly into the work force are more likely
to obtain jobs, because they have a greater perception of control
over their own lives, than those who have attended a segre-
gated school for most of their lives509 The graduates of inte-
grated schools are also more likely to find jobs with firms that
employ both black and white workers.5 10
As a very recent summary of studies by the Center for So-
cial Organization of Schools, Johns Hopkins University, notes:
An old argument, which has recently resurfaced, suggests that
separate-but-equal is as good for the society as integrated-and-equal.
Where the schools are concerned, at least, that argument is wrong.
The perpetuation of segregation from childhood into adulthood
might not be economically and socially harmful in a society in which
minority-owned institutions provided ample opportunities for eco-
nomic and social success. But U.S. society does not provide such op-
portunities. Therefore, segregation is harmful, because most
minority-group members must find their ways into desegregated insti-
tutions if they are to achieve success as adults.51 1
B. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EMPLOYMENT
The current retreat in desegregation policy is not limited to
education. Since January of 1981, several factors have also lim-
ited the scope of affirmative action in the employment field.
Implementation of comprehensive revisions to the Contract
Compliance Program prepared by the Carter Administration
has been suspended.51 In addition, proposed revisions of ex-
isting rules would relieve seventy-five percent of all contractors
(those employing less than one hundred persons) from the re-
quirement of preparing written affirmative action plans and re-
lieve others from routine compliance reviews.5 13 To date,
508. Id. at 13-14 (quoting testimony of Dr. James McPartland).
509. Id. at 14 (quoting testimony of Dr. McPartland).
510. Id. at 13-14 (quoting testimony of Dr. McPartland).
511. Braddock, Crain & McPartland, A Long-Term View of School Desegre-
gation: Some Recent Studies of Graduates as Adults, PHi DELTA KAPPAN, Dec.
1984, at 259, 262-63.
512. CrIIZNS' COMM'N, supra note 60, at 90; see also 47 Fed. Reg. 17,770
(Apr. 23, 1982) (proposing new changes for the program); 46 Fed. Reg. 42,968
(Aug. 25, 1981) (same).
513. 1983 Hearings, supra note 172, at 4-7 (statement of Robert B. Collyer,
Deputy Under Secretary for Employment Standards, U.S. Dept. of Labor);
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however, the OFCCP continues to insist that employers estab-
lish numerical goals and timetables for bringing blacks and
other minorities into the workforce.
5 14
The Labor Department has decided that it will no longer
seek pro rata backpay in discrimination actions but instead will
require identification of the injured employees or applicants
before back pay may be awarded. 515 It also plans to limit the
period for which it will seek backpay to two years.5 16 For the
first time since the early 1960's, the department will permit
some contractors to monitor their own compliance. 51 7 It has
also limited the ability of investigators to make on-site compli-
ance reviews. 518 The net result of these actions has been to sig-
nificantly reduce the back and front pay awarded to successful
claimants.5 19
The Department of Justice has also substantially changed
its policies on employment discrimination. It has announced
that it will no longer support or accept prospective hiring or
promotion goals or ratios that may benefit individuals who are
not identifiable victims of discrimination. 520 The department
CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 60, at 91 & n.235 (citing OFFICE OF FEDERAL
CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, PRELIMINARY REGULATORY IMPACT ANAL-
YSIS ON PROPOSED OFCCP REGULATIONS 21-22 (1981)).
514. 1983 Hearings, supra note 172, at 32.
515. CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 60, at 93 n.241 (citing OFCCP Order
760al (Mar. 10, 1983)); 1983 Hearings, supra note 172, at 5, 59, 65.
516. CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 60, at 93 n.241 (citing OFCCP Order
760al at 13 (Mar. 10, 1983)).
517. 1983 Hearings, supra note 172, at 7, 24 (statements of Robert B.
Collyer).
518. CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 60, at 93-94 n.244 (citing letter from
Robert B. Collyer to Subcomm. on Labor, Health, and Human Services, Educa-
tion and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, Mar. 17,
1983).
519. In fiscal year 1980, 476 employees classified as minorities received
$959,000 in backpay; in fiscal year 1981, 872 minority employees received
$948,000 in backpay; and in fiscal year 1982, 26 minority employees received
$74,000 in backpay. In 1980, five firms were disbarred; in 1982, none were.
1983 Hearings, supra note 172, at 45.
520. CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 60, at 99; Oversight Hearings on Equal
Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action, Part 1: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Educa-
tion and Labor, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 134 (1981) [hereinafter cited 1981 Hear-
ings].
The Department defined its new policy as follows: "[O]ur approach will
emphasize a three-pronged remedial formula consisting of: One, specific af-
firmative relief for identifiable victims of discrimination; two, increased re-
cruitment efforts aimed at the group previously disadvantaged; and three,
colorblind as well as sex-neutral nondiscriminatory future hiring and promo-
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has also sought reconsideration of goal or quota relief in judi-
cial proceedings521 and has refused to submit goals and time-
tables to the EEOC as part of its own internal affirmative ac-
tion plan.5 22
The newly constituted United States Commission on Civil
Rights has followed the lead of the Justice Department in re-
jecting numerically-based remedies. In its January 16, 1984,
statement on quotas regarding the Detroit Police Department,
it stated that ratio relief
benefits nonvictims as well as victims of past illegal discrimination
... in derogation of the rights of innocent third parties, solely be-
cause of their race. Such racial preferences merely constitute another
tion practices." 1d. at 138-39. The Justice Department explained in greater
detail:
The Department is firm in its resolve to seek, in suits under title
VII and similar statutes, affirmative remedies such as backpay, retro-
active seniority, reinstatement, and hiring and promotional priorities,
to insure that any individual suffering employment discrimination on
account of race or sex be placed in the position that he or she would
have attained in the absence of such discrimination.
In some circumstances, the granting of such relief will serve to
advance individual victims into seniority positions, or onto career lad-
ders, in preference to incumbent white or male employees shown to
have been improperly favored. Similarly, appropriate relief should
and will be sought for those qualified individuals shown to have been
discouraged from seeking positions because of past practices of unlaw-
ful discrimination on the part of the employer.
[Tihe Department will continue to seek injunctive relief directing
the employer to make employment decisions on a nondiscriminatory
race-neutral and sex-neutral basis. To insure that the injunction is
followed, we will require as part of the remedy that the employer
make special efforts to reach minority or female workers through
comprehensive use of employment recruitment techniques, such as
media advertising and visiting high school and college campuses.
Where appropriate, we will seek percentage recruitment goals for
monitoring purposes. Such recruitment goals will serve as a trigger-
ing mechanism for Department inquiry into whether the employer
has complied with the injunctive command to end its discriminatory
practices. These recruitment goals will be related to the percentage of
minority or female applicants that might be expected to result under
a nondiscriminatory employment policy, after job-related factors, such
as age, education and work experience among various applicants are
taken into account. When combined with fair and nondiscriminatory
selection procedures, they should be sufficient to correct the effects of
past discriminatory practices.
Id. at 138 (emphasis added).
521. See, eg., Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1557 (5th Cir.
1984); Bratton v. City of Detroit, 712 F.2d 222, 223 n.1, vacating, remanding,
denying rehg, and denying reh'g en banc, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983). cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 703 (1984).
522. Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1984, at D1, col. 6 & D10, col. 1.
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form of unjustified discrimination, create a new class of victims, and,
when used in public employment, offend the Constitutional principle
of equal protection of the law for all citizens.
52 3
The EEOC, to this point, has resisted the attempts of the
Departments of Justice and Labor to reverse current affirma-
tive action policies. It has continued to endorse affirmative ac-
tion remedies and to seek affirmative action relief, including
hiring goals, in its own enforcement policies. The Commission's
effectiveness has been adversely affected, however, by staff and
budget cuts. 524
Changes have come from the judicial branch as well. In
June 1984 the Supreme Court held in Firefighters Local Union
No. 1784 v. Stotts525 that a district court could not enforce or
modify a Title VII consent decree by altering a city fire depart-
ment's seniority system for determining which employees must
be laid off due to budgetary shortfalls. 526 Significantly, the
Court noted that a trial court has the authority to award com-
petitive seniority or to otherwise disregard a seniority system
only when individual members of the plaintiff class prove that
they were "actual victims of the discriminatory practice. '527
The precise impact of the Stotts decision on the legal stand-
523. CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 60, at 119 (quoting U.S. Comm'n on
Civil Rights, Jan. 4, 1984, Statement at 1).
524. CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 60, at 97-98.
525. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984), rev'g 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982).
526. A 1980 consent decree had settled a Title VII class action suit concern-
ing hiring and promotions in the Memphis Fire Department and established
goals and timetables. The decree did not contain an admission of past discrimi-
nation by the city. It did not provide for layoffs, nor did it award any competi-
tive or compensatory seniority to minority employees. See id. at 2581.
In May 1984, the city of Memphis laid off some nonessential personnel,
based on its "last hired, first fired" rule. The district court enjoined the city
from applying its seniority policy insofar as it would reduce the number of
black employees. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Stotts
v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
The Supreme Court held that the district court's injunction was erroneous
and reversed, finding that the injunction did not merely enforce the consent
decree because the decree did not provide, as the injunction had, for displacing
whites with seniority over blacks. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,
104 S. Ct. 2576, 2585-90 (1984). Moreover, the injunction was not a proper mod-
ification of the decree. The injunction conflicted with § 703(h) of Title VII,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-e(h) (1982), which permits an employer to use a
bona fide seniority system so long as there is no proof of intent to discrimi-
nate. The district court itself found that the city's layoff plan was not adopted
with a discriminatory purpose or intent. The Court held that the district court
did not have the authority to override the department's seniority policy by vir-
tue of its remedial powers under Title VII. See Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2590.
527. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2586-88.
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ing of affirmative action is unclear. Shortly after the Supreme
Court decided Stotts, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that class-wide relief is
permissible under Title VII, stating that "[i]f effective relief for
the victims of discrimination necessarily entails the risk that a
few nonvictims might also benefit from the relief, then the em-
ployer, as a proven discriminator, must bear that risk."52
Although the court found promotion goals and timetables inap-
propriate in that particular case, it approved class-wide goals
and timetables in principle. The court observed that "[e]very
federal Court of Appeals in this nation has approved remedial
use of goals and timetables without requiring that each and
every potentially eligible person be shown to have been a vic-
tim of discrimination. 5 29 Several other circuits have similarly
distinguished Stotts when reviewing affirmative action plans.,30
In addition, several weeks after Stotts, a federal district
court in the Eastern District of Michigan held that police de-
partment layoffs by the city of Detroit pursuant to its seniority
system violated the city's affirmative action obligation under
the fourteenth amendment, Stotts notwithstanding.5' The dis-
trict court emphasized that Stotts involved Title VII and its pro-
vision protecting bona fide seniority systems, whereas the case
before the district court involved the fourteenth amendment,
which has no such provision. Further, the court noted, there
was no admission of liability for past discrimination in Stotts,
528. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
529. Id. at 1293 & n.40 (citing Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 294 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Chisholm v. U.S. Postal Service, 665 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1981); United
States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1981); Association Against
Discrimination in Employment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256 (2d
Cir.), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1981); United States v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979); James v. Stockham Valves & Fit-
tings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); United
States v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 5, 538 F.2d 1012
(3d Cir. 1976); Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir.
1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479
F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544
(9th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); United States v. International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970)).
530. See, eg., Van Aken v. Young, No. 82-1570 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 1984); Bos-
ton Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, No. 81-1642 (1st Cir. Dec. 7, 1984); Wy-
gant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1157-58 (6th Cir. 1984); Kromnick
v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 739 F.2d 894, 911 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53
U.S.L.W. 3483 (1985).
531. NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 53 U.S.L.W. 2065 (E.D. Mich.
July 25, 1984).
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whereas the city of Detroit's liability had already been adjudi-
cated. In contrast, however, several other federal district courts
have vacated and remanded consent decrees providing layoff
protection to minority employees. 532
Experience in this circuit indicates that the changes in ad-
ministrative policies since 1981 will significantly slow the ef-
forts to bring more qualified blacks into the work force and
will retard the promotion of those already employed. The deci-
sion of the Department of Justice to forgo the use of hiring or
promotion goals or ratios where past discrimination has been
shown will have, perhaps, the greatest impact on the achieve-
ment of equal employment opportunities for blacks. This will
be particularly true if the Department successfully intervenes
in private actions where goal or ratio relief is sought.
532. E.g., Vulcan Pioneers, Inc. v. New Jersey Dept. of Civil Service, 588 F.
Supp. 732 (D. N.J. 1984); United States v. City of Cincinnati, 35 FAIR EMPLOY.
MENT PRAC. CASES 676 (S.D. Ohio July 3, 1984); see also Boston Firefighters
Union v. Boston Chapter NAACP, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 3576 (1984) (mem.) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting from grant of certiorari, vacation of judgment, and re-
mand).
The new Civil Rights Commission has issued a statement, with two Com-
missioners dissenting, approving the Stotts decision. Statement of the United
States Comm'n on Civil Rights concerning Firefighters v. Stotts (July 11,
1984). The statement reversed the Commission's previous position concerning
layoffs and affirmative action:
The Commission disagrees with the reasoning that would allow rigid
adherence to the policy of layoffs by seniority ... when such a policy
has disparate effect on minorities or women and freezes past discrimi-
nation. Such a policy must not be allowed to stand in the way of the
entire thrust of this Nation's efforts to improve equal employment op-
portunity for all Americans ....
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LAST HIRED, FIRST FIRED: LAYOFFS AND CIViI.
RIGHTS 61-62 (1977). The new Commission praised the Supreme Court's deci-
sion, saying it "not only preserved the validity of bona fide seniority systems
but also vindicated the important, general principle that rights inhere in indi-
viduals, not in groups." Statement of the United States Comm'n on Civil
Rights concerning Fire fighters v. Stotts at 1 (July 11, 1984). Commissioners
Ramirez and Berry issued a strong dissent, stating:
Civil rights laws were not passed to give civil rights protection to
all Americans, as the majority of this Commission seems to believe.
Instead, they were passed out of a recognition that some Americans
already had protection because they belonged to a favored group; and
others, including blacks, Hispanics, and women of all races did not be-
cause they belonged to disfavored groups. If we are ever to achieve
... real equality of opportunity . . . we must not deny our history
and present condition substituting illusion for reality.
Statement of Commissioners Ramirez and Berry on the Hishon and Stotts De-
cisions 1-2 (undated) (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 69:735
CIVIL RIGHTS
CONCLUSION
The black citizens of this circuit have survived 146 years of
slavery, four years of civil war, nine years of reconstruction,
and eighty years of separate and unequal treatment. They have
lived in segregated neighborhoods, educated their children in
poorly financed segregated schools, and found jobs whenever
and wherever they could. In 1954, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that blacks could not achieve equality in such a separate
society. Thereafter, six presidents and both houses of Congress
have joined the Court in a firm, consistent effort to bring equal-
ity of opportunity to blacks in education and employment.
The lessons of the 1950's and 1960's confirmed the need for
affirmative action. Governmental institutions met the chal-
lenge and, despite hostile public opinion, developed techniques,
including busing, to desegregate public schools, and used time-
tables, goals, and ratios to integrate public and private work-
places. As a result, many black children now receive a better
education, and black Americans now work in nearly every oc-
cupation, trade, and profession.
Now, as after Reconstruction, reaction has set in and oppo-
nents seek to end the affirmative action and desegregation that
promote an integrated society. Some of these reactionaries rely
on abstract, "neutral" concepts such as color blindness and indi-
vidual merit. Others cite the costs and administrative burdens
of desegregation, and still others appeal to the fears and appre-
hensions of those who feel threatened by the emergence of
blacks into the mainstream of American society. None of these
positions is true to the American constitutional ideals or to
America's historical experience.
To break the cycle of repression, America must renew its
commitment to full equality for all citizens. Victims of racial
injustice cannot be shunted aside for another generation while
the country debates the practical limitations of desegregation
and affirmative action. Equality of opportunity must be estab-
lished in the nation's schools, where children learn together
and where today's equal educational opportunity can assure to-
morrow's equal occupational opportunity.
Even more importantly, America must realize that purging
the taint of racism requires more than color blindness and race
neutrality in a free market. Color-blind remedies are also blind
to the historical fact that the law sanctioned racial oppression
for centuries. Because blacks suffered and whites prospered as
classes, any realistic remedy must also be class-based. Without
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these realizations, America must be prepared to endure the tur-
bulent discord that has disrupted the country in the past and
presently disrupts other separatist societies of the world. South
Africa, Northern Ireland, and Lebanon provide vivid reminders
that inequality of opportunity, violence, and bloodshed are the
inevitable products of a separatist society. America must reject
out of hand any policies that tend to separate the races.
If this country maintains its commitment to equal opportu-
nity, a time will come when the need for affirmative action will
disappear. This time will come when blacks and whites have
substantial equality in wages, employment rates, housing condi-
tions and opportunities, admissions to colleges and professional
schools, and membership in trade organizations and unions;
when minority groups are substantially represented in corpo-
rate board rooms, banks, the guiding bodies of the major polit-
ical parties, Congress, and state legislatures. This time will
come when there is racial parity in the positions where basic
economic and political decisions are made.
